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Abstract 
 
In Albany, the Court of Justice of the European Union held that collective agreements are 
exempt from the application of EU competition law such an agreement is (i) concluded 
between management and labour, or their representatives; and (ii) aimed at improving 
working terms and conditions.    Subjecting collective agreements to competition law would, 
the Court argued, seriously undermine the social policy objective contained in collective 
agreements.  This thesis examines whether we need to examine collective agreements from 
the scope of EU competition law.  It concludes that, for reasons of legal certainty and 
predictability, the Albany exemption is necessary. 
 
This thesis does the following.  First, the thesis establishes that a trade union is an undertaking 
under EU competition law when engaged in collective bargaining.  As such, EU competition 
law applies to collective agreements.  This conclusion contrasts with EU jurisprudence and 
academic literature, which argues that a trade union is neither an undertaking nor association 
of undertakings.  Second, the thesis explores Albany within its wider EU constitutional 
context.  It shows that the EU resolves conflicts between objectives in two ways; (i) through 
interpreting EU law in way that considers wider objectives, and (ii) through balancing through 
the proportionality assessment.  The discussion identifies how the CJEU in Albany balanced 
the competing objectives, concluding that it did so through a proportionality assessment.  
Third, the thesis will explore whether the application of Article 101 TFEU undermines the 
social policy objectives and fundamental rights present within collective agreements.  
Literature assumes that there is a clash between the respective policy considerations, and 
that these considerations can be neither reconciled nor accommodated within EU 
competition law.  This thesis questions this approach and shows that such interests can be 
given adequate weight within Article 101’s analysis.  This approach, however, has detrimental 
effects on collective bargaining. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1. Introduction 
Trade unions are combinations of workers, which “could be construed as a labour cartel, 
fettering the operation of free market forces between union members over the terms on 
which they offer their services in the market for their services.”1  Through collective 
agreements (and collective bargaining), trade unions restrict competition, undermining the 
low-cost, efficiency model that is vital to the competitive process.  Therefore, one would 
expect the EU’s prohibition on collusive agreements – Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) – to step in and prevent such agreements.  Article 
101 TFEU prohibits agreements “which may affect trade between Member States and have 
as their objective or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market.”2  Agreements falling foul of the prohibition are automatically void,3 unless 
the agreement benefits from exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. 
The application of Article 101 TFEU poses a problem.  In restricting competition, trade 
unions seek to achieve social policy objectives and exercise human rights.  They seek to 
protect their members’ interests by increasing wages and providing greater employment 
protection.  As such, applying Article 101 TFEU to collective agreements may seriously 
undermine the social policy objectives pursued and human rights interests.  In Albany, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that applying EU competition law would 
have this very effect: the social policy objectives would be seriously undermined.  As such, 
the CJEU held that collective agreements were exempt from EU competition law where such 
an agreement (i) is between management and labour, or their representatives; and (ii) seeks 
to improve conditions of work and employment.4   
                                                          
1 Shae McCrystal and Phil Syrpis, ‘Competition Law and Worker Voice: Competition Law Impediments to 
Collective Bargaining in Australia and the European Union’, Voices at Work (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2014) 421. 
2 Article 101(1) TFEU 
3 Article 101(2) TFEU 
4 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie (Case C-67/96) [2000] 4 C.M.L.R. 
446 
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Albany’s exemption is important.  Were EU competition law to apply, there would be 
significant negative effects on collective bargaining coverage rates across the EU.5  Collective 
bargaining covers approximately 55.8% of workers within the EU, with individual Member 
State’s coverage rates ranging from 98% (Austria and France) to 9.7% (Lithuania).6  Applying 
competition law could dramatically reduce high coverage levels by undermining worker 
representation and trade union activities.  Challenges to collective agreements under EU 
competition law could lead to situations where unions are challenged as a per se breach of 
competition law, as an unlawful labour cartel.7  Collective bargaining as a social institution 
could disappear as trade unions find that the risks involved with collective bargaining 
outweigh its potential benefits.8 
Subjecting a collective agreement to potential ex-post challenges under EU competition 
law would also reduce the certainty with which trade unions, employers and workers can rely 
on their terms.  The social partners may be less inclined to conclude collective agreements if 
subsequently void due to third party challenges.  These effects are worse than those faced by 
normal agreements.  First, an agreement for the supply of goods or services does not, unlike 
collective agreements, contain inherent restrictions on competition.  As such, the application 
of EU competition law would make collective agreements illusory: parties to normal 
arrangements would still conclude them.  They are not seen as automatically anti-
competitive.  Second, as set out in section 3 below, trade unions pursue wider social policy 
objectives through collective bargaining.  They provide a measure of countervailing power 
against their members’ employers,9 aim at improving the working conditions of workers, and 
achieve a level of solidarity.  Applying EU competition law would arguably reduce the 
                                                          
5 This is the number of employees whose pay and/or conditions of employment are determined by one or 
more collective agreement as a percentage of the total number of employees.  
6 See 
http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/oracle/webcenter/portalapp/pagehierarchy/Page27.jspx?subject=IR&indicat
or=ILR_CBCT_NOC_RT&datasetCode=A&collectionCode=IR&_afrLoop=266172773530268&_afrWindowMode=
0&_afrWindowId=14ng9yaaxz_1#!%40%40%3Findicator%3DILR_CBCT_NOC_RT%26_afrWindowId%3D14ng9y
aaxz_1%26subject%3DIR%26_afrLoop%3D266172773530268%26datasetCode%3DA%26collectionCode%3DIR
%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D14ng9yaaxz_49 [last accessed 10/08/2017, 14.48] 
7 The argument could be along the lines that a trade union is an association of undertakings—a cartel of 
workers—under Article 101 which has as its objective the fixing of prices in the labour market.  For a historical 
approach, see the common law restraint of trade doctrine.  See, for example, Hornby v Close (1867) 10 Cox CC 
393.  In the UK, trade unions are removed from the common law restraint of trade doctrine by statute; s.11 
TULRCA 1992. 
8 This would create the situation seen in the BALPA dispute where the trade union did not call industrial action 
due to potential liability under EU free movement rules. 
9 See Wilson and Palmer v United Kingdom [2002] I.R.L.R. 568, [42]-[44] 
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attainment of these objectives.  This effect is enhanced by the personal nature of the 
employment relationship; workers are in a position of dependency vis-à-vis their employer.    
Whilst there may be power imbalances, and a need to rectify such positions, the personal 
aspect of such imbalance is missing in other arrangements.   
Applying Article 101 TFEU to collective agreements also raises issues where the 
agreement’s provisions are incorporated into individual employment contracts.  Voiding a 
collective agreement as anti-competitive post-incorporation raises similar concerns to those 
found by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to be a breach of Article 11 ECHR.10  In 
Demir, the ECtHR held that the requirement for members of a trade union to repay the 
benefits obtained under a collective agreement that was subsequently void ex tunc, breached 
the right to collective bargaining under Article 11 ECHR.11  A similar position could be possible 
under Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU).12  
Furthermore, where a collective agreement has been incorporated into a contract of 
employment, the certainty by which an employee would be able to enforce their contractual 
terms and conditions would be significantly reduced.  If collectively agreed terms and 
conditions contained within employment contracts could be ex post void, collective 
representation would become highly unattractive, potentially rendering collective bargaining 
illusory. 
The focus of this thesis is to examine whether we need to exempt collective agreements 
from EU competition law in order to protect the social policy objectives pursued by such 
agreements and wider fundamental rights considerations.  It will explore whether the 
exemption in Albany is the most appropriate method of resolving the conflict between the 
competing objectives, identifying how the CJEU balanced the competing objectives present.  
The thesis will examine how the different components of the EU Treaties fit together, 
engaging in a constitutional investigation of how the Treaties, CJEU case law, and CFREU affect 
                                                          
10 Demir and Baykara v Turkey (2009) 48 E.H.R.R. 54. 
11 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union OJ C 326, 26.10.2012.  See Ewing and Hendy who 
argue that the CJEU’s decisions on the interaction between trade union activities and EU law are irreconcilable 
with ECtHR jurisprudence.  KD Ewing and John Hendy, ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 
39 Industrial Law Journal 2, 40–2. 
12 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union OJ C 326, 26.10.2012.  See Ewing and Hendy who 
argue that the CJEU’s decisions on the interaction between trade union activities and EU law are irreconcilable 
with ECtHR jurisprudence.  KD Ewing and John Hendy, ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 
39 Industrial Law Journal 2, 40–2. 
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the CJEU’s approach in Albany.  It will explore whether there is an alternative to the Albany 
exemption.  
The thesis will address three broad questions: 
 
1. Is the decision in Albany correct as a matter of law? (Chapters 4 – 7) 
2. Do we need to adopt such an exemption? (Chapters 2, 4 – 7)  
3. What would happen were collective agreements to be subject to Article 101 TFEU?  
Would the social policy objectives be seriously undermined?  (Chapters 6 and 7) 
 
How the thesis will address these questions is set out in depth in Section 5 below.  Before 
doing so the introduction will do three things.  First, section 2 will set out the methodology 
adopted in the thesis.  Second, section 3 will identify the clash between the social policy 
objectives pursued by collective agreements and trade unions, and competition policy’s 
objectives.  The discussion in section 3 will provide an understanding of the background to 
the conflict present in Albany, providing the basis for subsequent discussion in the thesis.  
Third, section 4 will set out the economic understanding of trade unions and collective 
bargaining, demonstrating how economic theory has tended to see trade unions (and 
collective bargaining) as having negative market effects and being anti-competitive. 
 
2. Methodology 
The thesis adopts a doctrinal methodology.  Doctrinal research aims to “systematise, rectify 
and clarify the law on any particular topic by a distinctive mode of analysis of authoritative 
text that consist of primary and secondary sources.”13  This approach is appropriate given the 
thesis’ aims and its focus on EU competition law.  In answering the questions posed above, 
the thesis will provide a detailed, critical analysis of the CJEU’s decision in Albany.  A doctrinal 
methodology which examines the relevant primary and secondary legal sources will provide 
a sound basis by which these questions can be answered.  For example, a doctrinal 
methodology in Chapter 4 is appropriate for examining the wider EU constitutional law 
context of the decision in Albany.  Such discussion relies on detailed analysis of the CJEU’s 
                                                          
13 Michael McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Second edition, Edinburgh 
University Press 2017) 4.  See also, Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction 
and Guide to the Conduct of Legal Research (Pearson/Longman 2007) 49. 
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jurisprudence, EU legislation, and academic literature of the approaches to reconciling 
competing objectives under EU law. 
A drawback of such an approach is that it potentially gives little weight to other non-
legal arguments.14  For example, in focussing on EU law and CJEU jurisprudence, the thesis 
could miss the different approaches and arguments at Member State level and/or economic 
arguments which affect the application of Article 101 TFEU.  As such, the thesis will have a 
limited interdisciplinary aspect, referring to wider considerations where appropriate.15  For 
example, economic analysis will feature in the Introduction (see section 4 below) and 
Chapters 6 and 7.  This is important as where a collective agreement has positive economic 
effects, it may benefit from exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU, which questions the need 
for the Albany exemption.  Additionally, the thesis will refer to national level material where 
relevant.  It will not, however, engage in a detailed analysis of the approaches adopted by 
individual Member States.  As the CJEU’s decision in Albany is binding, we would expect all 
Member States to not apply EU competition law to collective agreements; the only difference 
being the approach adopted by individual Member States.  Such an analysis does not 
significantly add to the thesis’ discussion. 
The thesis will also adopt a comparative approach.  Chapter 8 will examine how the 
US has sought to resolve the conflict between the competing objectives of trade unions and 
antitrust.  The application of US antitrust law to trade union activities has been subject to 
significant discussion and consideration by both Congress and the US courts.  This provides a 
point of comparison for the approach in Albany, allowing the thesis to explore what can be 
learnt from US approaches, and whether Albany’s exemption can or should be adjusted. 
 
3. A Clash of Objectives? 
The goals of EU competition law and trade unions pull in opposite directions.  Competition 
law pursues economic objectives; trade unions, through pursuing the interests of their 
members, pursue social policy objectives.  In Albany, the CJEU held that applying EU 
                                                          
14 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 
17 Deakin Law Review 83, 118–9; D Vick, ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) 31 Journal of Law 
and Society 164.  
15 See Moti Nissani, ‘Fruits, Salads, and Smoothies: A Wording Definition of Interdisciplinarity’ (1995) 29 
Journal of Educational Thought 121, 141.  Nissani argues that there are varying degrees of integration that are 
possible with interdisciplinary approaches. 
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competition law to collective agreements would seriously undermine the social policy 
objectives pursued.16  How this conflict can be resolved is explored in Chapters 4 and 5.  This 
section shall identify the clash between EU competition policy and the objectives pursued by 
trade unions and collective bargaining.  
Although subject to significant debate,17 the goal of EU competition law is generally 
assumed to be the maximisation of consumer welfare.18  However, this view has not been 
explicitly endorsed by the CJEU.  The CJEU has avoided ascribing a single goal to EU 
competition law, referring in their judgements to, for example, market integration, consumer 
welfare, and the protection of the competitive process.19  In T-Mobile the CJEU stated that 
Article 101 is designed to protect “not only the immediate interests of individual competitors 
or consumers but also to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such.”20  
It was “not necessary for there to be … a direct link between the concerted practice and 
consumer prices.”21   However, there are compelling reasons to argue that consumer welfare 
is enhanced by achieving each of the goals relied on by the CJEU.  For example, in achieving 
market integration, consumers have access to a wider choice of goods; by protecting the 
competitive process, consumers potentially receive lower prices and/or higher-quality goods. 
In contrast to the CJEU, the European Commission has explicitly taken the view that 
consumer welfare lies at the heart of EU competition policy.22  Its endorsement of this position 
is highly persuasive given the Commission’s role in enforcing EU competition law, however its 
                                                          
16 Albany (n.4) [59] 
17 See, for example, Wolf Sauter, Competition Law and Industrial Policy in the EU (Clarendon Press 1997); 
Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and 
Measurement (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed 2010); G Monti, ‘Article 81 EC and Public Policy’ (2002) 39 
Common Market Law Review 1057; Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2007); Okeoghene Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81 (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press 2006). 
18 See Odudu (n 17); Okeoghene Odudu, ‘The Wider Concerns of Competition Law’ (2010) 30 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 599. 
19 See, for example, T-Mobile Netherlands BV (Case C-8/08) [2009] E.C.R. I-4529; GlaxoSmithKline Services 
Unlimited v Commission (Case C-501/09 P) [2009] E.C.R. I-9291, [63]; Österreichische Postparkeasse AGv 
Commission (Cases T-213/01 and 214/01) [2006] E.C.R. II-1601, [115]; Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige 
AB (Case C-52/09) [2011] E.C.R. I-527, [22]; Brasserie de Haetch v Consorts Wilkin-Janssen (Case 23-67) [1967] 
E.C.R 525; Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (Case 56-65) [1966] E.C.R. 235 
20 T-Mobile (n.20), [38] 
21 ibid, [39]-[41].  See also GlaxoSmithKline (n.20), where the CJEU states that “there is nothing in … [Article 
101(1)] … to indicate that only those agreements which deprive consumers of certain advantages may have an 
anti-competitive effect.” [63] 
22 Kiran Klaus Patel and Heike Schweitzer (eds), The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law (First 
edition, Oxford University Press 2013) 222. 
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statements are neither definitive nor binding.  Speeches by Joaquin Almunia23 and Neelie 
Kroes24 refer to consumer welfare as being the goal of EU competition law.  For example, 
Almunia considered that consumer welfare was the “cornerstone, the guiding principle of EU 
competition policy.”25  This can also be seen in official Commission documents.26  In the Article 
101(3) Guidance, for example, the Commission states that the objective of Article 101 TFEU 
“is to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and 
ensuring an efficient allocation of resources” and “the creation and preservation of an open 
single market promotes an efficient allocation of resources throughout the Community for 
the benefit of consumers.”27  (emphasis added) 
EU social policy is aimed at achieving solidarity, social justice and social cohesion.28  As 
Schubert states, EU social policy is based on two pillars: occupational safety laws and the 
principle of self-determination (including, one assumes, collective self-determination).29  
Additionally, the preamble to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) reaffirms the EU’s 
“attachment to fundamental social rights in the European Social Charter, its determination to 
promote economic and social progress, and desire to deepen [the] solidarity of its people.”30  
Trade unions aim at achieving these objectives.  Through collective bargaining and collective 
action, they seek to achieve solidarity between, and the protection and improvement of the 
working conditions of, workers enabling self-determination within the workplace.31   
                                                          
23 Speech given at ‘Competition – what’s in it for consumers?’ Poznan, November 2011, SPEECH/1/2003803, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches.   
24 Speech given at the ‘Delivering Better Markets and Better Choices’, European Consumer and Competition 
Day, London, 15th September 2005, SPEECH/05/512, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches.  Kroes stated 
that “he protection of competition in the market was a means of enhancing consumer welfare and ensuring an 
efficient allocation of resources.”  These objectives are linked in that achieving allocative efficiency, consumer 
welfare is enhanced. 
25 Almunia (n.25).  See also Monti who states that one of his most important achievements whilst Competition 
Commissioner was putting consumer welfare at “the top of the agenda of competition policy…”; ‘Competition 
for consumer’s benefit’ speech at European Competition Day, Amsterdam, 22nd October 2004 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2004_016_en.pdf [last accessed 01/08/2017] 
26 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] O.J. C130/01, [7]; Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty [2004] O.J. C101/97. 
27 Article 81(3) Guidelines, ibid, [15] 
28 Dagmar Schiek, ‘The EU Constitution of Social Governance in an Economic Crisis: In Defence of a 
Transnational Dimension to Social Europe’ (2013) 20 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 
185, 205. 
29 Claudia Schubert, ‘Collective Agreements within the Limits of Europe: Collective Autonomy as Part of the 
European Economic System’ (2013) 4 European Labour Law Journal 146, 170. 
30 [2012] O.J. C326/13.  The preamble also adopts a commitment to liberty, democracy, respect for 
fundamental freedom and human rights and the rule of law. 
31 See Keith Ewing, ‘The Function of Trade Unions’ (2005) 34 Industrial Law Journal 1; Guy Davidov, ‘Collective 
Bargaining Laws: Purpose and Scope’ (2004) 20 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
14 
 
The main purpose of trade unions is the protection of their members’ interests.  This 
is recognised by the wording of both Article 11 ECHR and Articles 12 and 28 CFREU,32 and 
features heavily within ECtHR jurisprudence.33  In Wilson and Palmer, for example, the ECtHR 
stated that a trade union must be “free to strive for the protection of its members’ 
interests…”34  Within the UK, a trade union is defined as an organisation which has as its 
principal purpose “the regulation of relations between workers … and employers or 
employers’ associations.”35   Trade unions, in protecting their members’ interests, seek to 
prevent worker exploitation.  They provide a counter to employer power in the labour market.  
Employer power derives from competition amongst workers, increasing where the employer 
is the only, or one of a few, employer(s) within their labour market. 
In protecting workers from exploitation, trade unions aim to eradicate competition 
between workers.36  They provide a constraint on the employer’s ability or ‘freedom’ to act, 
potentially undermining the competitive process protected by EU competition law.  This is 
seen most clearly through the monopoly union model of trade unions: unions “limit the 
supply of labor so that the employer cannot use competition among laborers to control the 
price of labor.”37  Through collective bargaining and collective action, trade unions increase 
wage levels, agree hiring and dismissal procedures and prevent the introduction of new 
technologies.  From a competition policy viewpoint, each activity has the potential to raise 
prices, reduce allocative and productive efficiency, stifle innovation and/or prevent market 
harmonisation.  
                                                          
Relations 81; Schubert (n 29).  See also, the decision in Sindicatul “Pastorul Cel Bun” v Romania (2014) 58 
E.H.R.R. 10, [130], where the ECtHR states that trade union freedom is “an essential element of social dialogue 
between workers and employers, and hence an important tool in achieving social justice and harmony.” 
32 See also, Article 5, European Social Charter 1961; ILO Convention No 87 on Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organize; ILO Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively. 
33 See National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium (1979-1980) 1 E.H.R.R. 578 [39]; Wilson and Palmer v United 
Kingdom [2002] I.R.L.R. 568, [42]-[44]; Demir (n.12) [141]. 
34 Wilson and Palmer ibid. 
35 Section 1, Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 
36 See Lord Wedderburn, ‘Freedom of Association and Philosophies of Labour Law’ (1989) 18 Industrial Law 
Journal 1, 8, 28; Allan Flanders, Trade Unions (7th Edition, Hutchinson & Co 1968) 77; Richard A Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law (Ninth edition, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 2014) 421. In Crofter Hand Woven 
Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch [1941] AC 435, 447, Viscount Simon LC saw no problem with union action taken 
to prevent under-cutting and unregulated competition to create the better basis for collective bargaining.  See 
also the CJEU in Defrenne v Sabena (No.2) (Case 43/75) [1976] ECR 455, [8]-[12] as to the purpose behind the 
equal pay provision (Article 157 TFEU). 
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Whereas trade unions exist to prevent the exploitation of workers and a “race to the 
bottom”, competition is concerned with creating a free market with low costs to achieve 
allocative and productive efficiency.38  Trade unions, through collective bargaining and 
collective action, undermine the low-cost efficiency model that is vital to the competitive 
process.  Higher wages are passed on to consumers through higher prices; similarly, stoppages 
of production due to industrial action lead to reduced productivity.  Where such actions are 
not accompanied by a consumer benefit, consumer welfare is reduced.   
In applying competition law to remedy the harm to consumer welfare and competition 
caused by trade union activities, the social policy objectives pursued by trade union activities 
may be undermined.  However, as will be explored in Chapters 6 and 7, does the application 
of EU competition law seriously undermines the social policy objectives?  Having set out the 
potential conflict between the objectives of EU competition law and the objectives of trade 
unions, section 4 will introduce the economics associated with trade unions.  It will show how 
trade unions have been understood from an economic perspective and identify a trade 
union’s economic effects on the market.  It will show how economics literature has 
predominantly seen trade unions as being anti-competitive, and detrimental to consumer 
welfare.  However, the section will also identify how unions may create potential positive 
market effects that could lead to a consumer welfare justification under Article 101(3) TFEU. 
 
4. The Economics     
Labour is an essential input in the production process.  It is through the employment 
relationship that firms hire labour to produce and deliver goods and services to be sold to 
consumers within the product market.  Where labour is organised the bargaining position of 
labour is replaced by a trade union, raising competition law concerns.  Economic literature 
argues that trade unions are anti-competitive: “[c]ombinations by workers through a trade 
union could be construed as a labour cartel, fettering the operation of free market forces 
between union members over the terms on which they offer their services in the market for 
their services.”39  Unions, Posner argues, have the main purpose of limiting “labor so that the 
                                                          
38 See, for a neo-classical discussion of labour law and trade unions, Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1960); Richard Posner, ‘Some Economics of Labor Law’ (1984) 51 The 
University of Chicago Law Review 988. 
39 McCrystal and Syrpis (n 1) 421. 
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employer cannot use competition among laborers to control the price of labor.”40  The effect 
of unionisation “is to reduce [the] supply of labor in the unionised sector.”41  Through 
collective bargaining, unions increase wages to levels above that set by a competitive market.  
“The pursuit of collective bargains may be construed as conduct designed to lessen 
competition in the markets in which hirers of labour operate, limiting the capacity of firms to 
compete through adjustments to the price of labour, in particular where collective bargaining 
occurs on an industrywide scale.”42 
Economics, however, does not offer a general theory of trade unions.  Different 
models have been proposed, each adopting different assumptions about both trade unions 
and the labour market.43  Section 4.1 provides a brief overview of the main economic models 
adopted by the economic literature in relation to trade unions and collective bargaining. 
 
4.1 Economic Models of Trade Unions 
Neoclassical economic models assume that labour markets are competitive.  They assume 
that where wages are low, demand exceeds supply; competition between employers for 
workers leads to higher wages.  Conversely, where wages are high, supply exceeds demand, 
with competition between workers driving wages down.  In both situations, traditional 
models assume that competition will ensure that an equilibrium is achieved.  This has two 
main policy implications.  First, there is no need for governmental intervention.  Any 
intervention will lead to excess demand for (or supply of) labour.  Second, where changes in 
income distribution are deemed desirable, it should be through tax and expenditure programs 
rather than non-competitive market intervention.44  Trade unions interfere with this 
competitive model.  Through seeking to eliminate wage competition and control the supply 
                                                          
40 Posner (n 36) 427. 
41 ibid 429. 
42 McCrystal and Syrpis (n 1) 421. 
43 For an overview, see George J Borjas, Labor Economics (Seventh edition, McGraw-Hill Education 2016); 
Alison L Booth, The Economics of the Trade Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Simon 
Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, ‘Labour Law and Economic Theory: A Reappraisal’ No. 92 ESRC Centre for 
Business Research Working Papers 1; Edward Lazear, Personnel Economics (3rd Edition, MIT Press: 
Massachusetts 1998). 
44 See Michael L Wachter, ‘Neoclassical Labor Economics: Its Implications for Labor and Employment Law’, 
Research Handbook on the Economics of Labor and Employment law (Edward Elgar 2012) 41. 
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of labour, trade unions prevent the operation of a competitive market.  Wages are set above 
the equilibrium level, and employment below it.45  This creates inefficiency.  
 The monopoly union model demonstrates this clearly.  Under this model, the union 
sets the monopoly wage level; the employer, their level of employment accordingly.  The 
employer shifts up along its demand curve, reducing employment to maintain its profits.  This 
model, however, is unrealistic and rests on two major assumptions not reflective of labour 
markets.  First, the model assumes that the union has a homogenous membership base—the 
preferences of each member are the same.  However, as the literature shows, each member’s 
preference differs according to age,46 level of seniority,47 labour market opportunities,48 
degree of commitment to the union movement,49 and the preference for union-provided 
private goods such as representation at disciplinary proceedings.50  Second, the model 
assumes a fixed membership level of all workers within the industry or sector.  One union 
controls all potential labour supply.  There is no non-union labour able to compete with union 
labour or for the employer to turn to.   
These criticisms led to the adoption of different models of union monopoly; for 
example, the ‘right-to-manage’ model51 and ‘median-aged member’ model.52 The right-to-
manage model assumes that unions and firms bargain over any surplus (profit) to determine 
wage levels.  Once wage levels are set, the firm has the exclusive ability to set employment 
levels.  Here, the union monopoly model is a “special” example.  Union monopoly only holds 
where there is no non-union labour, or the competitive nature of the product market is such 
that the employer has no bargaining power.  Where this is the case, the union can extract all 
                                                          
45 Booth (n 43) 53–8., identifies two conditions required for a union to raise wages above the nonunion level.  
These are (i) the existence of economic surplus in the product market, and (ii) the power of the union to act as 
a monopolist in the supply of labour.  In a perfectly competitive product market, the firm must be making 
positive profits when employing N workers at wage WC.  
46 H Farber, ‘Individual Preferences and Union Wage Determination: The Case of the United Mine Workers’ 
(1978) 86 Journal of Political Economy 932. 
47 G Grossman, ‘Union Wages, Temporary Layoffs, and Seniority’ (1983) 73 American Economic Review 277. 
48 Alison Booth, ‘A Public Choice Model of Trade Union Behaviour’ (1984) 94 Economic Journal 883. 
49 A Booth and M Chatterji, ‘Reputation, Membership and Wages in an Open Shop Trade Union’ (1993) 45 
Oxford Economic Papers 23. 
50 A Booth and Chatterji, M, ‘Union Membership and Wage Bargaining When Membership Is Not Compulsory’ 
[1993] Birkbeck College London, Department of Economics Discussion Paper No.493. 
51 W Leontief, ‘The Pure Theory of Guaranteed Annual Wage Contract’ (1946) 54 Journal of Political Economy 
76. 
52 See Booth (n 43) 111–6. 
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available surplus.53 The median-aged member model is an adaptation of the median-voter 
model and proposes that the union chooses a wage and fringe-benefit package, subject to the 
labour demand curve, which maximises the utility of the median-aged member.54  However, 
this does not produce a definitive equilibrium.  The two choice variables present in the union 
model, wages and employment, do not provide a combination which wins a majority against 
all other options.55  Depending on the combination being offered, a different median member 
will appear. 
Economists have also constructed an efficiency bargaining model.56  This model takes 
the opposite approach to the monopoly model, adopting the assumption that the union and 
firm bargain over wages and employment simultaneously.  Where the union and firm bargain 
simultaneously, the outcome would be efficient in that at least one party would be made 
better off by shifting from a monopoly outcome to achieve a Pareto efficient outcome.57  
Where such bargaining occurs, it is irrelevant whether the union and/or firm is a monopolist—
any bargain struck is efficient.  An example of an efficient bargain could be a two-part tariff, 
i.e. lower wages combined with enhanced pension contributions by the employer.  However, 
this does not mean that the outcome is efficient for society, or that such bargaining occurs in 
practice.  For example, employers have greater control over employment levels than under 
an efficient bargaining model.   
Empirical analysis shows no strong support for either the monopoly union or efficient 
bargaining models.58  As Lawson points out, the monopoly model does not produce Pareto 
efficient outcomes, and the efficient bargaining model does not perfectly mirror reality in that 
direct bargaining on employment is rarely observed.59  Some attempts have been made to 
adopt a middle course, which gives employers the ability to set employment whilst still 
                                                          
53 Similarly, where the employer has an elastic labour demand curve, the union wage gains will be low.  The 
opposite is also true.  Where the union is concerned with employment as well as wages, its ability to raise 
wage levels will depend on demand elasticity. 
54 This model is based on the median-voted models. 
55 See Douglas Blair and David Crawford, ‘Labor Union Objectives and Collective Bargaining’ (1984) 99 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 547.  More generally, see, AB Atkinson and Joseph E Stiglitz, Lectures on Public 
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56 Ian McDonald and Robert Solow, ‘Wage Bargaining and Employment’ (1981) 71 The American Economic 
Review 896. 
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58 See Nicholas Lawson, ‘Is Collective Bargaining Pareto Efficient? A Survey of Literature’ [2010] Princeton 
University Working Paper No. 558 13–5. 
59 ibid 18. 
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achieving Pareto outcomes.  For example, Hall and Lilien suggest allowing the union to set not 
the individual wage but the total wage bill where it is a function of employment such that the 
employer’s profit maximising choice of employment is the efficient amount.60  Additionally, 
Kuhn suggests a model where the union specifies a seniority-wage profile which requires that, 
were the employer to reduce employment, they start with those at the bottom of the wage 
scale.61  These studies, however, are questionable in their representation of reality. 
 
4.1.1 A Trade Union as a “Firm” 
Despite the different models set out above, we can conceive of a trade union in the same way 
as a normal firm within the market.  Firms arise due to market failures.62  A market failure 
exists where the market fails to achieve an efficient outcome—an individual’s pursuit of self-
interest prevents a Pareto efficient outcome being reached.  This can occur for many reasons; 
for example, the existence of public goods, monopolies, externalities and information 
asymmetries.  Firms arise to resolve the causes of market failure, ensuring that a Pareto 
efficient outcome is achieved.63  Within labour markets, three causes of market failure exist: 
inequality of bargaining power, informational asymmetries, and high transaction costs.  These 
factors potentially contribute to the creation of trade unions as a tool to combat such failures.  
This section shall explore how these three causes of market failure can explain the existence 
of trade unions.   
First, high transaction costs are present within labour markets.  Individual bargaining 
over terms and conditions is costlier than having to bargain collectively.  A trade union acting 
as a one-stop shop for negotiation will reduce transaction costs,64 with the reduction varying 
according to the level at which bargaining occurs.  Where bargaining occurs at national or 
sector level, the reduction achieved will be greater than under firm-level bargaining. 
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Second, unions arose as a response to employers’ power within individual labour 
markets.65  Trade unions provide a constraint on employers’ ability to exercise their buyer 
power within labour markets.  Were labour markets perfectly competitive, unions would not 
be needed to achieve a Pareto efficient outcome.  Perfectly competitive markets would clear 
and be efficient, preventing the use, or creation, of monopsony power.  However, the 
presence of a trade union potentially creates a bilateral monopoly where employer 
monopsony exists.66  Although countering such monopsony, a bilateral monopoly does not 
guarantee that the supply of labour “will reach the competitive level, although wages will be 
higher than if there is just monopoly.”67  Where supply is not at the competitive level, power 
on at least one side increases: oversupply increases an employer’s power, undersupply a 
union’s power.  Furthermore, countervailing power does not guarantee an improvement in 
terms and conditions.  The bilateral monopoly that is created could be more harmful than 
beneficial.  Wages set above the equilibrium level will lead to lower labour demand.68  Such a 
situation could be resolved through efficient bargaining, for example through a two-part 
tariff.  This would prevent double marginalisation from occurring, and ensure an efficient 
outcome.69  An example of how this could occur is that identified by Kuhn70:  the use of a 
seniority-wage profile where the marginal wage is equal to the opportunity cost of labour at 
the efficient employment level.71  Where the employer reduces its number of workers, it must 
start with workers on the lowest pay scale.72   
Third, there are informational asymmetries within labour markets.  Firm theory 
assumes that it is impossible for all market participants to always have perfect information.  
As Aghion and Hermalin argue, freedom of contract can be restricted due to informational 
                                                          
65 John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power. (London: Hamilton 
1961). 
66 Whether an employer has monopsony power varies according to a number of different factors.  See W Abel, 
S Tenreyo and G Thwaites, ‘Monopsony in the UK’ [2018] Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper 
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asymmetries, thereby enhancing efficiency.73  What one party asks for in a contract can reveal 
information to the other party: the better-informed party can use this as an incentive to signal 
information through what they ask for.  This can lead to the contract being distorted: the 
better-informed party can send false signals.  This can also lead to a matching problem.  An 
employer will want to know about a worker’s effort, productivity and ability both before and 
during employment: a worker, whether the employer is a “good” employer and, for example, 
the employer’s financial situation for wage bargaining purpose.  Absent this information, the 
“wrong worker” could be hired by the “wrong employer”.  Freeman and Medoff’s voice/exit 
“face” of unionism shows how unions can solve informational asymmetries.74  Unions provide 
information to employers through acting as a “monitor” of employee effort but can also 
remedy information deficit to employees.  Unions can use the information gained through 
collective bargaining to provide its members information about the state of the business.75  
Although most legal regimes require the employer to provide certain information to help 
unions bargain collectively,76 other information may be forthcoming.  For example, 
information about the financial state of the employer may include information about future 
business plans.  This information would not be readily available for workers and is potentially 
gained through the use of union power during negotiations.  
Trade unions do remedy other inefficiencies.  Through collective bargaining, trade 
unions can overcome the free-rider issue and obtain public goods,77 for example health and 
safety policies, and prevent inefficient actions such as preventing opportunistic decisions or 
discrimination between workers.78  Additionally, a trade union can be a commitment device.  
They prevent employers from exploiting individual workers and enable employers to make 
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credible promises about elements of the employment contract that cannot easily be written 
down.79   
Resolving the above failures would remove the economic basis for unions; however, 
it may be impossible to rely on markets to do so.  It may be necessary for policy decisions to 
be made to remedy such failures.  But, it may be that in resolving these failures, unions 
enhance competition within such markets.  The next subsection shall explore union effects, 
focussing on union effects on wages and productivity.  It should be noted that where unions 
have positive productivity effects, this can lead to consumer welfare justifications under 
Article 101 TFEU.  The discussion will also show how union power arises.  The above economic 
models do not explain where union power comes from, or its effects. 
 
4.1.2 Union Market Effects 
Union power derives from two main sources.80  First, union power arises from their 
monopolisation of the labour supply.  Where the union controls all potential workers, they 
can exercise almost unlimited pressure on the employer.81  Where the union does not have 
monopoly control, or enough workers to put sufficient pressure on its members’ employer(s) 
to achieve its objectives, their power depends on their ability to coerce non-union labour.  
Without this power, non-union labour will compete and drive down union demands.82  This is 
a parallel to a “dominant” firm with a number of small rivals. The ability to coerce non-union 
workers stems from the incentives that exist for such workers.  Although this is predominantly 
through the benefits associated with union jobs, this also stems from potential union spillover 
effects—wages and benefits in the non-union sector may be above the equilibrium level to 
prevent unionisation.  Second, union power derives from its ability to organise strikes.  “The 
strike is by far the most important source of union power…”83  Yet this assumes either a “one 
                                                          
79 For an analogy with guilds, see Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (n 64).  Greif, Migrom and Weingast explain 
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81 Hayek (n 38) 338. 
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firm-one union”, or a “one union-all firms” bargaining model.  Where the employer operates 
in a competitive product market, striking is potentially counterproductive.  Striking causes a 
reduction in output, leading customers to switch.84  Thus, the firm may fail: something 
possible even if the employer agrees to the increased costs.85  This would cost union jobs as 
the firm folds.  However, even where this does not happen, a trade-off must be made when 
calling a strike: are the potential gains from striking worth the losses to workers?  Is the 
likelihood of the employer conceding to the union’s demands a sufficient incentive to 
compensate for the actual and/or potential losses incurred by going on strike?  Where the 
union covers an industry the ability to strike increases the union’s power significantly. 
 It is through the exercise of their power that unions have an effect on markets.  
Economic literature, however, is split on whether unions have positive or negative effects on 
labour and product markets.  Monopoly theory, for example, argues that unions have 
predominantly detrimental effects; institutional economists that unions can have some 
beneficial effects.  These effects centre on wages and productivity.  Whilst other effects are 
present, i.e. a reduction in profits and transaction costs, I will focus on wage and productivity 
effects.  Whilst positive productivity effects lead to efficiency and welfare-enhancing effects, 
wage effects may have the opposite.  These arguments are highly fact-specific and, as such, 
the discussion below will provide a generalised overview rather than a detailed examination.  
The discussion will show how such effects mean that unions are predominantly seen as anti-
competitive, however, it will also highlight any pro-competitive effects.  Such positive effects 
may support a consumer welfare justification under Article 101(3) TFEU. 
 
4.1.2.1 Union Wage Effects 
As shown in the monopoly model above, unions raise wages above the competitive level.  This 
is driven by a union’s monopoly power: “a power related to the wage sensitivity of the 
demand for organised labor … that is, to the change in employment induced by a given change 
in wages.”86  Any increase in wages is inefficient as it leads to employers reducing their labour 
demand and/or increasing prices.  Workers who would have been employed had the union 
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not raised wages above the previous equilibrium are forced to work elsewhere.  Furthermore, 
labour markets may become stagnant.  Those employed on union wages are less likely to 
leave, only leaving for wage gains comparable to those moving from non-union to union 
employment.87  Union wage levels also keep those who would otherwise be employed at the 
equilibrium wage out of labour markets—employers reduce their demand to accommodate 
the higher wage costs.88   
In goods markets, the simplest impact of higher union wages is that wage increases 
are passed onto consumers in the form of higher-priced goods.  This, however, is dependent 
on several factors; for example, where there are only few firms in the market leading to 
oligopolistic outcomes, and there is low or no demand elasticity.  Additionally, higher wages 
can act as a barrier to entry.  Labour supply is as affected by price as any other input, with any 
increase potentially producing “a differential shift in the level of average costs to the relative 
disadvantage of small-scale firms.”89  This is most likely the case where centralised bargaining 
takes place.  In a centralised bargaining regime, all firms in the industry are bound by the same 
wages.  In this situation, it is possible to use wage bargaining as a method of raising rivals’ 
costs.90   
However, an employer may pay a higher wage, not because of the union, but because 
it makes the cost of failure very high for the worker.  This is called the efficiency wage theory.91  
Paying a higher wage, it is argued, can increase worker productivity.  The worker works harder 
for fear of losing their job since their outside option is less attractive; alternative jobs pay at 
a significantly lower level.  It is a way to create incentives for effort and increase productivity 
to match the higher pay. 
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4.1.2.2 Union Effects on Productivity 
Economic theory shows that unions can have both positive and negative effects on 
productivity.  Several arguments support positive productivity effects.  First, where unions 
raise wages, employers should respond by demanding increased productivity and hiring 
better workers.92  Second, higher wages should attract a better calibre of candidate, allowing 
employers to choose better workers.  Third, where unionised labour is more expensive than 
non-unionised, employers are induced to substitute capital for labour, leading to productivity 
enhancing capital-intensification.  Fourth, the voice function of unions improves productivity 
in two ways.93   Unionisation can reduce the frequency of resignations enabling workers to 
gain skills and experience, and can aggregate and convey preferences and knowledge to 
employers efficiently, ensuring that management are responsive to employee suggestions.94  
This assumes that productivity improvements are achieved through internal efficiency and 
good industrial relations in response to employee/union “voice”.   
In terms of negative effects, it can be argued, first, that unions lead to sub-optimal 
deployment of labour through “restrictive practices”.95  Where collective bargaining breaks 
down, subsequent industrial action can adversely affect productivity.  Second, a union’s ability 
to protect against arbitrary employer action, may enable workers to take unauthorised 
absences or ‘shirk’.96  As workers feel secure, they may choose not to work as hard.  Finally, 
unions may create a “hold-up” problem.97  Grout proposes that as unions extract rent from 
new investments, employers and investors may invest less than they otherwise would.  This 
leads to sub-optimal capital investments.98  
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Empirical evidence shows that a union’s impact on productivity is fact-sensitive, 
showing moderate increases and decreases in productivity.99  As Doucouliagos and Laroche 
point out on a meta-analysis of the results in the literature, findings are country, time and/or 
industry specific.100  In the UK, for example, economic literature shows either a neutral or 
negative impact on productivity.101  Similarly, studies of the German system of unionisation 
have showed modest negative effects.102  Addison, Schnabel and Wagner, in surveying early 
economic literature show that the general conclusions were that modest negative effects 
were seen.103  They point out that discussion of the productivity effects of unions are not 
widespread due to the focus on the productivity impact of works councils.  Economic 
literature, however, has not found any significant causal effects on productivity by works 
councils.104  In contrast, Barth et al. find a significant causal relationship between increasing 
unionisation and productivity in the Norwegian manufacturing industry.  They found a 1.7-
1.9% increase in productivity as union density increased over the period 2001-2012,105 yet are 
clear that this is highly dependent on the specific Norwegian industrial relations system 
examined.   
 Ultimately, it may be argued that productivity turns on the state of competition within 
the market.  All parties in industrial relations are “likely to devote efforts to productivity 
augmenting activities when they face the gun of competition … [I]n a competitive sector, only 
the unions and management that are able to raise productivity will survive in the long run.”106  
This, however, assumes three things.  First, it assumes wages are set at firm level.  Where 
they are set across the industry, competitive restraints are irrelevant—all firms have the same 
                                                          
99 On increases see Robert Lande and Richard Zerbe, ‘Reducing Unions’ Monopoly Power: Costs and Benefits’ 
(1985) 28 Journal of Law and Economics 297; Steve Allen, ‘Unionized Construction Workers Are More 
Productive’ (1984) 99 Quarterly Journal of Economics 251; Charles Brown and James Medoff, ‘Trade Unions in 
the Production Process’ (1978) 86 Journal of Political Economy 355. On decreases see, Posner (n 36) 1000–1; 
Metcalf (n 95). 
100 Christos Doucouliagos and Patrice Laroche, ‘What Do Unions Do to Productivity? A Meta-Analysis’ (2003) 42 
Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 650. 
101 See, for example, SJ Machin, ‘The Productivity Effects of Unionisation and Firm Size in British Engineering 
Firms’ (1991) 58 Economica 479; John Addison and Clive Belfield, ‘Unions and Establishment Performance: 
Evidence from the British Workplace Industrial/Employee Relations Surveys’ [2002] IZA Discussion paper 
series, No. 455 1, 6; Doucouliagos and Laroche (n 100) 655–6, 678. 
102 See, for an overview, John Addison, Claus Schnabel and Joachim Wagner, ‘German Industrial Relations: An 
Elusive Exemplar’ (1995) 2 Industrielle Beziehungen 25, 31. 
103 Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (n 102). 
104 See Felix FitzRoy and Kraft, Kornelius, ‘Efficiency and Internal Organization: Works Councils in West German 
Firms’ (1987) 54 Economica 493. 
105 Barth, Bryson and Dale-Olsen (n 96). 
106 Freeman and Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (n 74) 179. 
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labour cost increases.  Second, it assumes that there is strong/perfect market competition.  
To achieve monopoly wages, competition would need to be weak.  Where there is strong 
competition, wage differentials between union and non-union firms would not be that 
large.107  Finally, this assumes that firms are operating at their marginal cost.  Firms with higher 
profit margins can share rents: profitable firms generally pay more.108  A good example of this 
can be seen in Germany, where the competitiveness of German industry has been attributed, 
in part, to trade union restraint in wage bargaining.109 
The most significant criticism of positive productivity effects is that, if unionisation did 
increase productivity, then employers would voluntarily unionise; they would want to benefit 
from unionisation.110  Increases in productivity are a big incentive, leading to an increasing 
union membership profile.111  Additionally, where there is a causal link between productivity 
and unionisation, a consumer welfare justification can be made under Article 101(3) TFEU.  
Where productivity improves, consumers benefit.  This, however, is highly context-specific.  
 
4.2 Summarising comments 
The economic discussion above shows that trade unions can be anti-competitive.  Where no 
efficient bargaining takes place, unions cause potentially detrimental effects in both labour 
and goods markets.  However, economic evidence is unclear as to whether unionisation 
causes improvements in productivity which offset any anti-competitive effects.  The actual 
effects of a trade union are highly fact-specific.  As such, one would expect rules prohibiting 
anti-competitive conduct to step in and prevent such effects from occurring.   
 
                                                          
107 See Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (n 102). who argue that small wage differentials were a feature of 
ensuring that firm competitiveness under centralised bargaining.  
108 Although dated, see David Blanchflower and Andrew Oswald, ‘The Wage Curve’ (1990) 92 Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics 215. 
109 Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (n 102). 
110 See, Posner (n 36). 
111 The trend over recent decades has been a continuous decline in union membership.  See for example the 
Certification Officer’s Annual Report 2015-16, where membership decreased by 0.88% from the previous year.  
When compared to the UK’s peak, the current figures represent approximately a 47% drop.  Annual report 
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/certification-officer-annual-reports [last accessed 
31/07/2017, 13.11] 
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5. Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis will adopt the following structure.  It features 7 substantive chapters, with Chapters 
1 and 9 introducing and concluding the thesis. 
 Chapter 2 will establish whether a trade union is an undertaking or association of 
undertakings.  This is important as if a trade union is neither an undertaking or association of 
undertakings, EU competition does not apply.  As such, the social policy objectives pursued 
by collective agreements are not undermined as there is no clash with competition policy’s 
objectives.  An exemption for collective agreements from Article 101 TFEU is therefore 
unnecessary.  The chapter will examine whether collective bargaining can be defined as an 
economic activity, or whether it falls within the scope of a solidarity or public function.  Where 
collective bargaining is not an economic activity, a trade union cannot be an undertaking or 
association of undertakings.  It will also explore the existing approaches to this question in 
CJEU case law, examining first, whether a union acts as its members’ agent, and second, 
whether a worker is subsumed within their employer’s undertaking, and hence not an 
undertaking, when bargaining over conditions of work and employment.  Chapter 2 will 
conclude that a trade union is an undertaking when engaged in collective bargaining.  As such, 
Article 101 TFEU may apply to collective agreements and therefore necessary to exempt such 
agreements to protect the social policy objectives present.   
Chapter 3 will examine the current exemption contained in Albany.  It will explore the 
decision of the CJEU and the opinion of AG Jacobs, examining the scope of the exemption and 
criticisms of it.  The chapter will provide the basis for discussion in subsequent chapters.  It 
will show that the CJEU balanced the competing objectives and concluded that the social 
policy objectives always outweigh competition policy’s objectives where its stipulated 
conditions are met.  This will form the basis of the discussion in Chapters 4 and 5.  Chapter 3 
will also show that the CJEU did not examine whether collective agreements infringe EU 
competition law; in balancing the competing objectives, the CJEU simply assumed that 
collective agreements are always anti-competitive.  If collective agreements do not infringe 
Article 101 TFEU, an exemption is unnecessary.  Whether collective agreements infringe 
Article 101 TFEU is examined in detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 Chapter 4 will focus on the constitutional issues present in Albany.  The chapter will 
explore how the Treaties and CJEU resolve conflicts.   It will examine the conflict between the 
competing objectives present in Albany, seeking to identify how the conflict was resolved.  
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First, the chapter will show how the Treaty integration clauses and the CJEU’s teleological 
approach require that EU law is interpreted in a manner consistent with wider Treaty 
objectives.  In doing so, it will provide an argument that the exemption in Albany may not be 
needed.  If Article 101 TFEU can be interpreted in a manner which gives adequate weight to 
the social policy objectives and fundamental rights interests, such considerations are not 
seriously undermined.  Second, the chapter will show how the CJEU resolves conflicts through 
a balancing exercise.  In doing so, it will identify how the CJEU in Albany balanced the 
competing objectives.  Did the CJEU appropriately weigh the competing objectives?  If not, 
the decision in Albany may incorrect. 
 Chapter 5 will expand on the constitutional discussion in Chapter 4, examining the 
potential effects of the EU’s approach to fundamental rights (and CFREU) on the decision in 
Albany.  Fundamental rights, as general principles of EU law, require that they are considered 
in the application and interpretation of EU law.  This, the chapter will argue, has two effects 
on Albany’s exemption.  First, where Article 101 TFEU can be interpreted in a manner which 
gives adequate weight to the right to collective bargaining, the right is not seriously 
undermined.  As such, an exemption may not be necessary.  Second, where such an 
interpretation is not possible, EU fundamental rights require that the CJEU balance the 
competing interests/rights/objectives.  Chapter 5 will refer to the examination of the CJEU’s 
balancing exercise in Albany set out in Chapter 4 and will propose that adding fundamental 
rights considerations may not alter the outcome of the balancing exercise in Albany.  Chapter 
5 will also examine two connected points: first, whether Article 28 CFREU is a right or 
principle; and second, the scope of Article 28 CFREU.112  These points affect the strength of 
any right to collective bargaining under EU law, and any wider effect on the exemption in 
Albany. 
 Chapters 6 and 7 will focus on exploring what would happen were Article 101 TFEU to 
be applied to a collective agreement.  The discussion will explore whether we can include the 
social policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right within Article 101 TFEU.  The chapters will 
draw on Chapters 4 and 5, examining whether Article 101 TFEU can be interpreted in a way 
                                                          
112 Article 28 CFREU states that “[w]orkers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in 
accordance with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective 
agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend 
their interests, including strike action.” 
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which gives adequate weight to the social policy objectives and fundamental rights present.  
Where this is possible, an exemption may not be necessary: the competing objectives are not 
seriously undermined.  The discussion will show that existing case law allows for balancing 
within Article 101 TFEU itself.  The discussion in Chapter 6 will focus on Article 101(1) TFEU; 
Chapter 7, Article 101(3) TFEU.  Chapter 6 will also explore whether a collective agreement 
could fall outside of Article 101 TFEU, irrespective of its social policy objectives.  It will examine 
whether the agreement falls within the Vertical Block Exemption, does not have an 
appreciable effect on trade, and/or appreciably restricts competition. 
 Chapter 8 explores the approaches adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States 
of America (US).  The chapter tracks the development of two exemptions for trade union 
activities, identifying the different factors which have influenced the development of these 
exemptions.  The significant discussion of these two exemptions allows the chapter to 
compare the approaches adopted by the US and EU courts and explore whether the EU can 
learn anything from the discussion and approaches taken.  The chapter will show that the 
CJEU’s approach in Albany provides greater certainty and predictability for those involved in 
the collective bargaining relationship and greater protection of the collective bargaining 
process than the US approaches do. 
 
6. Limitation  
This thesis does not define the relevant market.  Defining the market will only affect the 
discussion in determining whether Article 101 TFEU applies in factual situations.  Two 
examples demonstrate this.  First, under a decentralised bargaining system the market may 
be defined sufficiently narrowly to conclude that there is no effect on interstate trade.  
Second, as a collective agreement is a vertical agreement, market definition and the 
identification of market shares could provide protections under either the Vertical Block 
Exemption Regulation or the de Minimis Notice.  In either situation Article 101 TFEU would 
not apply.  These arguments do not alter the application of Article 101 TFEU proposed in 
Chapters 6 and 7, nor the constitutional discussion in Chapters 4 and 5.  Whether, and how, 
we can include the social policy objectives and fundamental rights considerations in the 
application of EU competition law is unaffected by market definition. 
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Chapter 2 – Is a trade union an undertaking under EU competition 
law? 
1. Introduction 
EU competition rules only apply to undertakings.  The concept of an undertaking “makes it 
possible to determine the category of actors to which the competition rules apply.”1  An 
undertaking is defined as an “entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of the legal 
status of the entity and the way in which it is financed.”2  EU competition rules only apply to 
activities which are economic activities, and not to public or solidarity functions.3  In creating 
an exemption for collective agreements, the CJEU in Albany assumed that EU competition law 
applied.  This implies that a trade union is an undertaking or association of undertakings when 
engaged in collective bargaining.  If not, EU competition law would not apply, and Albany’s 
exemption unnecessary.  
Current CJEU jurisprudence suggests that a trade union, when engaged in collective 
bargaining, is not an undertaking or association of undertakings for the purposes of 
competition law; as a trade union operates as its members agent.4  As union members, 
workers, are not undertakings, EU competition law would not apply to collective bargaining.  
This questions the need for the Albany exemption, as EU competition law would not apply to 
collective agreements.  However, this does not necessarily mean that collective agreements 
would not be undermined by EU competition law.  Where bargaining occurs at a centralised 
level, or through multi-employer bargaining, arrangements between employers operating on 
                                                          
 An earlier version of this Chapter is contained in European Competition Journal.  See Shaun Bradshaw, ‘Is a 
Trade Union an Undertaking under EU Competition Law?’ (2016) 12 European Competition Journal 320. 
1 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie (Case C-67/96) [2000] 4 C.M.L.R. 
446, [AG206] 
2 Hofner and Elser v Macrotron GmbH (Case C-41/90) [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306, [21].  See also AG Jacobs in Albany, 
(n.1); Pavlov v Stichting Pensionefonds Medische Specialisten (Cases C-180-184/98) [2001] 4 C.M.L.R. 1. 
 See also, Article 1 of Protocol 22 EEA which defines an undertaking as “any entity carrying out activities of a 
commercial or economic nature.”  See also, Wouter Wils, ‘The Undertaking as a Subject of E.C. Competition 
Law and the Imputation of Infringements to Natural or Legal Persons’ (2000) 25 European Law Review 99; 
Alison Jones, ‘The Boundaries of an Undertaking in EU Competition Law’ (2012) 8 European Competition 
Journal 301. 
3 On public functions, see Bodson v Pompes Funebres des Regions Liberees SA (Case C-30/87) [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 
984; on solidarity functions, see Poucet v Assurance Generales de France and Caisse Muituelle Regionale du 
Languedoc-Roussillon (Cases C-159-160/91) [1993] E.C.R. I-637. 
4 See Albany (n.1); Criminal Proceedings Against Jean Claude Becu (Case C-22/98) [2001] 4 C.M.L.R. 96; FNV 
Kunsten Informatie en Media v Netherlands (Case C-413/13) [2014] E.C.R. 00 
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the same market(s) exist; arrangements to which competition law would apply.5  Applying  
competition law to such arrangement may undermine multi-employer collective bargaining, 
as employers may be prevented from negotiating as a collective.  As such, protecting these 
arrangements may be as important as protecting collective agreements.  
Given the wide divergence of collective bargaining models within the EU, the 
discussion in this Chapter will be more generalised.  It will draw on aspects of both 
decentralised, firm-based bargaining models and centralised bargaining models, adopting the 
following model. 
 
A trade union is engaged in collective bargaining on behalf of its members.  The union bargains over all 
aspect of the employment relationship.  Membership of Union A is voluntary, with members being 
required to pay a subscription fee to the union.  The union is free to set subscription fees at any level they 
decide; however, the union sets fees on a sliding scale according to wage bands.  
 
This chapter will do the following.  Section 2 will challenge the CJEU’s view that a trade union 
is not an undertaking or association of undertakings when engaged in collective bargaining in 
two ways.  First, section 2.1 will show that the incorrect test was adopted in determining 
whether a union acts as its members’ agent and explore whether, when applying the correct 
test, a trade union acts as its members’ agent when engaged in collective bargaining.  Second, 
section 2.2 will explore whether a worker is subsumed within their employer’s undertaking 
when bargaining over terms and conditions.  Section 2 will conclude that a trade union does 
not act as its members agent when engaged in collective bargaining, and that a worker is not 
subsumed within their employer’s undertaking when bargaining over terms and conditions.  
As such, a trade union may be an association of undertakings when engaged in collective 
bargaining.  Section 3 will examine whether a worker is an undertaking when bargaining over 
terms and conditions of employment.  The section will conclude that a worker is not an 
undertaking when bargaining over terms and conditions.  Therefore, a trade union cannot be 
an association of undertakings when engaged in collective bargaining. Section 4 will explore 
whether a trade union is an undertaking when engaged in collective bargaining.  It will 
                                                          
5 These arrangements are necessary to ensure that collective bargaining can work at a centralised (or multi-
employer) level, for example, bargaining strategies and wage rates they are willing to agree to.  AG Jacobs in 
Albany finds that there are implied (and explicit) agreements between employers for collective bargaining 
purposes; see [AG237]-[AG244]. 
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analyse, in section 4.1, whether collective bargaining is an economic activity or, in section 4.2, 
whether collective bargaining is either a public or solidarity function.  Section 5 will conclude 
the chapter. 
 
2. Is a trade union an undertaking: the agent-principal issue? 
Previous judicial discussion argues that a trade union is neither an undertaking or association 
of undertakings for the purposes of EU competition law.6  Such an argument is based on the 
premise that the union acts as agent of its members, and not in its own right.  Unions act 
“merely as agent for employees … and not in their own right … That alone suffices to show 
that … they are not acting as undertakings…”7  As a trade union’s members (workers) are not 
undertakings for the purposes of EU competition law,8 then the union, as its members’ agent, 
is neither an undertaking or association of undertakings.   
This, however, raises two issues.  First, the incorrect test was adopted in concluding 
that a trade union acts as its members’ agent.  An agent is a “legal or physical person vested 
with the power to negotiate and/or conclude contracts on behalf of another person (the 
principal), either in the agent's own name or in the name of the principal” for the sale or 
purchase of goods or services of the principal.9  An agent bears no, or only an insignificant, 
risk in relation to the contracts “concluded and/or negotiated” on behalf of the principal.10 
and operates as an auxiliary organ of its principal.11  In contrast, AG Jacobs in Albany simply 
considered whether collective bargaining was attributable to the union in its own right.  
Whether a trade union acts as its members’ agent on application of the correct approach is 
explored in section 2.1 below. 
Second, the CJEU’s case law assumes that when bargaining over terms and conditions 
of employment (through collective bargaining) a worker is subsumed within their employer’s 
undertaking, and thus not an undertaking.  In Becu, the CJEU concluded that workers, as 
                                                          
6 See Albany (n.1) [AG221]-[AGA227]; Becu (n.4) [AG57]-[AG60]; FNV Kunsten (n.4) [27]-[28] 
7 ibid., [AG227].  See also [AG222] where AG Jacobs draws a distinction between a union acting in its own right 
and as a mere organ of “an agreement between its members.” 
8 Becu (n.4) [26] 
9 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2010) O.J. C130/01, [12] 
10 ibid., [15] 
11 CEPSA Estaciones de Servicio SA v LV Tobar e Hijos SL (Case C-279/06) [2008] ECR I-6681, [36]; Confederación 
Española De Empresarios De Estaciones De Servicio v Compañía Española De Petróleos SA (Case C-217/05) 
[2007] 4 CMLR 5, [46]-[49]; Bundeskartellamt v Volkswagen AG and VAG Leasing GmbH (Case C-266/93) [1995] 
E.C.R. I-3477, [19]. 
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defined under EU law, are not undertakings where they are acting for, and under the control 
of, their employer.12  This point is important.  If we conclude that a worker is not acting for, 
and under the control of, their employer when bargaining over terms and conditions of 
employment, they are not subsumed within their employer’s undertaking.  As such they may 
be an undertaking, and a trade union an undertaking or association of undertakings.  Section 
2.2 will explore this point further. 
 
2.1 Does a trade union acts as its members’ agent? 
In Albany, AG Jacobs argued that, when engaged in collective bargaining, trade unions act 
“merely as agent for employees … and not in their own right … That alone suffices to show 
that … they are not acting as undertakings…”13  In reaching this conclusion, AG Jacobs adopted 
a two-stage test.  First, AG Jacobs considered whether the activity is attributable to the trade 
union itself; and if so, second, whether the activity is of an economic nature.14  A trade union, 
AG Jacobs stated, is only an undertaking when carrying out an economic activity in its own 
right.15  As collective bargaining is an activity attributable to its members, a trade union is not 
an undertaking.  The union is not acting independently of its members; it is an “executive 
organ of an agreement between its members.”16   
As already pointed out, AG Jacobs adopted the wrong test in determining whether a 
trade union acts as its members’ agent.  An agent, under EU competition law, must have the 
power to conclude and/or negotiate contracts for the sale or purchase of goods and services 
of the principal and bear no, or only an insignificant, risk in relation to the contracts 
“concluded and/or negotiated” on behalf of the principal.17  The agent must also operate as 
an auxiliary organ of the principal.18   This section will explore whether, on an application of 
the correct approach, a trade union acts as its members agent when engaged in collective 
bargaining.  If a trade union does not act as its member’s agent, it may be an undertaking or 
association of undertakings.  The following discussion will examine, first, whether a trade 
                                                          
12 ibid. 
13 ibid., [AG227].  See also [AG222] where AG Jacobs draws a distinction between a union acting in its own 
right and as a mere organ of “an agreement between its members.” 
14 Ibid., [AG225] 
15 ibid., [AG225] 
16 Albany (n.1) [AG222] 
17 ibid., [17] 
18 CEPSA (n.11) [36]; Confederación Española (n.11) [43]-[44]; Volkswagen (n.11) [19]. 
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union bears sufficient financial risk when engaged in collective bargaining and, second, 
whether a trade union operates as an auxiliary organ of its members. 
In determining whether an agent bears no, or only an insignificant risk, the CJEU 
focuses on two separate types of risk: contract-specific risks and transaction-specific risks.19  
Contract-specific risks are those directly related to the contract concluded or negotiated.  In 
Confederación Española, for example, the Court considered that the service station operator 
bore contract-related risks when, amongst others, they took possession of the fuel, assumed 
directly or indirectly the costs linked with the distribution of those goods, maintained stock 
at their own expense, and assumed responsibility for any damage caused to the goods and by 
the goods when sold to third parties.20  In Daimler-Chrysler,21 the CFI held that Mercedes-
Benz’s German agents were “true” agents under Article 101 TFEU as Mercedes-Benz, not its 
agents, determined “the conditions applying to all car sales, in particular the sale price” and 
bore ”the principal risks associated with that activity, as the German agent is prevented by 
the terms of the agency agreement from purchasing and holding stocks of vehicles for sale.”22  
The CFI concluded that “when a customer orders a vehicle, but the sale does not proceed, the 
financial implications and hence the risks associated with that transaction, remains with” 
Mercedes-Benz.23  Mercedes-Benz was also “solely responsible for all risks associated inter 
alia with non-delivery, defective delivery and customer insolvency.”24 
Applying such an approach to collective bargaining creates difficult comparisons.  
Collective bargaining, and collective agreements, do not produce goods or services like those 
in the case law, but normally concern improvements to existing terms and conditions and the 
protection of their members’ interests.  As such, it is unclear whether a trade union bears 
contract-specific risks in relation to collective bargaining.  This is because a trade union does 
not provide the services bargaining over; these are provided by the union’s members.  This is 
like examples found in CJEU case law, where the goods and services bargained over remain 
                                                          
19 CEPSA (n.11) [38]-[39]; Confederación Española (n.11) [51]-[59].  See also the Vertical Guidelines (n.9) [14].  
The Guidance also mentions a third type of risk; risks related to the activities the principal requires the agent 
to perform on the same product or services market, for example after-sales and repairs.  These are not present 
in collective bargaining, thus shall not be considered here. 
20 Confederación Española (n.11) 
21 Daimler Chrysler AG v Commission (Case T-325/01) [2005] E.C.R. II-3319 
22 ibid., [102] 
23 ibid., [101] 
24 ibid. 
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vested with the principal.25  The trade union simply negotiates the conditions upon which 
those services (labour) are provided.   
However, there may be contract-specific risks where industrial action is used to put 
pressure on employers to agree a collective agreement.  Where industrial action occurs, trade 
unions may bear significant financial risk.  Within the UK, trade unions can be liable in tort for 
damages up to £250,000 where they have not complied with the legal requirements that 
allow for the union to call industrial action.26  This could substantially affect the union’s ability 
to engage in collective bargaining in future: they may be unable to fulfil their role in protecting 
and representing their members in industrial relations.  As industrial action is intrinsically 
linked with collective bargaining, such risk is directly linked to the “sale” of its members 
continued services.27   
Transaction-specific risks are those which enable the agent to carry out the activity 
they are appointed for.  These are “risks linked to investments specific to the market...”28  In 
Confederación Española, the CJEU considered such risks to be “those required to enable the 
service-station operator to negotiate or conclude contracts with third parties.”29  The CJEU 
made reference to investments “such as premises or equipment such as a fuel tank, or 
commits himself to investing in advertising campaigns, such risks are transferred to the 
operator.”30  As such, transaction-specific risks are usually sunk costs,31 including, one 
assumes, training costs and investment in human capital.32  In relation to collective 
bargaining, there are potential transaction-related risks for the union.  These take the form 
of the training costs of its “negotiators”.  Where bargaining is carried out by individual 
members as part of their role as either a union representative or shop steward, the union will 
need to train that member.  Such costs are not necessarily fully reimbursed by individual 
                                                          
25 For example, in Mercedes-Benz the goods remain with the principal at all times. 
26 In the UK context, see ss.226-234A TULRCA 1992; RMT v Serco [2011] I.R.L.R. 399; Metrobus v Unite the 
Union [2009] I.C.R 173.  For discussion, see Ruth Dukes, ‘The Right to Strike under UK Law: Something More 
than a Slogan?’ [2011] Industrial Law Journal 302. 
27 Industrial action is a vital component to the right to collective bargaining.  Without industrial action, 
collective bargaining is no more than collective begging.  See, for example, International Transport Workers’ 
Federation v Viking Line ABP (Case C-438/05) [2008] 1 C.M.L.R. 51; Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareforbundet (Case C-341/05) [2008] 2 C.M.L.R. 9 
28 CEPSA (n.11) [39]; Confederación Española (n.11) [51]. 
29 Confederación Española, ibid. 
30 ibid., [59]. See also CEPSA (n.11) [39] 
31 Vertical Guidelines (n.9) [14] 
32 ibid., [16] 
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membership fees.  Union membership fees cover a whole host of administrative costs and 
other services that unions provide, and are “sunk” costs in that they cannot be used for other 
activities.  However, it should be noted that this is case-specific, and there will be situations 
where training costs are fully reimbursed by union membership fees. 
Does a trade union operate as an auxiliary organ “forming an integral part of the 
principal's undertaking”?33  The CJEU has provided no clear definition or approach to this 
limb.34  In Minoan Lines, the CJEU implied that where an agent engages in business for 
themselves on the same market, they are not incorporated into the principal’s undertaking.35  
This potentially creates a situation of exclusivity: only where the agent works for one 
principal, or where the work for that principal consists of a significant proportion of the 
agent’s business, will the agent be held to be an auxiliary organ of the principal.36  This can be 
seen in the CJEU’s analysis in both CEPSA and Confederación Española, where the agency 
agreement prevented the service stations from selling or using fuel and other products 
supplied by any undertaking not specified within the agency agreement.   
When engaged in collective bargaining, a trade union does not operate as the auxiliary 
organ of its members.  There is no element of exclusivity; the union (as agent) can, and does, 
represent multiple competitors (principals) within the market.  Representing one worker in 
collective bargaining does not constitute a significant portion of the union’s work.  The union 
conducts a “considerable” amount of business for other principals on the same market, with 
a union contract of membership not preventing a trade union from representing other 
workers on the same market.  Indeed, for collective bargaining to be successful, it is necessary 
for the trade union to represent as many workers in the same employer and/or sector as 
possible.  This scenario, one agent and multiple principals operating on the same market, has 
not been considered by the CJEU.  CJEU case law all operates with one principal and multiple 
agents; for example, Mercedes-Benz and its agents.  However, could we consider the 
                                                          
33 Volkswagen (n.11) [19]. 
34 See Emmanuel Dieny, ‘The Relationship between a Principal and Its Agent in Light of Article 81(1) EC: How 
Many Criteria’ [2008] European Competition Law Review 5, 8.  See also Vertical Guidelines (n.7) [13], which 
states that the “determining factor defining an agency agreement … is the financial or commercial risk borne 
by the agent in relation to the activities for which it has been appointed as an agent by its principal.”  See also 
Volkswagen (n.11) [19]; Daimler Chrysler (n.21) [116]-[117].  In Daimler Chrysler, for example, Mercedes-Benz 
challenged the Commission’s assessment on risk to no avail.  The Commission had dismissed Mercedes-Benz’s 
argument, stating simply that this was not a separate criterion for distinguishing a commercial agent from an 
independent dealer.  See Mercedes-Benz (Case COMP/36.264) [2002] O.J. L 257 [162]-[168].   
35Minoan Lines v Commission (Case T-66/99) [2003] E.C.R. II-5515; [127]-[128]. 
36 See Dieny (n 34) 10. 
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relationship between a trade union and its members as a situation of “collective exclusivity”?  
In acting exclusively for workers, the union (as agent) represents the interests of those on one 
side of the market.   
To summarise, a trade union does not act as its member’s agent when engaged in 
collective bargaining.  The discussion showed that a union probably bears significant financial 
risk when engaged in collective bargaining and does not act as an auxiliary organ of its 
members.  The union represents other workers (principals) on the same market; there is no 
exclusivity.  As such, the union and worker do not form a single economic entity when 
engaged in collective bargaining.  A trade union may, therefore, be an undertaking or 
association of undertakings.  In order to be an association of undertakings, a trade union’s 
members must be undertakings, and the challenged decision must fall within the sphere of 
an economic activity.37  Are workers, when bargaining over terms and conditions of 
employment, undertakings, or are they subsumed within their employer’s undertaking?  
Section 2.2 will explore whether this is the case.   
 
2.2 Is a worker subsumed within their employer’s undertaking when bargaining over terms and 
conditions of employment?   
Current CJEU case law concludes that workers are not undertakings under EU competition 
law.38  In Becu, the CJEU held that workers, as defined under EU law, are not undertakings 
because they perform work “for and under the direction” of their employer.  Thus “for the 
duration of [the employment] relationship, [they are] incorporated into the undertakings 
concerned and thus form an undertaking within the meaning of Community competition 
law.”39  Similarly, in FNV Kunsten, the CJEU held that workers are not undertakings as they act 
“under the direction of his employer as regards, in particular, his freedom to choose the time, 
place and content of his work … does not share in the employer’s commercial risks … and, for 
the duration of that relationship, forms an integral part of the employer’s undertaking, so 
forming an economic unit.”40 (emphasis added) In FNV Kunsten, the CJEU argued that as self-
                                                          
37 Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (Case C-309/99) [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 27, 
[45]-[48]; Pavlov (n.2) [82] 
38 See Becu (n.4) [26]; Suiker Unie and Others v Commission (Cases 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73 to 56/73, 
111/73, 113/73 and 114/73) [1975] E.C.R. 1663 [537]-[557]. 
39 Becu (n.4) [26].   
40 FNV Kunsten (n.4) [36].  See also AG Jacobs in Albany (n.4) [212]-[215].  In addition to arguing that (i) Article 
101 is not tailored to be applied to workers and (ii) that we cannot interpret the term undertaking to include 
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employed workers are undertakings for the purposes of EU competition law,41 a body 
representing self-employed workers “does not act as a trade union association and therefore 
as a social partner, but, in reality, acts as an association of undertakings.”42  Such an 
association can “hardly be regarded as an ‘association of employees’ … it would be difficult to 
consider those trade unions as representing ‘labour’ within the meaning referred to in 
Albany.”43 The implications of this is clear, a body representing employees, and carrying out 
negotiations on their behalf, is not an association of undertakings.   
What the CJEU in Becu and Kunsten did not do, however, is examine whether an 
individual meets the conditions required to be subsumed with their employer’s undertaking 
when bargaining over terms and conditions.  If a worker, when bargaining over terms and 
conditions, acts outside of the employment relationship, they are not subsumed within the 
employing undertaking, and can potentially be defined as undertakings.44  As such, a trade 
union may be an association of undertakings.  For a trade union to be an association of 
undertakings two conditions must be met.  First, a trade union’s members must be 
undertakings; and second, the challenged decision must fall within the sphere of an economic 
activity.45   
When bargaining over terms and conditions of employment, either individually or 
through collectively bargaining, it can be argued that workers are acting outside the scope of 
their employment contract and not subsumed within their employer’s undertaking.  At a 
rudimentary level, when bargaining over terms and conditions of employment, workers are 
acting against their employer and are generally in conflict with their employer’s interests.  
They do not act on their employer’s behalf, nor are they engaged in activities for, and under 
                                                          
worker, AG Jacobs argued that employees are a form in dependent labour in that they do not bear the direct 
financial risk of a transaction.  Workers are ““subject to the orders of their employer.  They do not offer 
services to different clients but work for a single employer.  For those reasons, there is a significant functional 
difference between an employee and an undertaking providing services.” 
41 ibid., [AG30]-[AG32], [27]-[28]. 
42 ibid., [28].  See also AG Wahl at [AG32] who states that “a trade union acting on behalf of self-employed 
persons is to be regarded as an ‘association of undertakings’ within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU.” 
43 ibid., [28].  The reference to Albany is in regard to paragraphs [55]-[60] of the decision setting out the 
exemption.  It does not refer to any argument dealing with the undertaking question. 
44 See Paul Nihoul, ‘Do Workers Constitute Undertakings for the Purposes of the Competition Rules?’ [2000] 
European Law Review 408, 413–4.  Although Nihoul is talking about the subordination present within the 
employment relationship, it is possible to think wider.  Collective bargaining, in providing countervailing 
power, augurs against a form of subordination. 
45 Supra n.37. 
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the control of, their employer.46  There is no element of subordination of the worker by their 
employer.47  The worker is (nominally) free to choose whether to engage in collective 
bargaining: the adversarial nature of such bargaining argues against any control by the 
employer.  They are bargaining for improved terms and conditions; in effect, offering their 
continued services, their labour under new terms and conditions.  In such a situation, to 
consider workers and employers as constituting a single entity would be illogical.  As AG 
Jacobs accepts, from an economic perspective this is an exchange for the provision of 
services.48   
This conclusion raises difficulties.  First, it should be remembered that collective 
agreements generally cover more workers than those who are union members and engage in 
collective bargaining.  This would create a situation where some workers covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement could be undertakings, others not.  Both benefit from any 
improvement in terms and conditions, however only some covered may be subject to EU 
competition law.49  This could lead to significant uncertainty, for example where an 
agreement is held to be void under EU competition law,50 and would potentially undermine 
attempts at collective bargaining.  Second, when bargaining over terms and conditions of 
employment, workers still fulfil the terms of their existing contracts.  They are simply 
negotiating for an adjustment to the employment relationship.  They are still “subject to the 
orders of their employer”.51  They still work for, and under the direction, of their employer.  
To consider them as workers and not workers at the same time could be considered 
implausible.  However, this argument ignores the functional approach adopted by EU 
competition law.52  An individual may be an undertaking when engaging in one activity, and 
not an undertaking for others. 
One way of avoiding this would be to adopt the approach proposed by Townley; treat 
workers as undertakings regardless of whether they act for or against their employer.  “[W]e 
would treat such individuals if they were independently commercially exploiting their goods 
                                                          
46 See Nihoul (n 44) 413–4. 
47 ibid. 
48 Albany (n.1) [212] 
49 This assumes that a worker is an undertaking. 
50 For example, would those who have benefitted from the collective agreement, but did not engage in 
collective bargaining, would have to repay back the gains received, or whether only those who participated 
would. 
51 Albany (n.1) [AG215] 
52 See Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID v Greece (Case C-49/07) [2009] 5 C.M.L.R. 11, [7] 
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or services, as consultants.”53  This would avoid creating the distinctions between workers 
covered by a collective bargaining relationship set out above.  However, such an approach, as 
Townley accepts, has wider implications.  As Townley states, such an approach would mean 
that “[i]n theory, all instructions within a firm would have to be assessed for competition law 
compliance.”54  Although it is unlikely that individual workers would have appreciable market 
power, this would still create uncertainty and be costly in regard to time and money.55  
Similarly, such approach would remove any distinction between workers and self-employed 
workers, and ignore the realities of the employment relationship, specifically where workers 
bear no risk of the activities involved.  
The issues highlighted above do not avoid the conclusion that, when bargaining over 
terms and conditions of employment, workers are not acting for, or under the control of, their 
employer.  As such, they are not subsumed within their employer’s undertaking.  A worker 
may therefore be an undertaking.  This means that a trade union may be an association of 
undertakings when engaged in collective bargaining.  However, if a worker is not an 
undertaking, then the issues identified in this section do not apply.  EU competition law would 
not apply to any workers engaged in bargaining.  Section 3 will examine whether a worker is 
an undertaking. 
 
2.3 Summary 
The above discussion has done two things.  First, section 2.1 showed that the CJEU erred in 
concluding that a trade union is neither an undertaking or association of undertakings as it 
acts as its member’s agent.  It demonstrated that when engaged in collective bargaining a 
trade union can bear financial risk and does not form an auxiliary organ of its members.  The 
section concluded, therefore, that a trade union may be an undertaking or association of 
undertakings.  Second, section 2.2 concluded that a worker is not subsumed within their 
employer’s undertaking when engaged in bargaining over terms and conditions of 
employment.  In such a situation, a worker does not act for or under the control of their 
                                                          
53 Christopher Townley, ‘The Concept of an “Undertaking”: The Boundaries of the Corporation - A Discussion of 
Agency, Employees and Subsidiaries’, EC Competition Law: A Critical Analysis (Hart Publishing; Oxford 2007) 
14–16.  See also Mary Catherine Lucey, ‘Should Professionals in Employment Constitute “Undertakings”?: 
Identifying “False Employed”’ (2015) 6 Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 702. 
54 Townley (n 53) 16. 
55 ibid. 
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employer.  The conclusions in sections 2.1 and 2.2 mean that a trade union may be an 
association of undertakings or an undertaking when engaged in collective bargaining.  
Therefore, EU competition law may apply.   
Section 3 will focus on whether a worker is an undertaking when bargaining over terms 
and conditions of employment.  If workers are undertakings, then a trade union may be an 
association of undertakings.  For a trade union to be an association of undertakings, two 
conditions must be met.  First, its members must be undertakings; and second, the challenged 
decision must fall within the sphere of an economic activity.56  In Albany, AG Jacobs argued 
that a trade union was not an association of undertakings because workers “cannot be 
qualified as undertakings...”57  Section 3 will argue that a worker is not an undertaking when 
bargaining over terms and conditions of employment.  As such, a trade union cannot be an 
association of undertakings when engaged in collective bargaining. 
 
3. Is a worker an undertaking? 
In Albany, AG Jacobs argued that “since employees cannot be qualified as undertakings for 
the purposes of [Article 101], trade unions, or other associations representing employees, are 
not ‘associations of undertakings.’”58  However, as argued in section 2.2, workers may be 
undertakings when bargaining over terms and conditions of employment.  When bargaining 
over their terms and conditions of employment they are not performing work for or under 
the direction of their employer: they are not subsumed within their employer’s undertaking.  
Where a worker is an undertaking, a trade union can be an association of undertakings.  If 
these assumptions are true, EU competition law would apply to collective agreements.  
An undertaking is defined as an “entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of 
[its] legal status … and the way in which it is financed.”59  Whether an entity is an undertaking 
depends on the “industrial and commercial nature of the activity.”60  EU competition rules do 
not apply to an activity “which, by its nature, its aim and the rules to which it is subject does 
not belong to the sphere of economic activity … or which is connected with the exercise of 
                                                          
56 See Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (Case C-309/99) [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 
27, [45]-[48]; Pavlov (n.2) [82]; Commission v Italy (Case C-35/96) [1998] E.C.R. I-3855, [37]-[41]. 
57 Albany (n.1) [AG218] 
58 Albany (n.1) [AG218] 
59 Hofner (n.2) [21]. 
60 Re Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli di Stato: E.C. Commission v Italy (Case 118/85) [1988] 3 CMLR 
255, 258; per AG Mischo 
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the powers of a public authority.”61   Where the entity is engaged in an economic activity, it is 
an undertaking for the purposes of the Treaty competition provisions.  In assessing whether 
an activity is an economic activity, the CJEU takes a functional approach: an entity can be an 
undertaking when carrying out one activity but not when carrying out another.62  For example, 
in SELEX, the General Court held that some of Eurocontrol’s activities, for example, setting 
technical standards and managing intellectual property rights, were not economic, whereas 
others, for example the provision of technical assistance, were.63  The following discussion 
will focus solely on when a worker bargains over new and/or improved terms and conditions. 
An economic activity consists of offering goods and services on a given market.64  This 
has been given a wide interpretation.  In Spanish Courier Services, for example, the Spanish 
Post Office was held to be an undertaking on the basis that it provided services on a given 
market.65  Similarly in Ambulanz Glockner, the provision of ambulance services for 
remuneration was an undertaking for the purposes of competition law.66  The provider’s 
public service obligations did not prevent such a finding.67  When engaged in bargaining, 
individual workers do offer goods and services on a given market.  Workers offer their 
(continued) services in return for new or improved terms and conditions.  From an economic 
viewpoint, as AG Jacobs accepted in Albany, this is similar to a sale of goods or provision of 
services.68  
Additionally, the activity must, at least in principle, be capable of being carried out by 
a private undertaking in order to make a profit.69  As AG Jacobs states, “the basic test appears 
… to be whether it could, at least in principle, be carried on by a private undertaking in order 
                                                          
61 Wouters (n.56) [57] 
62 MOTOE (n.52) [7], “[t]he classification as an activity falling within the exercise of public powers or as an 
economic entity must be carried out separately for each activity to be exercised by a given entity.” [7]; See also 
AOK Bundesverband v Ichtyol Gesellschaft Cordes (Case C-264/01) [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 22, [AG25], [AG45], [58] 
63 SELEX Sistemi Integrati SpA v Commission (Case T-155/04) [2007] 4 C.M.L.R. 1096, [90].  Although the CJEU 
disagreed with the GC’s classification on appeal, it did not question the approach taken; see (Case C-113/07 P) 
[2009] 4 C.M.L.R. 1083, [77]-[79] 
64 Pavlov (n.2) [75] 
65 Commission decision 90/456/EEC (1990) O.J. L233  
66 Ambulanz Glockner v Landkreis Sudwestpfalz (Case C-475/99) [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 21; [19]-[22] 
67 ibid., [21] 
68 Albany (n.1) [AG212] 
69 See AOK Bundesverband (n.62) [AG59]. “If there were no possibility of a private undertaking carrying on a 
given undertaking, there would be no purpose in applying the competition rules to it.” 
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to make profits.”70  It is irrelevant that the entity lacks a motivation to create profit,71 or does 
not have an economic purpose.72  Such a profit-making function can be seen where workers 
bargain over their terms and conditions.  Workers seek to maximise their utility, by seeking 
to extract the maximum possible value for their services (their labour).  In seeking better pay, 
more favourable working hours, and better working conditions, they seek terms and 
conditions which are more beneficial (and profitable) to them than those currently offered by 
their employer. 
Furthermore, an undertaking must bear the financial or economic risks associated 
with the activity.73  As stated by AG Colomer, “[i]t is the ability to take on financial risks which 
gives an operator sufficient significance to be capable of being regarded as an entity genuinely 
engaged in trade, that is to say, be regarded as an undertaking.”74  It is questionable, however, 
whether an individual worker bears the financial or economic risks associated with bargaining 
over terms and conditions of employment.  Although workers bear direct financial risks in 
bargaining over terms and conditions when initially seeking work75; a worker bargaining for 
improved terms and conditions whilst employed faces no significant financial risks.  Where a 
worker is successful in bargaining for improved terms and conditions, for example, a pay 
increase or improved hours, they benefit financially.  Where they are unsuccessful, the worker 
continues to work on their current terms and conditions.  They are not in danger of losing 
their job,76 and only risk not attaining improved working terms and conditions.  It may be 
possible to view this risk as a financial risk; however, this is not a significant risk.  Even where 
a worker engages in industrial action to persuade their employer to agree to improved terms 
and conditions, the financial and economic risks encountered are minimal.  Whilst a worker 
                                                          
70 AOK Bundesverband, ibid, [AG27].  See also Sat Fluggesellschaft mbH v European Organisation for the Safety 
of Air Navigation (Case C-364/92) [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. 208, [AG9], where AG Tesauro states that the possibility to 
make a profit is “the essential factor in classifying a body as an undertaking…” 
71 Van Landewyck v Commission (Cases 209/78 etc.) [1980] E.C.R. 3125, [88]; Distribution of Package Tours 
During the 1990 World Cup [1992] O.J. L 326/31, [43] 
72 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze (Case C-222/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-289, [123] 
73 See Pavlov (n.2) where the Court held that an undertaking must “assume the financial risks attached to the 
pursuit of the activity.” [76]. 
74 Becu (n.4) [AG53]-[AG54] 
75 In bargaining over terms and conditions, the worker, if unsuccessful, bears the financial risk in that the 
employer may turn to someone who is willing to work on less favourable terms and conditions.  Where this 
happens, the worker risks their future position.  
76 This assume that workers are able to bargain over their terms and conditions of employment before taking 
employment.  In most situations, workers are unable to negotiate away from an employer’s offered terms and 
conditions 
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may not be paid for the period during which they are on strike,77  a worker is unlikely to lose 
their job and receives protection from employer action.78  It should be noted that this is a fact-
sensitive assessment, however, on balance, it is unlikely that a worker bears any financial and 
economic risks when bargaining over improved terms and conditions.  Only where there is a 
lengthy strike, or the worker can lose their job through strike action, will a worker bear any 
significant financial or economic risk in engaging in collective bargaining.   
Therefore, a trade union cannot be an association of undertakings when engaged in 
collective bargaining.  Whilst workers offer their (continued) services when bargaining over 
terms and conditions of employment and can profit from such an activity, it is highly likely 
that they do not bear any significant financial and/or economic risks.  However, if the CJEU 
were to conclude otherwise; for example, that a worker does bear financial and economic 
risks, a trade union would be an association of undertakings when engaged in collective 
bargaining, and EU competition law would apply. 
This does not mean that EU competition law cannot not apply to collective 
agreements.  A trade union may be an undertaking in its own right when engaged in collective 
bargaining.  Section 4 will examine whether this is the case.   
 
4. Is a trade union an undertaking?  
As set out above, an undertaking is defined as an “entity engaged in an economic activity 
regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed.”79  Only where 
an entity is engaged in an economic activity, is it an undertaking.  The CJEU has held that EU 
competition rules do not apply to activities which are either solidarity functions or “connected 
with the exercise of the powers of a public authority”80  Section 4.1 will explore whether 
collective bargaining can be an economic activity; section 4.2 whether collective bargaining 
                                                          
77 Note, however, that different EU Member States adopt different approaches to the withholding of pay 
during industrial action.  For example, in the UK an employer can withhold up to 100% of pay; see the 
decisions in Hartley v King Edward VI College [2017] 4 All ER. 637; Miles v Wakefield Metropolitan DC [1987] 1 
All ER. 1089; Wiluszynski v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [1989] I.R.L.R 259. 
78 Industrial action is protected as a qualified human right under Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights 1950, Article 11 and see the decision in RMT v UK [2014] I.R.L.R. 467.  On the protection within 
the EU, see the discussion of fundamental rights in Chapter 5. At a national level, within the UK workers are 
protected from suffering a detriment short of dismissal when on industrial action; see ss.237-238A TULRCA 
1992. 
79 Hofner (n.2), [21].  
80 Wouters (n.56) [57]. 
46 
 
can be either a solidarity or public function.  Where collective bargaining is an economic 
activity, a trade union is an undertaking, and EU competition law may apply to collective 
agreements.  As such, an exemption may be necessary to protect the social policy objectives 
pursued by such agreements. 
  
4.1 Is collective bargaining an economic activity? 
An economic activity is defined as “consisting in offering goods or services on a given 
market…”81  Trade unions, when engaged in collective bargaining, do offer services on a given 
market.82  Trade unions generally do not engage in collective bargaining unless they have 
members within a given firm or industry.  In return for subscription fees, the union provides 
it representational services, including for collective bargaining.83  Without members, there is 
no incentive for trade unions to engage in collective bargaining, nor does it make economic 
sense for them to do so.  Although a union can engage in collective bargaining for altruistic 
reasons,84 this does not alter the outcome.  Although such altruistic reasons may make such 
a provider less competitive, such reasons do not affect the provision of services on a given 
market. 
Furthermore, an entity must bear the financial/economic risks associated with 
economic activity.85  Trade unions do bear the financial risks of collective bargaining.  The 
union has a financial incentive to achieve a favourable outcome.  If collective bargaining is 
successful, the union has potential financial gains through attracting new members.  A union 
with a good record of attaining benefits for its members is more attractive than one that does 
not.  In contrast, if the trade union is unsuccessful in collective bargaining, it runs the risk that 
its members leave, possibly seeking out another union who may achieve better results.  As 
                                                          
81 Pavlov, (n.2) [75]. 
82 In 3F (formerly Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark (SID)) v Commission (Case C-319/07 P) [2009] 3 C.M.L.R. 
40, the Court, at [52] states that a trade union “is an economic operator which negotiates the terms and 
conditions on which labour is provided to undertakings”.  
83 Note, however, that within the UK it is possible that a trade union can engage in collective bargaining, 
irrespective of whether they have any members within that employer.  See, for example, in R (NUJ) v CAC and 
MGM, where the AJ legitimately was recognised for the purpose of collective bargaining despite only having 1 
member. 
84 See, for example, Bob Hepple, The Making of Labour Law in Europe (Mansell; London 1986); Otto Kahn-
Freund and others, Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law (London: Stevens, 1983 3rd ed 1983) 7. 
85 See Pavlov (n.2) [76], where the Court held that an undertaking must “assume the financial risks attached to 
the pursuit of the activity.” 
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the main revenue source for unions is through their members’ subscription fees,86 a loss of 
members has financial repercussions.  Thus, collective bargaining has a significant financial 
risk for unions. 
Finally, collective bargaining must, at least in principle, be capable of being carried on 
by a private undertaking in order to make a profit.87  It is sufficient that there is the potential 
to make a profit, not whether the entity actually makes a profit.88  It is possible for trade 
unions to profit through offering their services for the purposes of collective bargaining.  
Trade unions do not offer their bargaining services for free.  Although there are free-riders, 
in that the outcome of collective bargaining is normally applied to non-members as well as 
members, a significant proportion of those benefiting from collective bargaining will be fully 
paid up members.  Trade unions can set membership subscriptions at a level at which it is 
possible for them to operate at a profit.  This conclusion is not altered when trade unions do 
not operate at a profit.  This follows the decisional practice of the CJEU.  In Ambulanz 
Glockner, for example, it was argued that there was nothing about the nature of providing 
emergency or patient transport that necessitated that it be carried out by public entities.89  
Such an activity could in principle be carried on for a profit, and thus the body in question was 
an undertaking under EU competition law.  Although collective bargaining must be carried 
out by a trade union,90 there is no prohibition against unions making a profit through collective 
bargaining: it is entirely a matter for a trade union to set the level of fees applicable.91 
 
4.2 Is collective bargaining a solidarity or public function? 
The above section shows that collective bargaining can be an economic activity.  As such a 
trade union is, prima facie, an undertaking when engaged in collective bargaining.    It provides 
                                                          
86 For example, out of Unite’s £165,424 annual income, £153,839 was generated from membership 
subscriptions; see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/538434/795T_2015.pdf [last 
accessed 30/08/2016, 12.51]; out of UNISON’s £201,724 annual income, £158,304 was from its members. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/528258/736T_2015.pdf [last 
accessed 30/08/2016, 12.54] 
87 Albany (n.1); Pavlov (n.2); AOK Bundesverband (n.63) [AG59], “If there were no possibility of a private 
undertaking carrying on a given undertaking, there would be no purpose in applying the competition rules to 
it.” 
88 See Van Landewyck v Commission (n.71), [88]; Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze (n.72) [123] 
89 Ambulanz Glockner (n.66) [AG68] 
90 See section 178, TULRCA 1992 
91 Ambulanz Glockner (n.66).  AG Jacobs states that whether profit is made depends on the cost set by the 
operator for his services.  The same applies regarding collective bargaining. 
48 
 
services in the market, bears the financial risks involved, and has the potential to make a 
profit.  However, there are possible arguments against this conclusion.  These arguments 
focus on, first, whether collective bargaining is a public function (Section 4.2.1), and second, 
whether collective bargaining is a solidarity function (Section 4.2.2).  Where collective 
bargaining falls within either of these categories, it is not an economic activity.  Thus, a trade 
union is not an undertaking when engaged in collective bargaining and the Treaty competition 
rules would not apply.  The following discussion will explore whether collective bargaining is 
either a public function or solidarity function. 
 
4.2.1 A Public Function? 
If collective bargaining can be defined as a public function, it will not fall within the definition 
of an economic activity.  Activities connected with the exercise of public powers are not of an 
economic nature.92  In Bodson, the CJEU held that Article 101 TFEU did not apply to “contracts 
for concessions concluded between communes acting in their capacity as public authorities 
and undertakings entrusted with the provision of a public service.”93 Furthermore, in Cali,94 
the Court held that an entity acts in the exercise of official authority where a task is in the 
public interest and forms part of the essential functions of the state, and, “is connected by its 
nature, its aims and the rules to which it is subject with the exercise of public powers…”95  This 
section will consider whether collective bargaining is; first, in the public interest, and second, 
whether trade unions when collectively bargaining are entrusted with a public function.  
First, it can be argued that collective bargaining is generally considered to be in the 
public interest: strong worker representation and regulation of the employment relationship 
is a good thing.96  Collective bargaining, and collective representation more generally, 
prevents worker exploitation and provides countervailing bargaining power for workers as 
against their employer.  Second, where national labour relations are characterised by 
collective laissez faire and/or State abstentionism, collective bargaining plays a regulatory 
role, forming an essential function of the state.  Collective bargaining, through regulating the 
                                                          
92 See, for example, Wouters (n.56) 
93 Bodson (n.3) [18] 
94 Deigo Cali & Figli SRL v Servizi Ecologici Porto di Genova (Case C-343/95) [1997] 5 C.M.L.R. 484 
95 ibid [23] 
96 See AG Wahl in FNV Kunsten (n.4) [AG33].  At footnote 14, Wahl describes the importance of collective 
bargaining. 
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employment relationship, ensures that worker voice is heard and prevents the exploitation 
of workers.  In the absence of State regulation of labour relations and the employment 
relationship, collective bargaining is strongly in the public interest and arguably forms part of 
the essential functions of state.  A good example of this is seen in the German model of 
collective bargaining.  In German industrial relations, collective bargaining sets industry 
standards.  Collective agreements set wages and terms and conditions of employment for all 
workers in a given sector.  Prior to 2015, there was no statutory minimum wage within 
Germany: wage regulation was the sole prerogative of the collective bargaining regime.  This 
form of collective bargaining fits more closely with Bodson and Cali.  In Cali, for example, the 
private enterprise was entrusted with carrying out anti-pollution surveillance in Genoa. Under 
a collective bargaining model such as in Germany, the social partners, trade unions and 
employers’ associations, are potentially entrusted with the regulation of the employment 
relationship through collective bargaining.  However, changes in German industrial relations 
towards more firm-level bargaining and legislative provisions, implies that this may no longer 
be the case. 
At a decentralised level, collective bargaining is highly unlikely to be a public function.  
As seen within the UK, trade unions are free to set terms and conditions of employment 
through collective bargaining.  However, they are not entrusted with the regulation of the 
employment relationship.  Collective bargaining’s regulatory function over the employment 
relationships is, as understood in EU competition law, not “granted” by the State.  Whilst 
trade unions through collective bargaining, and collective agreements, are free to build on 
existing labour law legislation, the State predominantly reserves the primary role of 
regulation for itself.  The level of entrustment seen in Bodson and Cali, for example, is not 
present within such a collective bargaining system. 
The above conclusions are not altered when considering the factual situation in 
Albany.  In Albany, Dutch pension legislation allowed the Minister of State to make affiliation 
to a supplementary pension scheme set up by a collective agreement compulsory for the 
entire sector.  Although tempting to argue that this means that collective bargaining under 
such a framework is a public function, this insufficiently considers the legislative framework 
under which the collective agreement was agreed, and to which affiliation was made 
compulsory. Whilst affiliation to, and the provision of, a pension scheme is in the public 
interest, trade unions were not entrusted with creating such a scheme through collective 
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agreements.  The applicable legislation allowed sectoral pension schemes to be negotiated 
by trade unions and to which affiliation could be made compulsory, but did not entrust trade 
unions with such a function.97  It simply set the requirements that it had to meet for affiliation 
to be made compulsory.98  In contrast, the activities in Bodson and Cali were entrusted only 
to the entity in question.99 However, where such an activity is entrusted solely to trade unions, 
and provided that the activity is in the public interest, it will be a public function, not an 
economic activity. 
 
4.2.2 A Solidarity Function?  
The CJEU has held that entities adopting a solidarity function are not undertakings for the 
purposes of the Treaty competition provisions.100  Where collective bargaining can be defined 
as a solidarity activity, a trade union, when engaged in collective bargaining, is not an 
undertaking under EU competition law.  Solidarity for these purposes is defined as “the 
redistribution of income between those who are better off and those who, in view of their 
resources … would be deprived”,101 and, “the inherently uncommercial act of involuntary 
subsidisation of one special group by another.”102  However, cases involving solidarity have 
been few and far between, all concerning insurance and pension schemes.103  For example, in 
Poucet, funds managing the sickness and maternity insurance scheme for self-employed 
individuals in non-agricultural occupations were not undertakings due to the solidarity 
function they carried out.104  The scheme was “intended to provide cover for all the persons 
                                                          
97 Albany (n.1) [7]-[24] 
98 Note that although this was normally the common manner in which they were provided for legislative 
provisions did not require that it was.  This is supported by the legal provision requiring exemption be granted 
from a compulsory scheme where the employer provided, for at least 6 months prior to exemption being 
requested, a scheme at least comparable to the compulsory scheme.  Additionally, even where the scheme set 
up by collective agreement met the conditions for compulsory affiliation to be granted, the Minister is not 
required to do so. 
99 In Bodson this was the provision of specific services for funerals in communes; in Cali, preventative anti-
pollution measures in the oil port of Genoa. 
100 See Poucet (n.3); Federation Francaise des Societes d’Assurance v Ministere de l’Agriculture et de la Peche 
(Case C-244/94) [1995] E.C.R I-4013; Jose Garcia v Mutuelle de Prevoyance Sociale d’Aquitaine (Case C-238/94) 
[1996] E.C.R. I-1673. 
101 Poucet (n.3), [10] 
102 Sodemare SA v Regione Lombardia (Case C-70/95) [1997] E.C.R. I-3395, [AG29].  See also AG Jacobs in AOK 
Bundesverband (n.62) [AG32] 
103 In a search of Eur-lex using the terms “solidarity” AND “Poucet”, only 48 results were found.  This included 
cases unrelated to both the competition and free movement provisions. 
104 Poucet (n.3), [8]. The complaint challenged the orders that they pay contributions to the scheme and that 
the complainants should be free to approach any insurance provider in the Community and not be subject to 
the unilateral rules of the provider in question.  See also the schemes in Albany (n.1); Kattner Stahlbau GmbH v 
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to whom they apply, against the risks of sickness, old age, death and invalidity, regardless of 
their financial state and their state of health at the time of affiliation.”105   
The exemption for solidarity functions is based on the view that social programmes 
should be protected “from the Community’s economic law.”106  Competition law “recognises 
national solidarity as the political expression of a set of obligations citizens wish to extend 
towards one another.”107  Where it is demonstrated that such an obligation was essential for 
the achievement of the social goal, through the use of a system of redistribution based on 
solidarity rather than market activity, this will be respected by the Court.  EU competition law 
will not apply.108  
The CJEU has been consistent in its assessment of whether a specific activity can be 
classified as a solidarity function for the purposes of EU competition law.109  In doing so, the 
CJEU will look at the activity as a whole, including the entity carrying out such an activity.  
From the CJEU’s case law, we can distil 6 key factors that the Court will consider in answering 
this question.  The Court will look at (1) the objective being pursued; (2) the nature of the 
activity; (3) how contributions and benefits are calculated and managed; (4) the overall 
degree of state control; (5) the activities’ redistributive aspects; and (6) the existence of 
competing entities.  These factors are not cumulative; the Court will balance arguments and 
factors in favour and against solidarity.110  The following discussion will examine how the 
above factors apply to collective bargaining.   
 
4.2.2.1 Does the solidarity principle apply here? 
In applying these criteria to collective bargaining, there are several factors strongly in favour 
of holding that collective bargaining performs a solidarity function.  First, collective bargaining 
clearly has a social objective.  It seeks to improve the social and economic position of its 
members.  Its purpose is not to make a profit, but to protect and further worker interests 
                                                          
Maschinenbau- und Metall- Berufsgenossenschaft (Case C-350/07) [2009] E.C.R. I-1513; Cisal di Battistello 
Venanzio & C. Sas v Instituto nazionale per l’assicurazione contro gli infortune sul lavoro (INAIL) (Case C-
218/00) [2002] E.C.R. I-691 
105 ibid., [9] 
106 Nina Boeger, ‘Solidarity and EC Competition Law’ [2007] European Law Review 319, 324. 
107 ibid 338. 
108 ibid 338–9. 
109 See Federation Francaise, (n.100) [17]-[21]; INAIL (n.104). 
110 ibid., [19]-[21].  Here the Court held that the principle of capitalisation and linkage of benefits to 
contributions outweighed the other factors in favour. 
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through redistributive measures.111  This is evident from case law establishing collective 
bargaining as a fundamental right protected under Article 11 ECHR.112  Collective bargaining, 
according to the ECtHR, is “an essential means to promote and secure the interests of its 
members.”113  It is not an economic activity, but an exercise of social solidarity.    
When linked with the second and fifth factors, the nature of the activity and its 
redistributive qualities, this argues in favour of collective bargaining being a solidarity activity.  
Collective bargaining is a form of countervailing power against the employer.114  It is to provide 
protection for employees and, as already stated, improve their working terms and conditions.  
Furthermore, collective bargaining has a redistributive nature and function, aiming to 
improve the position of its members, generally at the cost of its members’ employer(s).  In 
wage bargaining, bargaining redistributes rents in favour of the employee. 
In addition, there is no link between the contributions paid and the benefits received 
through collective bargaining.  Contributions vary according to an individual’s salary, yet there 
is no differentiation as to the benefits received.  This, however, depends on the 
counterfactual adopted.  A less productive worker benefits more than a more productive 
worker receiving the same high wage: the less productive worker’s outside option is worse.  
Furthermore, benefits also accrue to non-union workers.115  Collective agreements are 
generally applied to members and non-members alike under both centralised and 
decentralised collective bargaining, provided that the employer is covered by the relevant 
collective agreement.116  Therefore, no principle of capitalisation, as shown in Federation 
Francaise,117 is present, thus strongly indicative of a solidarity function.   
                                                          
111 In Albany, the Fund and Government intervenors argued that the scheme pursued an essentially social 
function as it constituted a part of the Dutch social security system, operated on a non-profit basis, accepted 
all workers without prior screening, and did not link the contribution to pension rights.  See [74]-[76].  
However, the fund in question operated on a capitalisation basis (benefits were linked to investment), 
ultimately leading the CJEU to conclude that the fund was an undertaking; [82]-[86]. 
112 See Demir and Baykara v Turkey (2009) 48 E.H.R.R. 54. 
113 ibid., [157] 
114 John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power. (London: Hamilton 
1961). 
115 See Poucet (n.3) and Federation Francaise (n.100) whereby in some cases there was no contributions to the 
fund yet still had access to the benefits payable under them.  In a sense bargaining is not based on the 
principle of capitalisation. 
116 This can be seen more evidently where a collective agreement covers an entire sector or is subject to an 
erga omnes extension.  In such situations employers and workers are bound by the agreement regardless of 
whether they agreed to its terms or not. 
117 The benefits received are not linked to the contributions made and the financial results of the investments 
made. 
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The non-compulsory nature of trade union membership has little weight against 
finding that collective bargaining is a solidarity function.  Within the UK closed shops are 
unenforceable,118 and there is a corresponding negative right under Article 11 ECHR not to be 
a member.119  The presence of free-riders, when considered in light of the nature and purpose 
of collective bargaining, points strongly towards the conclusion that collective bargaining is a 
solidarity function.120  Everyone covered by the collective agreement benefits from it: 
collective bargaining has a compulsory effect, even though not compulsory in nature.  Where 
bargaining occurs at national or sector level, and/or the collective agreement benefits from 
erga omnes extension, this argument is strengthened considerably.  This can be seen when 
considered in light of the facts of Albany.  In Albany, membership of the pension scheme was 
made compulsory by order of the Minister of State: all workers in the industry would benefit 
from the pension scheme provided for by the collective agreement.   
However, there are strong arguments against collective bargaining being a solidarity 
function.  First, there are differences between what the CJEU case law has identified as 
solidarity functions under EU competition law and the social function performed by trade 
unions.  The nature of the activities differs considerably.  The cases involving solidarity and 
social protection concern the implementation and payment of state benefits and pensions.121  
These are largely public functions carried out by a public or quasi-public body.  In contrast, 
and as set out in the previous subsection, collective bargaining is not a public function.  At 
best, one can argue that there is a duty on the State to facilitate and enable certain trade 
union functions but there is no “right to prevail”.122  An employer can be forced to bargain, or 
at best to go through a process, but not to reach an agreement.  One can therefore draw a 
distinction between the solidarity cases and collective bargaining.  In the cases where the 
                                                          
118 See ss.137 and 152 TURLCA 1992 which prevent enforcement of both pre- and post-entry closed shops.  
See, also, ss.145A, 146 TURLCA.  In RJ Harvey, Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law. 
(Butterworths 2001)., it is argued that the Human Rights Act 1998, in incorporating Article 11 of the ECHR into 
UK law, “virtually guarantees that a closed shop may not be lawfully maintained.” NI.11.A.3[3107]; see also 
[3133]-[3135].  For an ECHR perspective, see Sørensen and Rasmussen v Denmark (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. 572 
119 Article 11 ECHR gives the right to join a trade union, and has been interpreted, albeit controversially, as 
giving the freedom to join a union, which therefore assumes that there is a freedom not to join a union.  One 
can interpret this to prevent compulsion to join a union as well.  See the corresponding rights in Young, James 
and Webster v United Kingdom [1981] I.R.L.R. 408; ASLEF v United Kingdom [2007] I.R.L.R. 361. 
120 Even in Germany where by law the benefits of a collective agreement only accrue to union members, 
employers will still extend the benefits to non-members. 
121 See, for example, Poucet (n.3); AOK Bundesverband (n.62) 
122 Sections 178-188, and Schedule A1 TULRCA 1992 place various duties on the employer to recognise, 
provide bargaining information and consult, for example, with the employer. 
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activity was a solidarity function, redistribution was guaranteed.  The “process” always 
reached a positive outcome.  This implies that redistribution is required for there to be a 
solidarity function.  Under collective bargaining, there is no guaranteed redistribution or 
“positive” outcome.  Collective bargaining can, and does, frequently reach no concrete 
outcome.  The employee, and trade union, can be in the same position many years after 
commencing collective bargaining. 
Whilst there is a redistributive element in collective bargaining, there is no 
“involuntary subsidisation” of one group by another.  The employer makes a voluntary choice 
to increase wages.123  Looking at the CJEU case law makes this distinction clearer.  The 
insurance/sickness funds found to operate on a solidarity basis all operated via either inter-
generational subsidisation124 and/or compulsory subsidisation between entities.125  Such 
redistribution is not generally present in collective bargaining.  Although collective 
agreements setting up social security schemes, such as in Albany, do this, a simple wage 
agreement does not.  It operates to improve the wages of those currently employed by a 
specific employer.  However, when viewed from a centralised bargaining model, this 
argument falls away.  Where sectoral wage bargaining occurs to set wages, the agreed upon 
wages apply across the board regardless of whether the individual employer agrees.  Even if 
the employer leaves the employers’ association, they are still bound by the collective 
agreement until its expiry.126  This, however, does not occur under a decentralised model. 
Furthermore, under decentralised bargaining systems there is, prima facie, the 
potential for competition between unions.  Although competition is allowed provided that it 
does not affect the actual accrued benefits,127 competition between unions when engaged in 
collective bargaining has the potential to affect the actual accrued benefits.  Competition 
between unions can prevent counterbalancing power against the employer being brought 
                                                          
123 Note that this includes situations where the employer concedes to the union demands following concerted 
industrial action. 
124 Poucet (n.3) [12] 
125 Poucet (n.3); Federation Francaise (n.100). 
126 Note that conformity with the collectively agreed terms is prominent within the non-unionised sector.  
Firms not belonging to employers’ association generally follow the collective agreed terms.  See, for example, 
Heinz Tüselmann and Arne Heise, ‘The German Model of Industrial Relations at the Crossroads: Past, Present 
and Future’ (2000) 31 Industrial Relations Journal 162, 164; Stephen J Silvia, Holding the Shop Together: 
German Industrial Relations in the Postwar Era (ILR Press, an imprint of Cornell University Press 2013). 
127 AOK Bundesverband (n.62) [56].  The Court held that competition was restricted solely to contributions and 
to attract members.  This did not deviate from the solidarity function as this had no effect on the overall 
benefits or the nature of the scheme. 
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and can render collective bargaining illusory.  Employers, averse to collective bargaining, 
could play one union off against the other rendering any outcomes either significantly less 
beneficial or illusory.128   As such, competition between unions is generally discouraged.  
Within the UK, for example, competition is muted by affiliation to the TUC.129  This, however, 
has not stopped some inter-union competition from occurring.130  Competition between 
unions under a centralised bargaining system, however, is unlikely and thus this consideration 
is not present.  
The strongest argument against collective bargaining as a solidarity function is the 
possibility of it being carried out with a view to making a profit.  As Sinclair states, in many 
social/public cases, there is no commercial provision of services nor is one possible.131  The 
body carrying out the solidarity activity does not profit from such activities.  Trade unions set 
their own membership fees.  Although generally linked to wage scales, there is nothing to 
prevent a union from setting membership dues at a level which enables it to profit from 
collective bargaining, nor is there anything to prevent a union from introducing an additional 
fee specifically for the union to engage in collective bargaining.132  Additionally, workers when 
bargaining over new terms and conditions seek to maximise their utility.  Although workers 
will engage in collective bargaining for altruistic reasons, they also profit from such activities. 
 
4.2.2.2 Summary 
To summarise, trade unions, when engaged in collective bargaining, are not carrying out a 
solidarity function.  Whilst it is accepted that the aim of improving terms and conditions of 
employment through redistributive methods is clearly of a social nature, this is negated by 
                                                          
128 This depends on what the “benefit” of collective bargaining is.  If it is the representational aspect that is the 
benefit, then competition will not undermine this function.  Indeed, it may enhance it.  However, if one views 
the outcome as the benefit, then the opposite is possible.  Competition may undermine its redistributive 
function. 
129 Note that TUC members are subject to the TUC Dispute Principles and Procedures which prevent 
competition for members unless agreed in advance or with the TUC’s permission (Principle 2) and prevent 
unions from seeking to organise within organisation where another TUC member is present unless certain 
conditions are met (Principle 3).  See Trades Union Congress, TUC Disputes, Principles and Procedures. (Trade 
Union Congress 2007). 
130 See for example, the dispute between Serco and Community, Appendix 4, 2013 TUC General Council 
Report, http://www.tuc.org.uk/about-tuc/congress/congress-2013/tuc-congress-2013-general-council-report 
[accessed 18/02/2015]. 
131 Duncan Sinclair, ‘“Undertakings” in Competition Law at the Public-Private Interface - an Unhealthy 
Situation’ [2014] European Competition Law Review 167, 170. 
132 Ambulanz Glockner (n.66).  AG Jacobs states that in regard to the transport services whether profit is made 
depends on the cost set by the operator for his services.  The same applies in regard to collective bargaining. 
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the consideration that collective bargaining can theoretically be conducted for the purposes 
of profit-making.  Collective bargaining can be a commercial activity.  As AG Tesauro states, 
an economic activity is something “which, could at least in principle, be carried on by a private 
undertaking in order to make a profit”.133  As collective bargaining can be carried out by the 
union with a view to a profit, it is an economic, rather than a solidarity function.   
 
5. Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter has shown that the existing view that a trade union is neither 
an undertaking nor association of undertakings is incorrect.  Section 2 demonstrated that the 
CJEU’s approach is incorrect in two ways.  First, section 2.1 argued that a trade union does 
not act as its members’ agent when engaged in collective bargaining.  The section showed 
that AG Jacobs did not apply the correct test for agency, and that the application of the 
‘proper’ test a trade union leads to the conclusion that a trade union does not act as its 
member’s agent.  When engaged in collective bargaining a trade union can bear significant 
financial risk when engaged in collective bargaining and does not form an auxiliary organ of 
its members.  Second, section 2.2 concluded that workers, when bargaining over conditions 
of work and employment, are not subsumed within the employing undertaking.  When 
bargaining over terms and conditions, a worker is acting against their employer’s interests 
and are not acting within the bounds of the employment relationship.   
This means that a trade union may be an association of undertakings or an undertaking 
when engaged in collective bargaining.  Section 3, however, demonstrated that a trade union 
is not an association of undertakings.  The section showed that workers are not undertakings 
when bargaining over terms and conditions of employment.  Workers do not bear any 
significant financial and/or economic risks.  Workers bargaining over new and improved terms 
and conditions, absent a lengthy strike, only risk the loss of a chance of improved working 
terms and conditions.  Workers do not risk their jobs in bargaining or a reduction in their 
existing terms and conditions. 
However, section 4 demonstrated that a trade union can be an undertaking when 
engaged in collective bargaining: collective bargaining is an economic activity.  Trade union 
offer their services for collective bargaining on a given market (the labour market), bear the 
                                                          
133 Poucet (n.3) [AG8] 
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financial risks of collective bargaining, and can profit from such activities.  The section also 
argued that collective bargaining is neither a public or solidarity function.  Section 4.2.1 
showed that collective bargaining is unlikely to be a public function in that, whilst it may be 
in the public interest, it rarely forms part of the essential function of the State.  Trade unions 
are unlikely to be entrusted with the regulating the employment relationship through 
collective bargaining.  Collective bargaining predominantly operates alongside legislative 
protections.  Section 4.2.2 demonstrated that that collective bargaining is not a solidarity 
function.  Whilst it was shown that collective bargaining does have solidarity features, the 
ability for trade unions to profit negated these considerations.   
The conclusions reached in this chapter mean that Article 101 TFEU can apply to 
collective agreements.  This provides the basis for examining the questions posed in the 
Introduction.  As a trade union is an undertaking when engaged in collective bargaining, EU 
competition law applies.  This means that there may be a conflict between the social and 
competition policy objectives, such that the social policy objectives are seriously undermined 
by the application of EU competition law.  Where the application of Article 101 TFEU seriously 
undermines the social policy objectives present in collective agreements the exemption in 
Albany may be necessary.   
 The discussion in Chapter 3 will set out the exemption created by the CJEU in Albany.  
It will set out the CJEU’s decision and criticisms of it.  It will show how the exemption has 
been developed in the subsequent case law and how the CJEU has refused to create a 
similar exemption in other fields of EU law.  Chapter 3 will provide the basis for the 
discussion in the remaining chapters of the thesis.  The chapters will explore the exemption 
in its constitutional setting, examining how it balanced the competing objectives (Chapters 4 
and 5), and whether the application of Article 101 TFEU seriously undermines the social 
policy objectives (Chapters 6 and 7). 
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Chapter 3 – The Exemption 
1. Introduction 
In Chapter 2, the thesis argued that a trade union is an undertaking under EU competition law 
when engaged in collective bargaining.  It offers services (collective bargaining) on a given 
market (the labour market).  Collective bargaining can be carried out with a view to making a 
profit, with the trade union bearing financial risk associated with the activity.  Collective 
bargaining, the Chapter argued, is neither a public or solidarity function.  The discussion 
concluded that a trade union does not act as its members agent when engaged in collective 
bargaining.  It showed that when engaged in collective bargaining a trade union can bear 
financial risk when engaged in collective bargaining and does not form an auxiliary organ of 
its members.  This means that EU competition law applies.  This creates the problem that the 
social policy objectives pursued by collective may be seriously undermined by the application 
of Article 101 TFEU.  Where this is the case, the exemption in Albany may be necessary.  
 This chapter will explore the decision of the CJEU in Albany.  In Albany, the CJEU held 
that collective agreements are exempt from the application of Article 101 TFEU where they 
are (i) between management and labour, or their representatives, and (ii) aimed at improving 
working terms and conditions.1   This chapter will, in section 2, set out the exemption in 
Albany, and, in section 3, examine the extent to which the decision in Albany has been 
challenged, focussing on academic literature critical of the Court’s approach.  Sections 4 and 
5 of this chapter will explore how the decision in Albany has developed in subsequent cases, 
and how the exemption has been strictly confined to the Treaty competition rules.  Section 6 
will summarise and conclude the chapter. 
 
2. The Exemption 
Collective agreements are exempt from the application of EU competition law where the two 
conditions set out in Albany are met.  In Albany, the CJEU held that  
 
                                                          
1 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie (Case C-67/96) [2000] 4 C.M.L.R. 
446, [59]-[60] 
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…agreements concluded in the context of collective negotiations between management and 
labour in pursuit of [their social policy] objectives must, by virtue of their nature and purpose, be 
regarded as falling outside the scope of [Article 101(1)] of the Treaty.2 
 
Therefore, any agreement, concluded in the context of collective negotiations between an 
employer and labour, or their representatives, aimed at improving working terms and 
conditions, falls outside the scope of EU competition law.  The reach of the exemption is wide.  
It potentially exempts agreements aimed at fixing prices or colluding within a product market, 
provided that the agreement also has the aim of improving working terms and conditions.  
Whether the aim must be the sole aim, the primary aim, or simply one of several aims, will be 
explored further in section 3 below.  Furthermore, Albany potentially exempts collective 
agreements extending beyond the employer’s own workers.  The exemption’s wording does 
not restrict a collective agreement to an employer and its workers (or respective 
representatives); it allows agreements between management and labour more generally.   
Albany concerned the decision of the Minister of State to make affiliation to a 
supplementary pension scheme created by an industry-wide collective agreement 
compulsory.  The scheme itself had the power to exempt individual employers from its 
purview.  Albany, having set up its own pension scheme, asked to be exempt on the basis that 
their scheme was more beneficial to its workers and that to modify their scheme would be 
disproportionate and burdensome.  The Fund administering the scheme refused to grant an 
exemption as Albany’s scheme had not been in existence long enough to qualify for 
exemption.  Albany appealed the refusal.  Whilst the Insurance Board hearing the appeal 
found that the Fund had been right under its own Guidelines not to grant an exemption, it 
felt that it was reasonable to request that the Fund make use of its exemption powers or 
demonstrate that there was no justification for doing so. 
The Fund did not reconsider their decision and served an injunction on Albany 
requiring it to pay the missing statutory contributions, interest on those contributions and 
collection costs.  Albany appealed against the injunction to the Arnhem District Court 
contending that compulsory affiliation to the pension scheme was incompatible with EU 
competition provisions.  The District Court referred three questions to the ECJ: first, was the 
sectoral pension scheme an undertaking under Articles 85, 86 or 90 (Articles 101, 102 and 106 
                                                          
2 ibid. [60]  
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TFEU respectively); second, was compulsory membership a measure which nullified the effect 
of competition rules applicable to undertakings; and third, if the second question was 
answered in the negative, could other circumstances render membership incompatible with 
Article 90?  This Chapter will focus on whether the agreement breached Article 101 (ex-Article 
85 EC) TFEU. 
 
2.1 AG Jacobs’ Opinion 
In his opinion, AG Jacobs held that there is no general exemption for the social provisions of 
the Treaty from the Treaty competition rules.3  However, in relation to collective agreements, 
AG Jacobs argued that 
 
[s]ince the Treaty rules encouraging collective bargaining presuppose that collective agreements 
are in principle lawful, [Article 101(1)] cannot have been intended to apply to collective 
agreements between management and labour on core subjects such as wages and other working 
conditions. Accordingly, collective agreements between management and labour on wages and 
working conditions should enjoy automatic immunity from antitrust scrutiny.4 [emphasis added] 
 
Any exemption for collective agreements, AG Jacobs argued, should not be without limitation.  
Jacobs proposed three conditions that must be met before the exemption applies.  First, the 
agreement must be made within the “formal framework of collective bargaining between 
both sides of industry.”5 Second, the agreement should be concluded in good faith.  Attention 
should be paid to agreements which “apparently deal with core subjects of collective 
bargaining … but which merely function as cover for a serious restriction of competition 
between employers on their product markets.”6  Competition authorities should be able to 
examine the agreement where this is the case.  Third, the exemption should only apply where 
the collective agreement concerns core subjects of collective bargaining and does “not 
directly affect third markets and third parties…”7 In this regard, AG Jacobs proposed that the 
test to be applied should be “whether the agreement merely modifies or establishes rights 
                                                          
3 ibid., [AG123]-[AG130].  AG Jacobs’ main argument is that if there was to be an exemption for social policy 
objectives, then there would be an explicit Treaty provision.  As there is not, there is no generalised exception. 
4 ibid. 
5 ibid., [AG191] 
6 Ibid., [AG192] 
7 ibid., [AG193] 
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and obligations within the labour relationship between employers and employees or whether 
it goes beyond that and directly affects relations between employers and third parties, such 
as clients, suppliers, competing employers, or consumers.”8  Collective agreements directly 
affecting third parties and/or markets have potentially harmful effects on the competitive 
process that should be the subject of examination by the competition authorities.9   
In AG Jacobs’ view, the need to exempt collective agreements stems from the tension 
between the two sets of Treaty rules: the competition rules and those encouraging collective 
agreements.10  Collective agreements on core subjects such as wages and working conditions 
restrict competition between employees: “they cannot offer to work below the agreed 
minimum.”11  The Treaty competition rules void anti-competitive agreements falling within 
their scope.  The Treaty does not provide a solution to this tension so established rules of 
interpretation must be used.12  This implies the use of a proportionality approach.  Since 
neither set of rules has absolute precedence over the other, neither should be “emptied of 
its entire content.”13  In adopting such an approach, AG Jacobs stated that because the Treaty 
rules encouraging collective bargaining presuppose the lawfulness of collective agreements, 
the Treaty competition provisions cannot have been intended to apply to such agreements 
on core subjects.14   
AG Jacobs argued that by encouraging the conclusion of collective agreements, “the 
Treaty recognises the possibility of an exemption to the general presumption on the 
consequences of agreements between private actors on the ground that under normal 
circumstances this category of agreements furthers the public interest.”15  AG Jacobs points 
out that this understanding of collective agreements is confirmed by the practices in Member 
States, and that subjecting collective agreements to competition law would reverse the 
                                                          
8 ibid. 
9 ibid.  As an example, AG Jacobs points to the national exemptions in existence.  For example, the Finnish 
Supreme Administrative Court has held that the Finnish statutory exemption only applies to agreement 
directly affecting working conditions. 
10 ibid., [AG177]-[AG179] 
11 ibid., [AG178] 
12 ibid., [AG179]  
13 ibid. This can be seen in how AG Jacobs narrowly prescribed his proposed exemption.  By restricting the 
exemption to agreements which are in good faith and do not directly affect third parties, AG Jacobs retains 
scope for the application of the Treaty competition rules to collective agreements. 
14 ibid., [AG179] 
15 ibid., [AG185] 
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practices followed in the Member States.16  The consistency in shielding collective agreements 
from national competition law, reinforces the public interest basis of the exemption.17 
This public interest basis can also be seen in earlier statements made by AG Jacobs as 
to the tension between the different Treaty rules.  In contrast to the employer-focussed 
efficiency benefits achieved through collective bargaining,18 Jacobs stated that the goal of 
preventing a “race to the bottom” as regards wages and working conditions “is why collective 
bargaining is encouraged by all national legal orders, international legal instruments and more 
particularly by the Treaty itself…”19  Although AG Jacobs used this point to highlight the 
tension between trade unions, and collective bargaining, and the Treaty competition rules, it 
can be argued that this consideration played a role in AG Jacobs’ decision to propose an 
exemption.  This thesis will explore the constitutional tension in Albany in Chapters 4 and 5.  
As such, I shall leave discussion to then. 
In his Opinion, AG Jacobs dismissed the argument that an “alleged” fundamental right 
to collective bargaining required the giving of special status under the competition rules to 
collective agreements.20  This is because the right to collective bargaining was not recognised 
as a “specific [EU] fundamental right”.21  In line with contemporary jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), AG Jacobs held that the EU legal order only protects 
the right to form and join trade unions and employers’ associations.22  There is a lack of 
“sufficient convergence of national legal orders and international legal instruments on the 
recognition of” a right to collective bargaining to find such a right under EU law.23  However, 
AG Jacobs concluded that “the right to protect collective action in order to protect 
occupational interests in so far as it is indispensable for the enjoyment of freedom of 
association is … protected by Community law.”24  If the right to collective action is protected 
in order to safeguard occupational interests, why is collective bargaining treated differently?  
                                                          
16 ibid.  AG Jacobs, earlier in his opinion, conducts a small comparative survey of the approaches in some 
Member States.  See [AG80]-[AG112] 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid., [AG181]-[AG182].  These are preventing labour conflict, reducing transaction costs, predictability and 
transparency, and achieving an equilibrium in bargaining power. 
19 ibid., [AG178].  At [AG164] AG Jacobs refers to the “international consensus on the legitimate and socially 
desirable character of collective bargaining. 
20 ibid., [AG132]-[AG164] 
21 ibid., [AG160] 
22 ibid., [AG158] 
23 ibid. 
24 ibid., [AG 159] 
63 
 
If one considers the statements made by AG Jacobs about the right to collective bargaining, 
the same applies to the right to industrial action.  In 2000, the ECtHR had not recognised a 
right to industrial action, and there was no convergence at national and international level.  
Furthermore, one of the main purposes of industrial action is to provide enforcement and 
strength to collective bargaining and collective agreements.25  Most industrial action will be 
preceded by collective bargaining and/or a concluded collective agreement.  Collective 
bargaining without the threat industrial action is no more than “collective begging.”26  Thus, 
collective bargaining should also have been given fundamental status under the Treaty.  
However, AG Jacobs argued that even were such a right present, it would not be 
sufficient to protect collective agreements from Article 101 TFEU.  Drawing an analogy with 
the protection provided to collective agreements under the general principle of freedom of 
contract,27 AG Jacobs pointed out that fundamental rights can be restricted by objectives of 
general interest pursued by the Community, where the restriction is proportionate and does 
not impair the substance of the right.  In the context of applying EU competition law to 
collective agreements, AG Jacobs was clear: “[t]here can be no doubt that in the present cases 
[Article 101 TFEU] pursues an important aim of the Treaty, namely the creation of a system 
ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted…”28  A right to collective 
bargaining would not be sufficient to “shelter collective bargaining from the applicability of 
the competition rules.”29  This is true, however in such a situation the social policy and 
fundamental rights interests are not seriously undermined.  Through the application of a 
proportionality assessment such interests are given adequate weight.  I shall return to this 
argument in Chapters 4 and 5. 
To summarise, AG Jacobs proposed that collective agreements should be exempt from 
the Treaty competition rules where such agreement is: (i) made within the framework of 
collective bargaining by both sides of industry; (ii) concluded in good faith on core subjects of 
bargaining; and, (iii) does not directly affect third parties or markets.  
 
                                                          
25 Simon F Deakin and Gillian S Morris, Labour Law (6th Edition, Oxford: Hart 2012) para 11.2. 
26 ATJM Jacobs, ‘The Law of Strikes and Lockouts’, Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in 
Industrialized Market Economies (8th Edition, Kluwer: Deventer 2001) 660. 
27 Albany (n.1) [AG161]-[AG162] 
28 ibid., [AG162] 
29 ibid., [AG163] 
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2.2 The Court 
The decision of the Court is short and stark.  Having set out the prohibition in Article 101 TFEU, 
the Court stated that: 
 
It is beyond question that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective agreements 
between organisations representing employers and workers. However, the social policy objectives 
pursued by such agreements would be seriously undermined if management and labour were 
subject to … [Article 101(1)] … when seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of 
work and employment.30 
 
As such, the Court held that collective agreements fall outside of the scope of Article 101 
TFEU.31  In a similar vein to AG Jacobs, the Court held that 
 
[i]t therefore follows from an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole which is 
both effective and consistent that agreements concluded in the context of collective negotiations 
between management and labour in pursuit of such objectives must, by virtue of their nature and 
purpose, be regarded as falling outside the scope of Article [101(1)] of the Treaty.32 
 
To benefit from the exemption, a collective agreement must fulfil two criteria.  First, the 
collective agreement must be “concluded in the context of collective negotiations between 
management and labour”,33 and second, it must seek to “improve conditions of work and 
employment.”34  It should be noted that the CJEU does not require the factors highlighted by 
AG Jacobs to be met; namely the requirements for good faith and that the agreement does 
not directly affect third parties.  This is significant in that by not requiring the agreement to 
meet such conditions the CJEU’s exemption is much wider than that proposed by AG Jacobs.  
In reaching such a decision, the CJEU balanced the competing objectives: “the social 
policy objectives would be seriously undermined” and the exemption “follows from an 
                                                          
30 ibid [59]; note that the French language version refers to “nature et objet”.  One can infer that that effects 
are superseded by the social objectives of the agreement.  Its objective of protecting workers outweighs the 
restrictive effects on competition. 
31 ibid., [60] 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid. Note that even if the collective agreement does not satisfy the Albany exemption the agreement may 
well fall outside the Article 101 prohibition as it does not have either an anti-competitive object or anti-
competitive effects. 
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interpretation [of the Treaty] which is both effective and consistent…”35  Where the stipulated 
conditions are met, the CJEU concluded that the social policy objectives outweigh 
competition policy’s objectives.  What the CJEU does not do, however, is explain how it 
balanced the competing or the weights assigned to the competing objectives.  This shall be 
explored in depth in Chapter 4, section 4.  Any discussion shall be left to then. 
The CJEU’s wording potentially creates a wide exemption, however the exemption can 
be interpreted in a narrow way.  In Albany, the CJEU stated that as the agreement in question 
established a pension fund, which is related to a worker’s remuneration, the agreement 
“directly contributes to improving one of their working conditions.”36 (emphasis added) This 
can be interpreted to mean that the purpose of the agreement (improving working terms and 
conditions) should be an agreement’s sole or main purpose, or one of many purposes will 
affect the exemption scope.  I shall return to this point in section 3 below.  Additionally, it 
should also be noted that the Albany exemption is not subject to a proportionality 
requirement.  The exemption only requires is that the agreement seeks to improve conditions 
of work and employment.37    
  
3. Albany challenged? 
The decision in Albany raises several issues.   First, the CJEU assumed that all collective 
agreements are anti-competitive; the CJEU does not discuss whether they actually are.38  As 
Townley argues, “it is questionable whether collective agreements inherently include, by their 
nature and purpose, restrictions on competition such that trade between Member States is 
appreciably affected … [I]t is arguable whether, by their very nature, the social policy 
objectives and the competition policy objectives actually conflict at all.”39  Van den Bergh and 
Camesasca take this further, arguing that collective agreements could produce sufficient 
                                                          
35 ibid. 
36 ibid., [63]. Note that the CJEU has not expanded in later cases on the scope of Albany. 
37 c.f Monica Wirtz, ‘The Collision between Collective Agreements and Competition Law’ (2006) PhD Thesis 
311–3.  Wirtz argues that a proportionality approach can be applied, however, it should only apply to tertiary 
employment conditions, for example, a ban on outsourcing or an exclusive right to mediate childcare for a 
company.  
38 Note that AG Jacobs in Albany does question whether there is an appreciable effect.  This is also present in 
subsequent CJEU jurisprudence.  For discussion of how Article 101 applies to a collective agreement, see 
Chapter 4. 
39 Christopher Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy (Oxford: Hart, 2009) 61.  For discussion of how the CJEU 
resolved the conflict in Albany, see Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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efficiency gains that compensate for any significant anti-competitive effects.40  Therefore, the 
removal of all collective agreements from EU competition law’s jurisdiction is unnecessary: 
individual agreements could satisfy the Article 101(3) TFEU conditions.41   
On this basis, Van den Bergh and Camesasca argue that a general per se exemption 
“can only be justified in the presence of substantial economies of scale, surpassing the firm 
level.”42  This argument, however, does not recognise that the exemption in Albany was based 
on the need to protect the social policy objectives and not a balancing of the agreements anti 
and pro-competitive benefits.  The CJEU, as will be explored in detail in Chapter 4, balanced 
the harm to the social policy objectives against the need to achieve competition policy’s 
objectives, and vice versa.  As such, the CJEU considered that the social policy objectives 
always outweigh competition policy’s objectives where its stipulated conditions are met.   
Second, and linked with the above, one must be mindful that Albany was pre-
modernisation and Regulation 1/2003: the Commission had the sole power to grant an 
individual exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.43  Where the parties, as in Albany, had not 
notified the Commission of the agreement, they could not benefit from Article 101(3) TFEU.44  
That subsequent case law did not address this point is understandable, as from a practical 
perspective it was not required to do so.  I shall return to whether a collective agreement 
could now benefit from Article 101(3) TFEU in Chapter 7. 
 Third, the exemption’s “purpose” requirement means that its scope is potentially very 
wide.45  de Vos argues that the exemption’s wording exempts collective agreements which 
have as their dominant purpose the improvement of working conditions.46  Collective 
agreements can pursue other purposes in addition to improving conditions of work.  This is 
                                                          
40 Roger Van den Bergh and Peter Camesasca, ‘Irreconcilable Principles? The Court of Justice Exempts 
Collective Labour Agreements from the Wrath of Antitrust’ (2000) 25 European law Review 492, 506–7. 
41 ibid 506. 
42 ibid.  The authors argue that this is a welfare-maximising analysis, balancing the anti and pro-competitive 
effects.  This approach is “an all-round assessment of collective agreements’ diverse consequences”.  See also 
Marc de Vos, ‘Collective Labour-Agreements and European Competition Law: An Inherent Contradiction’, A 
decade beyond Maastricht: the European social dialogue revisited (Kluwer Law International 2003) 73.  de Vos 
argues that  
43 See Regulation No. 17: First Regulation Implementing Article 85 and 86 of the Treaty [1962] O.J. 13, Article 
9(1). 
44 Article 4(1), Regulation 17, ibid. 
45 Marc de Vos (n 42); Stephen Vousden, ‘Albany, Market Law and Social Exclusion - Case C-67/96 Albany 
International BV v Stichting Bedrijfsfonds Textielindustrie Judgment of 21 September 1999’ (2000) 29 Industrial 
Law Journal 181; Deakin and Morris (n 25) 786. 
46 ibid 80. 
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correct, however, de Vos’ ‘dominance’ requirement does not necessary follow from the 
Albany exemption.  In Albany, the CJEU held that the exemption applied as the agreement 
contributed “directly to improving” working conditions.47  This, Deakin and Morris argue, 
could mean that the exemption applies to collective agreements that have a “tangential” 
relationship to the improvement of conditions of work and employment.48  However, the 
requirement for the agreement to “directly” relate to improving working conditions 
potentially restricts the application of the immunity.49  It means that the agreement must 
have as its purpose the improvement of terms and conditions of employment.  It does not, as 
Vousden argues, restrict the application of the exemption to certain types of provision.50  The 
CJEU only requires that the agreement is directly related to improving conditions of work and 
employment. 
 Arguments such as that of Vousden create uncertainty as to whether an agreement is 
directly related to improving working conditions.  That the CJEU gives no guidance 
exacerbates this further.51  For example, the CJEU does not identify whether this is assessed 
according to a subjective or objectives standard.52  de Vos argues that the requirement that 
the agreement be directly related to the improvement of terms and conditions, implies a 
subjective standard: “[t]he improvement in employment and working conditions must be the 
preponderant aim of the contracting parties.”53  Furthermore, the exemption’s framing 
implies that the CJEU adopted a  “laissez faire” view of industrial relations; the industrial 
relations partners are free (within limits) to determine the means by which they achieve the 
legitimate objective.    In a similar fashion to the approach adopted by the UK courts to the 
term “in contemplation or furtherance of” under industrial action legislation,54 the CJEU 
potentially allows the parties the freedom to decide if the agreement is the best option to 
                                                          
47 Albany (n.1) [63] 
48 Deakin and Morris (n 25) 786. 
49 Vousden (n 45) 189. 
50 ibid.  Vousden argues that the requirement that the agreement directly relate to terms and conditions draws 
a distinction between issues of remuneration and non-remunation. 
51 See Vousden, ibid 188–9. 
52 See Marc de Vos (n 42) 80–1.   
53 Marc de Vos (n 42).  See also Catherine Barnard and Simon Deakin, ‘Negative and Positive Harmonization of 
Labor Law in the European Union’ (2002) 8 Columbia Journal of European Law 389, 392–3., who argue that the 
use of a subjective test favours the autonomy of the collective bargaining process.  The authors point out that 
this contrasts with AG Jacob’s approach which encourages an objective standard. 
54 See section 219 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.  Section 219 gives a trade union 
immunity from liability in tort.  The section states that “An act done by a person in contemplation or 
furtherance of a trade dispute is not actionable in tort…”   
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achieve its intended outcome.55  Whether the intended outcome is achieved is irrelevant.   By 
contrast, an objective approach, such as that seen under the free movement provisions,56 
could restrict the exemption to “core topics” of bargaining and allow the courts to probe into 
the purpose of the parties to a collective agreement.   
 Fourth, Albany’s exemption has been criticised on the basis that the CJEU adopted an 
incorrect basis.  de Vos argues that “[t]he ECJ builds up a labour exemption from the 
recognition of the … European social dialogue in the TEC.”57  In basing the exemption on Article 
139(1) EC (now Article 151(1) TFEU), an exemption should only cover supra-national collective 
agreements: “[t]he support and organization of the European social dialogue in the TEC … 
cannot per se be extended to the purely national social dialogue, as the ECJ seems to do.”58  
If we consider the wording of the provisions relied upon in Albany, de Vos is mistaken in his 
view.  The CJEU pointed towards generic provisions which encouraged the EU and Member 
States to closely co-operate on the right to association and collective bargaining, whilst also 
referring to European social dialogue.  It can be argued that national and European level social 
dialogue are correlated.  Without strong national level dialogue, it may not be possible to 
have strong European dialogue.   
 Two arguments, which support the CJEU’s decision and approach, are seemingly 
missing from the literature.  First, the exemption in Albany provides a level of certainty for 
the social parties when engaging in collective bargaining.  Such an argument is easier to 
sustain across all Member States than that made by Vousden in support of a blanket 
exemption: a blanket exemption for collective agreements could lead to the transformation 
                                                          
55 See, in relation to section 219 TULRCA 1992, Express Newspapers v McShane [1980] AC 672, 687, per Lord 
Diplock; Duport Steel v Sirs [1980] 1 WLR 142; NWL Ltd v Nelson [1979] IRLR 478.  The House of Lords held that 
the effects that such action will have are irrelevant in considering whether the action is in contemplation or 
furtherance of a trade dispute.  It is sufficient that the person taking the action honestly and genuinely 
believes that the action is.  Note, however, that an improper motive may negative any genuine intention to 
promote or advance the dispute in question; see Lord Salmon in Nelson; Millet J in Associated British Ports v 
TGWU [1989] IRLR 291, 300.  Note that lower courts had proposed various restrictions.  These were the 
“principle purpose test” (Lord Denning in McSchane v Express Newspapers [1979] IRLR 79), the “reasonably 
capable test” (Lawton and Brandon LJJ in McShane), and the “remoteness test” (see Beaverbook Newspapers 
Ltd v Keys [1978] IRLR 34).  For a convenient summary, see United Brands (UK) Ltd v Fall [1979] IRLR 110. 
56 For an example of how an objective approach can restrict collective trade union action, see the decision of 
the CJEU in International Transport Workers’ Federation v Viking Line ABP (Case C-438/05) [2008] 1 C.M.L.R. 
51.  
57 Marc de Vos (n 42) 69. 
58 ibid.  See also Vousden (n 45) 188.  Vousden points out that the Court seemed oblivious to the fact that the 
provisions cited in support of its exemption refer to the European social partners, whereas the measures in 
Albany were “purely legal measures produced by representative social partners. 
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of private collective bargaining into a quasi-public form of governance.59  Albany ensures that 
trade unions, workers and employers know that where the agreement in question seeks to 
improve conditions of work and employment, it falls outside the scope of EU competition law 
and can therefore be relied upon.  There is no concern for the social partners that the 
agreement is vulnerable to ex-post challenge under competition rules.  As set out in the 
thesis’ introduction, the social partners may be less inclined to conclude collective 
agreements if subject to challenge under EU competition law.60  This is especially the case 
where an agreement only has a marginal improvement on conditions of work and 
employment.  Parties will not know with any certainty the agreement’s effects.61   
Second, the clash of objectives in Albany is constitutional; there is a clash between 
objectives protected by the EU Treaties (or Treaty in force at time of the CJEU’s decision), 
which require a constitutional methodology to be adopted.  This is what the CJEU inevitably 
reverts to in considering the case (and creating the exemption).  Although the CJEU is not 
explicit in adopting such an approach, the structure it adopts in balancing the competing 
objectives indicates such an approach.  Rather than interpreting the competition provisions 
in a way which enables the agreement to not fall within their scope, the CJEU balanced the 
competing objectives through a proportionality assessment.62  In the CJEU’s view, such an 
approach “follow[ed] from an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole which 
is both effective and consistent…”63  Viewing Albany in this way explains the CJEU’s refusal 
(examined in Section 5 below) to adopt a similar approach in the free movement and public 
procurement realms (these areas already allow for competing objectives to be reconciled) 
and why the CJEU adopts such a seemingly wide exemption.64  The CJEU in Albany chose to 
create an exemption, rather than leave any balancing to Article 101 TFEU.  It provided an easy 
solution to a difficult and intractable question, removing the uncertainty that a case-by-case 
approach creates.  A detailed discussion of how the CJEU balanced the competing objectives 
will be the focus of Chapter 4, section 4.   What the constitutional approach in Albany does 
                                                          
59 Vousden (n 45) 191. 
60 See page 8 
61 This is potentially exacerbated by the focus on economic approach adopted by the Commission and CJEU to 
the Treaty competition rules. 
62 See Chapter 4 for detailed discussion of the proportionality principle and the CJEU’s balancing exercise in 
Albany. 
63 Albany (n.1) [60] 
64 This assumption is that where the two conditions are met, the social policy objectives will always outweigh 
the competition policy objectives present. 
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not do, however, is provide an answer for the CJEU’s failure to establish that there was a 
restriction on competition.  If there is no restriction on competition, and/or if the agreement 
benefits from exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU, an exemption may not be necessary.  The 
discussion in Chapters 6 and 7 will examine whether collective agreements fall within Article 
101 TFEU.  Chapters 4 and 5 will explore the constitutional aspects of Albany in further 
detail.65  
Moving on, what is clear from the CJEU case law is that subsequent case law applying 
the exemption does not engage with the arguments set out above.  The CJEU has simply 
applied the exemption to the facts of the case as stated, providing very limited guidance on 
the exemption’s application.66  Section 4 will examine how the exemption has been applied 
in subsequent cases, and its treatment by subsequent AG Opinions.  Section 5 will follow this 
by exploring the CJEU’s approach to similar arguments within the free movement and public 
procurement realms.  The arguments adopted in later case law, strengthens the view that 
Albany conducted a constitutional methodology. 
 
4. The position post-Albany 
Subsequent application of the Albany exemption by the CJEU has not provide any further 
discussion of the exemption’s underlying basis or scope.67  In each case, the CJEU simply 
applied the exemption to the facts of the case.  In Van der Woude, the CJEU held that a 
collective agreement establishing a sector-wide healthcare insurance scheme fell within the 
scope of the exemption as it contributed to improving the working conditions of the 
employees.68  The agreement ensured that employees would have the necessary means to 
meet medical expenses and reduced the costs to be borne by workers.69  Similarly, in 
                                                          
65 Chapter 4 will explore in more detail the constitutional framework and balances under EU law and Albany; 
Chapter 5 the effect of fundamental rights considerations within the EU’s constitutional framework and 
whether this has any effect on the current (and future) application of Albany. 
66 See H Nordling, ‘State of the Unions: The Applicability of Art 101(1) TFEU to Collective Bargaining 
Agreements after FNV Kunsten Media’ (2015) 14 Competition Law Journal 37, 41. 
67 See, Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken BV v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor de Vervoer- en Havenbedrijven (Case 
C-219/97) [1999] E.C.R. I-6121; Brentjens' Haandelsonderneming BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de 
Handel In Bouwmaterialen (Cases C-115 to 117/97) [1999] E.C.R. I-5751; Pavlov v Stichting Pensionefonds 
Medische Specialisten (Cases C-180-184/98) [2001] 4 C.M.L.R. 1; AG2R Prévoyance v Beaudout Père et Fils Sarl 
(Case C-437/09) [2011] 4 C.M.L.R. 19; Van Der Woude v Stichting Beatrixoord (Case C-222/98) [2001] 4 
C.M.L.R. 2.  See also the European Free Trade Court in Landsorganisasjonen I Norge v Kommunes 
Sentralforbund (Case E-8/00) [2002] E.F.T.A. Ct. Rep. 114 
68 Van Der Woude, ibid, [25] 
69 ibid. 
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Brentjens and Drijvende Bokken, the CJEU held that agreements establishing supplementary 
pension schemes fell within the Albany exemption: the agreements guaranteed a certain level 
of pension for all workers in the sector, and thus contributed directly to improving the 
workers’ remuneration.70  Furthermore, in FNV Kunsten, the CJEU held that collective 
agreements covering self-employed workers did not fall within the exemption.71  In finding 
that the agreement fell outside the Albany exemption, the CJEU’s reasoning is clear.  
Individuals working on a self-employed basis are not employees, and those representing them 
are not trade unions but associations of undertakings.72  However, where such individuals are 
classified as “false self-employed” the Albany exemption will apply.73  Such individuals are, 
the CJEU stated, “in a situation comparable to that of employees.”74  This approach brings the 
decision in Albany in line with the EU jurisprudence on the definition of a worker.75 
 Discussion within the AGs’ Opinions, however, has explored the boundaries of the 
Albany exemption.  First, the Advocates-General argued that a restrictive approach should be 
adopted in relation to the exemption.76  In Van der Woude, AG Fennelly opined that the 
exemption must be construed narrowly according to the principle of proportionality.77 AG 
Fennelly argued that a collective agreement will not be protected from EU competition law 
where the agreement “does not pursue a genuine social objective because the restrictions 
resulting from it, or from its application, go beyond what is required by the pursuit of its 
objective.”78  This would significantly restrict the exemption, allowing courts to adopt an 
interventionist approach to an agreement’s purpose.  It allows, as AG Trstenjak in Commission 
v Germany stated, “a substantive examination of the criterion of whether the collective 
agreements concerned or the individual provisions of such were, in fact, concluded with a 
                                                          
70 See Brentjens’ (n.67) [60] 
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74 ibid., [31] 
75 Nordling (n 87) 46–48. 
76 See AG Fennelly in Van der Woude (n.67) [AG28]-[AG32]; AG Jacobs in Pavlov (n.67) [AG100]; AG Trstenjak in 
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view to improving conditions of work and employment.”79  Such an approach would also mean 
that the “purpose” test in Albany is assessed according to an objective standard. 
 Second, AG Trstenjak in Commission v Germany argued that the Albany exemption is 
nothing more than a limitation on the application of competition law.80  The non-applicability 
of the Treaty competition provisions was not automatic and determined on a case-by-case 
basis, meaning that Albany created a limitation and not an exclusion.  This argument is 
unconvincing.  If we consider the wording of the CJEU’s decision in Albany, whether the CJEU 
created a “limitation” or an exclusion is irrelevant.  Where the two requirements in Albany 
are met, Article 101 TFEU does not apply. 
 Third, in FNV Kunsten, AG Wahl proposed an extension to the Albany exemption.  AG 
Wahl argued that a collective agreement covering self-employed workers could be exempt 
from Article 101 TFEU where there is a risk of social dumping.81  AG Wahl made two arguments 
in support of this extension.  First, if it is economically viable to replace employees with self-
employed workers, then employed workers are at risk of losing their jobs and/or becoming 
marginalised.82  Protection is needed to ensure that they are not undercut in terms of wages 
or working terms and conditions.  Implicit in AG Wahl’s statement is that the protection of 
employed workers should take precedence over competition concerns.  Second, to allow this 
form of social dumping weakens a union’s position within collective bargaining.83  Social 
dumping reduces the ability of trade unions to protect their members.  A collectively agreed 
wage increase would be undermined if there was nothing to prevent an employer from 
replacing those workers with self-employed workers at a lower wage.  
AG Wahl suggested that, as such, a two-step test must be satisfied before extending 
the Albany exemption on social dumping grounds.  First, there must be a real and serious risk 
of social dumping.84  It is insufficient to state that there is the possibility that social dumping 
may occur.  If there is no real and serious risk of social dumping, any improvement in a 
worker’s status is uncertain and speculative.  Second, the provision must not go beyond what 
is necessary to prevent social dumping.85  Any provision designed to combat social dumping 
                                                          
79 Commission v Germany (n.71) [AG60]-[AG61] 
80 ibid., [AG62] 
81 FNV Kunsten (n.76) [AG74]-[AG79] 
82 ibid., [AG77] 
83 Ibid., [AG78] 
84 ibid., [AG89]-[AG91] 
85 ibid., [AG92]-[AG99] 
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must be the least restrictive measure.  If it can be prevented via other means, the provision 
is not exempt.  To further this, the provision must be concluded on behalf, and in the interests, 
of those employed.  Thus, a collective agreement solely between workers and their employer 
that sets the amount to be paid to self-employed workers could fall within the Albany 
exemption.  
Although the proposals put forward by the AGs are highly persuasive, they have not 
featured within the CJEU jurisprudence.  This does not necessarily infer that the CJEU rejected 
them, but rather that they were not needed to resolve the case.  As Nordling comments, “the 
application of the [Albany] test was limited to case-specific facts and the Court, perhaps 
intentionally so, provided little guidance on the general application of the test.”86  In refusing 
to provide any further guidance, the CJEU gives itself greater freedom in the future 
application and development of the exemption for collective agreements.  This may include 
the developments identified by the AG’s above, however until that point the CJEU appears 
set on applying the exemption in line with Albany’s decision. 
 
5. Albany confined 
The Albany exemption has been strictly confined to EU competition law.  The CJEU has refused 
to exempt collective agreements from the free movement provisions,87  and  to situations 
where industrial action clashed with the fundamental freedoms.88  In Viking Line, the Court 
held that the reasoning that applies in relation to competition law cannot be transferred to 
the free movement realm.89  Competition law and the “Treaty provisions on the free 
movement of persons and services … are to be applied in different circumstances.”90  The 
Court held that “it cannot be considered that it is inherent in the very exercise of trade union 
rights and the right to take collective action that those fundamental freedoms will be 
prejudiced to a certain degree.”91   
                                                          
86 Nordling (n 66) 41. 
87 See, for example, Schöning-Kougebetopoulou v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg (Case C-15/96) [1998] 1 
C.M.L.R. 931; Merida v Germany (Case C-400/02) [2004] 3 C.M.L.R. 52. 
88 Viking Line (n. 56); Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet (Case C-341/05) [2008] 2 
C.M.L.R. 9 
89 ibid., [51] 
90 ibid., [53] 
91 ibid., [52]. 
74 
 
Furthermore, in Commission v Germany,92 the Court held that the Albany exemption 
was not applicable, nor could it be extended, to EU public procurement rules.   The CJEU, as 
in the fundamental freedom cases, held that the existence of an exemption from the 
competition rules does not automatically mean that collective agreements are exempt from 
public procurement rules.93  In the Court’s view, the application of the public procurement 
rules did not “affect the essence of the right to bargain collectively.”94  Thus, there was no 
need for an exemption: public procurement rules could adequately take account of the social 
policy objectives expressed through collective bargaining.95 
What is noticeable about the case law is that the CJEU consistently refers to the need 
to reconcile the competing objectives through the proportionality assessment,96 and that the 
interests present are not prejudiced to the same extent as under the EU competition 
provisions.  The competing objectives can be accommodated, and balanced, within the 
relevant EU provisions.  They can be considered and used to permit otherwise prohibited 
conduct under EU law.  Were such an approach adopted under Article 101 TFEU, the Albany 
exemption may be unnecessary.  The competing objectives could be accommodated and 
balanced within Article 101 TFEU.  However, this is not to say that decisions such as Viking 
Line do not have a significant chilling effect on trade union rights when faced with liability 
under EU law.97  The BALPA dispute clearly shows this.  BALPA, on threat of an injunction and 
claim for damages for infringing EU free movement provisions, decided against calling 
industrial action.  The potential liability under the EU free movement rules, undermined the 
union’s willingness to exercise its fundamental right to take industrial action.98  This 
strengthens the validity of the decision in Albany to exempt collective agreements, and 
questions the decision not to extend the exemption to other fields of EU internal market law.  
If the detrimental effects are potentially of an equivalent level, why does the CJEU not allow 
for such a broad exemption in other fields of EU law?  
                                                          
92 Commission v Germany (n.76) 
93 ibid., [48] 
94 ibid., [49] 
95 ibid. 
96 See Viking Line (n.56) [46]; Laval (n.88) [94]; Commission v Germany (n.76) [44] 
97 See KD Ewing and John Hendy, ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 39 Industrial Law 
Journal 2, 8.  Ewing and Hendy describe Viking Line as “disembowelling” the right to strike. 
98 c.f. Govia GTR Railway Ltd v ASLEF [2017] I.C.R. 497 
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The CJEU’s case law consistently implies that the proportionality assessment 
contained within the free movement and public procurement provisions cannot be adopted 
under the Treaty competition provisions.  For example, within the free movement provisions 
competing objectives can be balanced through either express derogation provisions or the 
mandatory requirements jurisprudence.99  The assumption is that the CJEU cannot adopt such 
an approach within the Treaty competition provisions.  For example, although the provisions 
of Article 101(3) TFEU mirror a proportionality assessment, the provision’s balancing exercise 
is not as broad as that seen under the free movement and public procurement provisions.100  
However, as will be demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, the CJEU has developed such an 
approach within both parts of Article 101 TFEU.  In Wouters, for example, the CJEU held that 
restrictions on competition which are necessary to achieve a legitimate aim fall outside the 
scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.101  Subsequent application of the Wouters test shows similarity 
with the free movement rules.102  Therefore, the argument that we cannot reconcile the 
competition objectives within Article 101 TFEU may be incorrect. 
 
6. Summary and Concluding Comments 
In Albany, the CJEU held that collective agreements are exempt from EU competition law 
where they are between management and labour, or their representatives, and aim at 
improving terms of work and employment.  To apply competition law to collective 
agreements would, the Court held, seriously undermine the inherent social policy objectives 
contained within such agreements.  However, the CJEU assumes that there is a conflict 
between the competing interests and determines that the best solution is to exempt 
collective agreements from competition law’s scope.  The CJEU does not explore whether 
collective agreements fall within Article 101 TFEU; it simply assumes that they are anti-
competitive. 
As section 2.2 identified, the CJEU in Albany balanced the competing objectives 
present.  Where Albany’s stipulated conditions are met, the social policy objectives outweigh 
                                                          
99 See Articles 36 and 45 TFEU, and the decision in Cassis de Dijon (Case 120/78] [1979] E.C.R. 649 [10]-[14]. 
100 See the discussion in Chapter 7. 
101 See Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (Case C-309/99) [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 2 
[97]-[109] 
102 See Meca-Medina v Commission (Case C-519/04 P) [2006] E.C.R. I-6991; Ordem dos Technicos Officias de 
Contas v Autoridade da Concorrencia (Case C-1/12) [2013] 4 C.M.L.R. 20. 
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competition policy’s objectives.  The CJEU’s balance however is very opaque.  All we can say 
for certain is that the CJEU balanced/weighed the competing objectives outside of Article 101 
TFEU.  It is unclear what values were assigned to the competing objectives and how the CJEU 
balanced them.  Did the CJEU balance of the competing interests according to the 
proportionality principle?  This is important in determining whether the decision of the CJEU 
is ‘correct’.  If we do not know how the CJEU weighed the competing objectives, we cannot 
say whether its decision is ‘correct’. 
Chapters 4 and 5 will address these questions.  Chapter 4 will explore the structure of 
the EU Treaties and the effect that the EU constitutional legal order has on the competing 
objectives.  It will also show how conflicts between objectives are resolved, and whether this 
has any impact on the balance within Albany.  Chapter 5 will develop the constitutional aspect 
of Albany further, examining the impact that EU fundamental rights may have on the Albany 
exemption.  The discussion in these chapters will lead into the discussion in Chapters 6 and 7 
which will examine whether it is possible to interpret and apply Article 101 TFEU in a way 
which takes account of the competing objectives present when applying that provision to 
collective agreements.  
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4. The EU Constitutional Implications of Albany: How did (and can) the 
CJEU resolve the conflict between objectives 
 
1. Introduction 
In applying Article 101 TFEU to collective agreements, two sets of conflicting rules are present: 
labour rules and competition rules.1   A conflict between these rules arises where a collective 
agreement is shown to be anti-competitive.  The treaty provisions presume that collective 
agreements are lawful, yet anti-competitive agreements are automatically void under Article 
101(2) TFEU.  This conflict is more evident when viewed through the lens of the policy 
objectives present: social policy and competition policy.  In Albany, the CJEU concluded that 
applying competition law to collective agreements would seriously undermine the social 
policy objectives sought by such agreements.  Implicit in this, is the view that competition and 
collective agreements seek to achieve different, irreconcilable objectives.  As set out in the 
introduction, trade unions, and labour laws, aim to prevent the exploitation of workers and a 
“race to the bottom”.  In contrast competition is concerned with creating a free market with 
low costs to achieve allocative and productive efficiency.2  Trade unions, through collective 
bargaining and industrial action undermine the low-cost, efficiency model that is vital to the 
competitive process.  Higher wages are passed on to consumers through higher prices; 
similarly, stoppages of production due to industrial action lead to reduced productivity.  
Where such actions are not accompanied by a consumer benefit, consumer welfare is 
reduced.   
This was the dilemma faced by the CJEU in Albany, treaty objectives pulling in opposite 
directions.  In creating an exemption for collective agreements, the CJEU implied that the 
differing objectives cannot be reconciled in other ways; the social policy objectives pursued 
by collective agreements could only be achieved if competition policy’s objectives were 
excluded.3  In doing so, the CJEU gives priority to social policy goals.  Where the stipulated 
conditions in Albany are met, the social policy objectives outweigh competition policy’s 
                                                          
1 See Chapter 1, section 3; Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie (Case C-
67/96) [2000] 4 C.M.L.R. 446 [AG178] 
2 See Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1960); Richard Posner, 
‘Some Economics of Labor Law’ (1984) 51 The University of Chicago Law Review 988. 
3 Townley refers to this as a first order conflict; one policy can only be achieved at the expense of the other. 
Christopher Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy (Oxford: Hart, 2009) 28–41. 
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objectives.  However, such an approach could, as Townley argues, jeopardise the attainment 
of competition law’s goals.4  By ignoring the competitive effects of a collective agreement, 
and focussing solely on the perceived public policy benefits, an exemption prevents the 
“optimal Community balance” from being achieved.5  However, this assumes that Albany does 
not achieve the “optimal Community balance”.  As the CJEU stated, the “social policy 
objectives pursued by such agreements would be seriously undermined if … subject to [Article 
101] of the Treaty…”6  The “optimal community balance” could be to protect the social policy 
objectives.  In balancing the competing objectives, the CJEU concluded that the social policy 
objectives “outweigh” competition policy’s objectives. 
This chapter will examine the CJEU’s decision in Albany in the context of the EU‘s 
constitutional framework.  The Chapter will explore how the CJEU resolves conflicts between 
objectives, and the effect that this has on the approach within Albany.  The discussion will 
explore whether, from a constitutional perspective, the decision in Albany is correct.  Section 
2 will set out the constitutional framework within which Treaty objectives sit.  The section will 
explore the effects of the Treaty integration clauses and the CJEU’s teleological approach on 
the application and interpretation of EU law.  The section will show that by requiring that 
wider objectives/interests are considered in the application of EU Treaty provisions, balancing 
competing objectives may be required.  It will also show that interpreting Article 101 TFEU in 
a manner which gives adequate weight to the social policy objectives may remove the need 
for an exemption.  Where this is possible under Article 101 TFEU, the social policy objectives 
are arguably not seriously undermined. 
Section 3 will explore how the CJEU generally resolves conflicts between objectives by 
balancing the competing objectives through the application of the proportionality.  Section 
3.1 will start the discussion by identifying the differing views of balancing.  Section 3.2 will 
show that the CJEU resolves conflicts between objectives by balancing them through the 
proportionality assessment.  In conducting such an assessment, the CJEU considers whether 
the measure is (i) suitable or appropriate in order to achieve the objective pursued; (ii) 
necessary to achieve the desired objective; and, (iii) imposes on the individual a burden that 
                                                          
4 Christopher Townley, ‘What Goals Count in Article 101 TFEU? Public Policy and Its Discontents’ (2011) 9 
European Competition Law Review 441. 
5 ibid. On this basis, Townley argues that competition policy cannot be reduced to one single goal. 
6 Albany (n.1) [59] 
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is excessive in relation to the objective sought.7  The aim of section 3.2 is not to add to the 
existing literature but show how the CJEU balances competing objectives.  This will provide 
the basis to explore whether the CJEU in Albany adopted the correct approach in balancing 
the competing objectives.8  If the CJEU adopted an incorrect approach, it can be argued that 
the CJEU’s decision is incorrect.   
Section 4 will explore how the CJEU in Albany balanced the competing objectives 
present.  The section will show that the CJEU in Albany applied a proportionality approach 
stricto sensu, balancing the harm to the social policy objectives against the need to achieve 
competition policy’s objectives.  The section will argue that the CJEU adopted a symmetrical 
balancing exercise.  This can be seen from the CJEU’s formulation of the exemption in that it 
does not apply to all collective agreements, only those that meet its stipulated conditions.  
Exempting all collective agreements, we can assume, was considered disproportionate.  
Section 5 will summarise the chapter. 
 
2. The Treaties  
The Treaties potentially provide for a hierarchy of objectives.  Prior to the Lisbon Treaty 
amendments, the Treaty’s structure enabled a hierarchy of objectives to be easily identified.9  
Article 2 EC provided the main goals of the Community as being a common market, economic 
and monetary union  
 
and by implementing the common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 4 EC, to promote throughout 
the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of 
employment and of social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary 
growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection 
                                                          
7 See, P Craig and G De Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University 
Press 2015) 551–8; Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press 2006) ch 3. 
8 For detailed discussion see Grainne De Burca, ‘The Principle of Proportionality and Its Application in EC Law’ 
(1993) 13 Yearbook of European Law 105; Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2018) chs 
19–21; Tridimas (n 7) chs 3, 4. 
9 See Christopher Townley, ‘Is Anything More Important than Consumer Welfare (in Article 81 EC)? Reflections 
of a Community Lawyer’ in Catherine Barnard (ed), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 
(Bloomsbury Publishing 2008) 351. c.f. Marc de Vos, ‘Collective Labour-Agreements and European Competition 
Law: An Inherent Contradiction’, A decade beyond Maastricht: the European social dialogue revisited (Kluwer 
Law International 2003) 70–1., who argues that there is no a priori hierarchy in the Treaties. 
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and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and 
economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.10   
 
Articles 3 and 4 set out the means of achieving the objectives listed in Article 2, which included 
both competition and social policy objectives.11  For example, Article 3 EC states that the 
activities of the Community include, amongst others, an agricultural and fisheries policy,12 a 
system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted,13 employment 
policy,14 and environmental policy.15 
Such a structure is also present post-Lisbon.  Article 3 TEU sets out EU’s objectives, 
combining the Article 2 and 3 EC objectives within one provision.  Article 3(1) TEU sets out the 
more aspirational objectives contained within Article 2 EC,16 with Articles 3(2) and 3(3) TEU 
containing the objectives previously set out in Article 3 EC.  As such, implementation 
provisions in the Treaty aimed at achieving the objectives set out in Articles 3(2) and (3) TEU, 
are ultimately, in turn, aimed at achieving the aspirational objectives set out in Article 3(1) 
TEU.  For example, the Treaty competition provisions are aimed at achieving the internal 
market and economic growth (Article 3(3) TEU), which in turn ensures the well-being of the 
Union’s peoples (Article 3(1) TEU). 
Article 3(3) TEU provides for a mix of economic and social objectives, with no a priori 
hierarchy between objectives.  The social and economic objectives are “a priori on a par.”17  
Article 3(3) TEU states that  
 
[t]he Union shall establish an internal market.  It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe 
based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, 
                                                          
10 Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community [2002] OJ C325/33. 
11 See, for example, Articles 3(1)(g), (i), and (k) EC 
12 Article 3(e) EC 
13 Article 3(g) EC 
14 Article 3(i) EC 
15 Article 3(l) EC. 
16 Article 3(1) TEU states that “[t]he Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its 
peoples.” 
17 See Constanze Semmelmann, ‘The European Union’s Economic Constitution under the Lisbon Treaty: Soul-
Searching among Lawyers Shifts the Focus to Procedure’ [2010] European Law Review 516, 520.  Wardhaugh 
qualifies this, arguing that even if there is a hierarchy between objectives, competition may not be near the 
top: “[I]t is certainly not primus inter pares.”  Bruce Wardhaugh, ‘Crisis Cartels: Non-Economic Values, the 
Public Interest and Institutional Considerations’ [2014] European Competition Journal 311, 330. 
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aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the 
quality of the environment.  It shall promote scientific and technological advance… (emphasis added) 
 
Article 3(3) TEU also provides for further social and economic objectives, for example, 
solidarity, social and economic cohesion, non-discrimination, equality, and economic and 
monetary union.  Although Article 3(3) TEU contains no reference to a “system of undistorted 
competition”, previously found within Article 3(1)(g) EC, such requirement is contained within 
Protocol 27.  Any reference to competition within Article 3(3) TEU is limited to achieving a 
“highly competitive social market economy”.18  This raised arguments that competition was 
no longer a fundamental goal,19 however, the ECJ quickly remedied this, stating in TeliaSonera 
that the requirement of “undistorted competition” belongs to the fundamental principles of 
the economic constitution of the EU.20   
This does not, however, explain how conflicts between objectives of a priori 
equivalence are resolved.  The equivalence given to Treaty objectives implies that conflicts 
between them are resolved through a balancing exercise.  This equivalence does not mean 
that objectives cannot have different weights when weighed against each other, simply that 
one objective does not automatically outweigh the other: individual situations will further, or 
seek to achieve, objectives to differing extents.  A clear example of this can be seen in Albany.  
In concluding that collective agreements should be exempt from European competition law, 
                                                          
18 Protocol 27 states that “…the internal market as set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union 
includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted.”  Note that Article 3(3) TEU refers to a “highly 
competitive social market economy…” 
19 Ben van Rompuy ‘Thanks Nicolas Sarkozy, But No Thanks’ Kluwer Competition Law Blog 25th November 2011 
, http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2011/11/25/thanks-nicolas-sarkozy-but-no-thanks-cjeu-rules-on-
status-of-protocol-on-internal-market-and-competition/ [last accessed 30/05/2016, 14.26].  President Sarkozy 
had stated that such a move had “…obtained a major reorientation of the objectives of the Union.  
Competition is no longer an objective of the Union, or an end in itself, but a means to serve the internal 
market.”.  See also Anne C Witt, ‘Public Policy Goals Under EU Competition Law—Now Is the Time to Set the 
House in Order’ (2012) 8 European Competition Journal 443, 465; Ben Van Rompuy, ‘The Impact of the Lisbon 
Treaty on EU Competition Law: A Review of Recent Case Law of the EU Courts’ December 2011 CPI Antitrust 
Chronicle 1. 
20 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB (Case C-52/09) [2011] E.C.R. I-527 [20].  Note that there is a 
difference between undistorted and unrestricted. See also Neelie Kroes; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-07-250_en.htm?locale=en [last accessed 22/06/2017, 12.17]; Michel Petite, Director General 
of the European Commission’s Legal Service (Letter to the editor of the Financial Times 27 June 2007) who 
states that the protocol has the same legal value as the Treaty provisions to which it is attached. See also 
Article 119 TFEU which states that “[f]or the purposes of Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union, the 
activities of the Union and Member States shall include, as provided in the Treaties, the adoption of an 
economic policy which is based on the close cooperation of Member States’ economic policies, on the internal 
market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle of an 
open market economy with free competition.” 
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the CJEU considered that the social policy objectives outweighed competition policy’s 
objectives.  What the CJEU did not do is clearly explain why the social policy objectives 
outweighed competition policy’s objectives.  This shall be explored in section 4 below.  
However, it may be that competing objectives can be reconciled through other means. This 
shall be the focus of sections 2.1 and 2.2. 
 
2.1 Integration Clauses and  
Integration clauses are prevalent within the Treaties: indeed, they were present in the EC 
Treaty as well.21  Integration, or policy-linking clauses, require that their objectives are 
considered whenever other EU policies and activities are implemented.22  These clauses 
attempt to codify the Court’s case law on policy linkage.23  Article 7 TFEU provides for a generic 
approach, stating that the “Union shall ensure consistency between its principles and 
activities, taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance with the principle of 
conferral of powers.”24  The Treaties also include other object-specific clauses, covering 
objectives such as promoting high levels of employment, combating discrimination and 
inequality to consumer protection, environmental protection, and animal welfare.25   
The integration clauses have been well received within the academic literature.  
Article 7 TFEU has been described as a “super-integration clause”,26 providing the basis for all 
EU objectives and policies to have relevance in seemingly isolated activities.  Townley argues, 
in the context of the EC Treaty, that such clauses require “that their objectives be considered 
whenever other Community policies and activities are implemented.”27  Lavrijsen, 
furthermore, states that in the context of the Treaty competition provisions, “[f]rom a legal 
perspective, it may be concluded that the TFEU and the policy-linking clauses in particular, as 
well as the case law of the ECJ, leave some leeway for non-competition interests in the 
                                                          
21 See, for example, Articles 6 & 11 TEC 
22 Craig and De Búrca (n 7) 393. 
23 Witt (n 19); Wardhaugh (n 17). See also Albany (n.1) [60]; “It therefore follows from an interpretation of the 
provisions of the Treaty as a whole which is both effective and consistent…” 
24 Article 7 TFEU 
25 See Articles 8-13 TFEU.  Note that other integration clauses feature within the Treaties, for example, Article 
167 TFEU relating to cultural policy.  
26 Hans Vedder, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon and European Environmental Law and Policy’ (2010) 22 Journal of 
Environmental Law 285, 289. 
27 Townley, ‘Is Anything More Important than Consumer Welfare (in Article 81 EC)? Reflections of a 
Community Lawyer’ (n 9) 352.  See also Martin Wasmeier, ‘The Integration Environmental Protection as a 
General Rule for Interpreting Community Law’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 159, 162. 
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interpretation of competition law.”28  Similarly, Boute argues, in the context of Article 11 TFEU 
(the environmental integration clause) and EU competition law, that “[c]ompetition law … 
must take environmental considerations fully into account.”29 
The use of integration clauses within CJEU case law has, however, been mixed.  
Although referred to in CJEU judgments, the CJEU has more frequently focused on 
interpretative techniques, especially its teleological approach.30 In Artegodan, for example, 
the CJEU, having stated that Article 6 EC (Article 11 TFEU) and Article 152 EC (Article 168 TFEU) 
expressly integrated a high level of protection of the environment and public health 
respectively into all Union policies,31 uses the presence of these clauses to define the 
precautionary principle “as a general principle of Community law requiring the competent 
authorities to take appropriate measures to prevent specific risks to public health, safety and 
the environment, by giving precedence to the requirements related to the protection of those 
interests over economic interests.”32  It was through the precautionary principle that the CJEU 
decided the case, not the integration clauses as such. 
 This approach is also present in relation to other integration clauses.  For example, 
when faced with cultural and public health issues, the Court has adopted a teleological 
approach to ensure that such considerations are taken account of.  In Pfizer Animal Health, 
for example, the Court relied on the precautionary principle, alongside the integration clause 
in Article 152 EC, to include public health objectives within their assessment.  The Court held 
that it must assess “whether the institutions correctly applied the relevant provisions of 
Directive 70/524, as they are to be interpreted in light of the rules of the Treaty and, in 
particular, of the precautionary principle, as enshrined in Article 130r(2) of the Treaty.”33  In 
                                                          
28 Saskia Lavrijssen, ‘What Role for National Competition Authorities in Protecting Non-Competition Issues 
after Lisbon?’ [2010] European Law Review 636, 646. 
29  Anatole Boute, ‘Environmental Protection and EC Anti-Trust Law: The Commission’s Approach for Packaging 
Waste Management Systems’ (2006) 15 Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 
146, 153. See also Suzanne Kingston, ‘Integrating Environmental Protection and EU Competition Law: Why 
Competition Isn’t Special’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 780, 786. 
30 The CJEU’s teleological approach requires that EU legislative provision are interpreted and applied in light of 
the EU’s objectives.   
31 Artegodan GmbH v Commission (Joined Cases T-74/00 etc.) [2002] E.C.R. II-4945, [183] 
32 ibid., [184].  See also PreussenElektra (Case C-379/98) [2001] E.C.R. I-2099, [73]-[78] where the Court makes 
express mention of the integration clause in Article 6 EC (now Article 11 TFEU) alongside express policy aims 
contained in the Preamble to Directive 96/92 allowing Member States to give priority to energy from 
renewable sources. 
33 Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council (Case T-13/99) [2002] E.C.R. II-3305, [125].  At [114] the Court states that 
“[i]t is apparent from Article 130r(1) and (2) of the Treaty that Community policy on the environment is to 
pursue the objective inter alia of protecting human health, that the policy which aims at a high level of 
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Commission v Belgium, the Court rejected the Belgian State’s argument that its system of 
controls imposed on programmes from other Member States could be justified by reading 
Directive 89/552 in conformity with Article 128 EC.34  The Court accepted that Article 128 EC 
(now Art 167 TFEU) required the Community “to take cultural aspects into account in its 
actions under other provisions of the Treaty”,35 but held that Article 128 EC does not allow for 
a derogation from the system established by the Directive.36   
 The CJEU’s preferred approach potentially denies the Treaty integration clauses any 
independent legal effect within the CJEU’s analysis, arguably going against the Treaties 
express intention.37  For example, the Court has used the Treaty integration clauses alongside 
the preamble in relevant secondary legislation,38 the precautionary principle,39 and the CJEU’s 
teleological approach to interpretation.  This implies that the Treaty integration clauses 
achieve nothing that existing CJEU approaches do not,40 with such clauses seen as a 
codification of its existing teleological approach.  As such, it is unsurprising that the CJEU 
adopts a more passive approach.  The clauses provide no guidance as to how their objectives 
are to be taken account of: the clauses simply require that they are considered.41   
                                                          
protection, is based in particular on the precautionary principle and that the requirements of the policy must 
be integrated into the definition and implementation of other Community policies.  Furthermore, as the third 
subparagraph of Article … [152 EC] … provides, and in accordance with settled case law … health protection 
requirements form a constituent part of the Community’s other policies and must therefore be taken into 
account when the common agricultural policy is implemented by the Community institutions.” (emphasis 
added).  See also, Commission v France (Case C-197/08) [2010] E.C.R. I-1559; Commission v Austria (Case C-
198/08) [2010] E.C.R. I-1645; Commission v Ireland (Case C-221/08) ]2010] E.C.R. I-1669, concerning minimum 
pricing requirements for tobacco products.  
34 Commission v Belgium (Case C-11/95) [1996] E.C.R. I-4153.  The Belgian State had argued that the its system 
of control was necessary to secure respect for certain cultural objectives; see [46].  
35 ibid., [49] 
36 Ibid., [50].  At [48], the Court points out that the Directive already pursues cultural objectives in its scheme 
set out in Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 89/552.  See also CISAC (Case COM/C2/38.698) [2003] O.J. L 107, [93]-
[99] where the Commission directly addressed CISAC’s argument under Article 167(4) TFEU that the challenge 
to the associations licensing scheme would impact on cultural diversity. 
37 Collette Cunningham, ‘In Defence of Member State Culture: The Unrealised Potential of Article 151(4) of the 
EC Treaty and the Consequences for EC Cultural Policy’ (2001) 34 Cornell International Law Journal 120, 154–5.  
Cunningham argues that the CJEU has left the strength of the cultural integration clause uncertain.  In failing to 
set the clauses’ limits, or explain how such clauses may be used, the CJEU fails to help the Commission 
integrate wider policy objectives into their activities. 
38 Commission v Belgium (n.34) 
39 Artegodan (n.31); PreussenElektra (n.32) 
40 See AG Lenz in The Publishers Association v Commission (Case C-360/92 P) [1995] E.C.R. I-0023, [AG60].  AG 
Lenz makes this statement in the context of the cultural integration clause contained within Article 167 TFEU 
(ex-Art 128 EC). 
41 Evangelina Psychogiopoulou, ‘The Cultural Mainstreaming Clause of Article 151(4) EC: Protection and 
Promotion of Cultural Diversity or Hidden Cultural Agenda?’ (2006) 12 European Law Journal 575, 584. 
Psychogiopoulou argues that the Treaty integration clauses “merely entrusts Community institutions with such 
a duty. It is a matter of assessment and evaluation, not of prescribed results to obtain. Hence, although an 
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2.2 The teleological approach 
The CJEU has consistently held that EU law is to be “interpreted and applied in light” of the 
Treaties’ objectives.42  In van Gend & Loos, the CJEU held that the provision in question, Article 
12 EEC, had to be interpreted “according to the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of 
the Treaty.”43  In Continental Can, the CJEU held that in order to answer the question before 
it, “one has to go back to the spirit, general scheme and wording of Article [102 TFEU], as well 
as the system and objectives of the Treaty.”44  Similarly in CILFIT, the CJEU stated that in 
addition to the wording and context of the provision within Community law as a whole, and 
its objectives, the CJEU should also have regard to “its state of evolution at the date on which 
the provision in question is to be applied.”45  This means that, where necessary, the CJEU will 
interpret, and apply, Treaty provisions in ways which may seem at odds with their wording, 
adopting a dynamic approach to the development of EU law.46  In adopting such an approach, 
Bengoetxea states that the CJEU’s approach goes “beyond words, or at the very least beyond 
the plain, seemingly obvious meaning of a word in one particular language version, and 
looking for a more autonomous, cross-language or harmonised meaning, taking into account 
context, system, objectives, effectiveness and consequences.”47    
Bengoetxea identifies three “first-order criteria” for interpretation relied upon by the 
CJEU in “hard” cases.48  These are (i) semiotic or linguistic arguments based on the wording of 
the provision in question; (ii) systemic and contextual arguments placing the legal provision 
                                                          
easy precedence of cultural concerns to the detriment of other legitimate EC objectives is not required, the 
goals identified under the various EC policy fields must be attained in the most culturally friendly way. In the 
case of seriously conflicting interests, where equilibrium is not possible to find, caution should be exercised via 
the adoption of measures that refrain from making arrangements which might jeopardise the attainment of 
cultural goals in the long run.” 
42 See, for example, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and Commercial Solvents Corporation v Commission 
(Joined Cases 6 and 7/73) [1974] ECR 223, [32]: Levin (Case 53/81) [1982] ECR 1035, [15]. 
43 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue 
Administration (Case 26/62) [1963] E.C.R. 1, 13.  See also Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of 
Health (Case 283/81) [1982] E.C.R. 3415 [19]-[20]; Procureur de la Republique v Association de defence des 
bruleurs d’huilage usages (Case 240/83) [1985] E.C.R. 531, [13], [AG53]. 
44 Continental Can (Case 6/72) E.C.R. 215, [22] 
45 CILFIT (n.43) [20] 
46 Hartley explains that this creates interpretations and decisions which are both “outside” and “contrary” to 
the wording of the provision being interpreted. Trevor Hartley, ‘The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and 
the Constitution of the European Union’ (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 95, 96. 
47 Joxerramon Bengoetxea, ‘Text and Telos in the European Court of Justice - Four Recent Takes on the Legal 
Reasoning of the ECJ’ (2015) 11 European Constitutional Law Review 184, 206–7. 
48 Joxerramon Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice: Towards a European 
Jurisprudence (Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press 1993) 233. 
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in a wider context of the Treaties; and (iii) teleological, functional and consequentialist 
arguments relating to “the dynamic context in which norms operate.”49  The CJEU, however, 
does not separate out such considerations within its decisional practice, instead using all 
three criteria in support of an interpretation.  In Continental Can, for example, the CJEU held 
that the wording of Article 102 TFEU (ex-Article 86 EC) along with the underlying Treaty 
objectives pursued by the provision allowed for the provision to catch practices which were 
detrimental to consumers due to their effects on the market’s structure.50   
In adopting an interpretation “in light of the broader context provided by the [EU] 
legal order and its ‘constitutional telos’”,51 the CJEU ensures that EU law develops without the 
need for constant Treaty amendments.   In this sense, the CJEU will consider interpretations 
aimed at achieving and furthering the goals and objectives of the Union as a whole, in line 
with the goals and objectives contained within Articles 2 and 3 TEU.  Such an approach can 
clearly be seen within the CJEU’s case law.  For example, in Van Gend & Loos, the CJEU held 
that the provision in question had direct effect; it could be relied upon by natural and legal 
persons in courts of the Member States.  The CJEU did so through considering the wider 
underlying objectives of the European Community.52  In Defrenne, the CJEU held that Article 
141 EC (now-Article 157 TFEU) was directly effective and could be invoked by private and 
public bodies.53  Despite not fulfilling the criteria for direct effect, the CJEU focussed on the 
need to ensure the provision’s effectiveness.54  The CJEU’s reasoning emphasised the dual 
economic and social objectives the provision pursued,55 and stated that even though the 
                                                          
49 ibid 233–262.  See also Kutscher Methods of Interpretation as seen by a Judge at the Court of Justice in 
Judicial and Academic Conference, Luxembourg, 27-28 September 1976, part 1, sections 5-6.  Itzcovich 
criticises Bengoetxea’s second and third criteria on the basis that in using teleological considerations, the CJEU 
will consider the systemic considerations and vice versa. Therefore, it is potentially misleading to separate out 
these more dynamic considerations. See Giulio Itzcovitch, ‘The Interpretation of Community Law by the 
European Court of Justice’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal 537. See also, Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Interpreting 
European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2008) 1 European Journal of 
Legal Studies 137, 140. 
50 Continental Can (n.44) [23]-[26] 
51 Poiares Maduro (n 49) 140. 
52 Van Gend en Loos (n.44) 12.  See also Costa v E.N.E.L. (Case 6/64) [1964] E.C.R. 585, where the CJEU 
introduced the concept of supremacy of EU law based on the need to ensure the effectiveness of EU law.  The 
CJEU states that “the executive force of community law cannot vary from one State to another in deference to 
subsequent national laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty set out in Article 
5(2) and giving rise to the discrimination prohibited in Article 7.” (emphasis added) 
53 Defrenne v SABENA (No. 2) (Case 43/75) [1976] ECR 455 
54 ibid., [31]-[34].  The Court considered that it would be counter-intuitive to not allow individuals to rely on 
the provision where the provision had not been implemented within the set period, and EU institutions had 
not acted sufficiently energetically to Member States’ failure to act. 
55 ibid., [8]-[20].   
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provision was formally addressed to Member States, it did not prevent “rights from being 
conferred at the same time on any individual who has an interest in the performance of the 
duties thus laid down.”56   
The teleological approach allows the CJEU to interpret EU law, and Treaty provisions, 
in light of the “dynamic and evolving nature of the European Community, which over the 
years has changed its plans from a purely economic approach to a broader system of values 
which affects social and environmental issues, and the protection human rights.”57  It ensures 
that CJEU jurisprudence develops in line with Treaty amendments, particularly where there is 
an enlargement or adjustment to the underlying values and objectives of the Union.   This 
includes the Treaty competition provisions.  Gerber, for example, has argued that the Treaty 
competition provisions have developed in line with the teleological approach; the CJEU 
interpreting the provisions in light of “its own conception of what was necessary to achieve 
the integrationist goals of the Treaty.”58  This teleological approach can already be seen within 
the CJEU’s jurisprudence concerning the Treaty competition provisions, for example, through 
the wide range of objectives which the CJEU has adopted in its decisional practice.  The CJEU 
has avoided stating the goal/objective pursued by the Treaty competition provisions. 
 
2.3 Why is this relevant to Albany? 
The above discussion has shown that the Treaty integration clauses and the CJEU’s 
teleological approach require that EU law is interpreted in a manner which considers the 
wider objectives of the EU.  In relation to Albany, this provides an argument against the need 
for an exemption for collective agreements.  Where Article 101 TFEU can be interpreted and 
applied in a manner which gives appropriate weight to the social policy objectives pursued by 
collective agreements, they are not seriously undermined.  As such, any restriction on such 
objectives would be proportionate: the social policy objectives would have been 
                                                          
56 ibid., [31].  
57 Oreste Pollicino, ‘Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Context of Principle of Equality Between 
Judicial Activism and Self-Restraint’ (2005) 5 German Law Journal 283, 289.  See also Federico Mancini, 
Democracy and Constitutionalism in the European Union: Collected Essays (Hart Pub 2000) 44.  Mancini states 
that the “primary objective [of the EU] is an ever closer union among the peoples of the Europe.” 
58David Gerber, ‘The Transformation of European Community Competition Law?’ (1994) 35 Harvard 
International Law Review 97, 109.  See also Khoo, who argues that the Treaty competition provisions have to 
be interpreted in light of the Treaties’ objectives and principles.  Sheryl Khoo, ‘Carving out Non-Economic 
Objectives under Section 9, Chapter I Prohibition of the UK Competition Act 1998: What Money Can’t Buy’ 
(2018) 39 European Competition Law Review 190, 194. 
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appropriately considered.  Any exemption may be unnecessary.  Whether such an 
interpretation of Article 101 TFEU is possible will be explored in Chapters 6 and 7.  The 
chapters will examine how we could apply the provision to a collective agreement. 
However, it is not always possible to resolve conflicts between different policy 
objectives by using the Treaty integration clauses and the CJEU’s teleological approach.  
Where this is the case, the CJEU balances the competing objectives through the 
proportionality principle.  Only by weighing the competing interests can the court determine 
which objective outweighs the other.  This does not mean that the proportionality assessment 
and teleological approach exist in isolation; the proportionality assessment is influenced by 
the teleological approach.59  Furthermore, in balancing the competing objectives, the CJEU (or 
court in general) should be clear how the balancing exercise is conducted, and what aim the 
exercise is to achieve.  Without doing so, the balance becomes overly subjective and lacks any 
clear structure.  Therefore, it is vital that the CJEU is clear how such objectives are balanced, 
what considerations it is considering, and what the overarching/ultimate goal of such a 
balance is.  
This is hidden in the CJEU’s decision in Albany.  Whilst the CJEU balanced the 
competing objectives present, it did not clearly explain how it did so.  The CJEU did not clearly 
articulate the objectives being balanced and how it intended to weigh and balance them.  The 
CJEU simply held that applying EU competition law (and achieving competition policy’s 
objectives) would seriously undermine the social policy objectives pursued by collective 
agreements.  What is important in Albany is that the CJEU did not consider that the social 
policy objectives always outweighed the competition policy objectives, they only did where 
Albany’s stipulated conditions were met.  This shows that the CJEU considered that the social 
policy objectives pursued by collective agreements would not always be seriously 
undermined by the application of EU competition policy to require exemption.  I shall return 
to this point throughout the following discussion. 
The remainder of this chapter will focus on how the CJEU balances competing 
objectives, and discussion of the CJEU’s balance in Albany.  Section 3 will set out how the CJEU 
balances competing objectives through a proportionality application.  It will also provide a 
basic overview of the theoretical arguments for and against balancing.  Section 4 will then 
                                                          
59 This can be seen in Albany where the CJEU stated that the exemption was following an “interpretation of the 
provisions of the Treaty which is both effective and consistent.” 
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examine the approach of the CJEU in Albany to balancing the competing objectives.  It will 
show that the CJEU balanced the competing objectives through a proportionality approach. 
 
3. Balancing and the CJEU’s approach to proportionality 
The previous sections have demonstrated that the Treaty integration clauses and CJEU’s 
teleological approach require that multiple objectives are considered by the CJEU when 
interpreting and applying Treaty provisions.   As such, conflicts arise where objectives pull in 
different directions.  This means that the CJEU has to balance competing objectives.  As Alexy 
states, if two principles (objectives) compete then “one of the principles must be 
outweighed.”60  Similarly, Beck argues that in the context of the EU legal order, value pluralism 
requires that conflicting values/objectives are balanced.61  Whether we can balance 
competing objectives, rights, or freedoms has been the subject of significant debate.62  The 
purpose of this section is not to engage in a debate of whether we could or should balance 
rights, objectives or goals, but rather will show, in section 3.2, how the CJEU approaches 
balancing competing objectives.  Section 3.1 will first provide a basic overview of the opposing 
views of balancing, focussing on Habermas and Alexy, before addressing the CJEU’s approach 
to balancing.  The section will not engage with the debate over whether we can balance rights 
or goals; the purpose is to show that it is disputed whether balancing is the appropriate tool 
for reconciling competing objectives. 
 
3.1 A “brief” view of balancing 
There are fundamentally two views of balancing; one hostile, one favourable.  The hostile 
view of balancing is that it is an irrational and illegitimate renunciation of law in favour of a 
system of arbitrary judicial discretion.63  Habermas, for example, argued that balancing 
reduces all debate about rights, or between rights and the pursuit of conflicting goals, to 
                                                          
60 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Repr, Oxford Univ Press 2010) 50.  Alexy describes a conflict 
between objectives/principles as being where one principle prohibits something and another permits it. 
61 Gunnar Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU (Hart Publishing 2012) 185–6.  Beck states 
that this greatly extends the judicial discretion of the CJEU as it is required to balance, choose between, or 
interpret various norms, values, principles and objectives.  
62 See, for example, Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
and Democracy (MIT Press 1996); Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (n 60); Ronald Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously (Harvard Univ Press 1978); Steven Greer, ‘“Balancing” and the European Court of Human 
Rights: A Contribution to the Habermas-Alexy Debate’ (2004) 63 Cambridge Law Journal 412. 
63 See Greer (n 62) 256–61, 413. 
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policy arguments, which removes rights’ strict priority over other considerations.  This, 
Habermas argued, means that the “firewall” between the pursuit of rights and the pursuit of 
public policy collapses.64  Furthermore, as there is no rational standard by which judges can 
reconcile competing objectives, any decisions based on balancing are irrational.   Balancing 
takes place not within the scope of rule-governed behaviour, but that of judicial discretion.  
Finally, Habermas argued that the overall balance is therefore not about right or wrong, but 
rather what is adequate or appropriate in varying degrees.65   
The opposing view, as argued by Alexy, is that although judicial balancing can be 
difficult to describe and defend, when properly understood it is not irrational.66  Balancing, as 
Alexy argued, is inescapable when faced with conflicting rights, and conflicts between rights 
and collective interests.  Rights should be considered as optimisation principles, meaning that 
they should be realised to the greatest possible extent given the factual and legal situation.67  
Basing his argument on German constitutional jurisprudence, Alexy proposed that conflicts 
between rights could be resolved through the proportionality principle, assessing whether a 
restriction on a competing principle/right is suitable, necessary and proportionate in the 
narrow sense.68  In considering whether a restriction is proportionate, Alexy theorised a “Law 
of Balancing”, stating that the importance of achieving one right or principle must outweigh 
the detriment caused by not achieving the competing one.69   
Alexy breaks his “Law of Balancing” into three separate steps, which provide a counter 
to the arguments against balancing.  First, the “degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, 
the first principle” is established; second, the importance of satisfying the competing principle 
is established; and third, whether the importance of satisfying the competing principle 
justifies the detriment to, or non-satisfaction of, the first principle.70  In applying this 
approach, Alexy provided a triadic scale through which the weights of competing objectives 
could be determined.  These are light, moderate, and serious, with differing levels contained 
                                                          
64 Habermas (n 62) 256–61. 
65 ibid. 
66 See Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (n 60). 
67 ibid 47–8. 
68 ibid. This is where the harm to one objective is balanced against the need to achieve another competing 
objective. 
69 ibid. 
70 Robert Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing and Rationality’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 131, 136.  It must be 
assumed that this approach is applied in the reverse, considering the importance of achieving the first 
principle, and the detriment achieved to the second principle, otherwise such an approach would be 
asymmetrical and potentially flawed.   
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within the balance.71  The total weight assigned to an objective, Alexy argued, is the sum of 
an objective’s relative qualitative and quantitative weight.  The qualitative aspect concerns 
each objective’s importance; the quantitative, how much each objective is infringed or 
satisfied. This, however, assumes that we can adequately allocate relative values to the 
objectives to enable balancing to be carried out, and that we can adequately evaluate how 
much an objective is infringed.  These values can be very difficult to assess/give a definitive 
value to, despite the broadness of Alexy’s categories.  They can be (and indeed are) subject 
to value judgments made by the court as to their relative weights. 
 
3.2 The CJEU’s approach to proportionality 
Proportionality is a general principle of EU law.72  Article 5 TEU provides that the 
proportionality principle governs the use of EU competences, and that the content and form 
of EU action is subject to proportionality.  “[T]he content and form of Union action shall not 
go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.”73  Proportionality, 
therefore, can be used to challenge all EU and Member State action falling within the scope 
of EU law.74  This section will set out how the CJEU uses the proportionality principle to resolve 
conflicts between objectives pursued by the EU and Member States.  It shall leave discussion 
of the effect of such an approach on Albany to section 4. 
The CJEU adopts a three-step approach to proportionality, assessing whether the 
measure implemented under EU law is (i) suitable or appropriate in order to achieve the 
objective pursued; (ii) does not go beyond what is necessary; and, (iii) does not impose a 
burden which is excessive in relation to the objective sought.75  As the proportionality 
principle applies in many different contexts, the CJEU has adopted varying degrees of intensity 
                                                          
71 See ibid; Robert Alexy, ‘On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 433, 
440–8.  On the criticism see Habermas (n 62) 256–9; Jürgen Habermas, ‘Reply to Symposium Participants’, 
Habermas on Law and Democracy (University of Chicago Press 1998) 430.  Habermas’ critique is that balancing 
is subject to irrational rulings, whereby there are no rational standards by which to weigh, with arbitrary or 
unreflective weighting taking place.  Thus, in Habermas’ view although this produces a result, this does not 
provide a justification due to the value judgments which have occurred. 
72 See R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p. British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco 
Ltd (Case C-491/01) [2002] ECR I-11453.  Note that the proportionality is provided for in Article 5(4) TEU. 
73 Article 5(4) TEU   
74 See Tridimas (n 7) 137. 
75  It has been debated whether the third stage forms part of the CJEU’s approach, however it may be that the 
CJEU considers this when determining necessity or disposes of the case through the earlier stages. See Craig (n 
8) 19. 
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in its application.76  As de Burca stated, “[i]t becomes apparent that the way the 
proportionality principle is applied by the Court of Justice covers a spectrum ranging from a 
very deferential approach to a quite rigorous and searching examination of the justification 
for a measure which has been challenged.”77  The degree of intensity adopted depends on a 
number of factors, for example, the conflict in question, the nature of the interests present, 
and the perceived severity of the imputed breach.78  This also reflects the distribution of 
interests between the EU and Member States, ensuring that the balance of competencies is 
respected.   
Although the CJEU does not clearly identify the intensity of review adopted, the CJEU’s 
approach can be grouped into three broad categories of review.  These categories are not 
hierarchical.  First, the CJEU adopts a ‘manifestly inappropriate’ standard of proportionality 
when reviewing an EU measure or a Member State measure implementing EU law.79  This 
standard also applies where an EU institution has exercised “a broad discretion involving 
political, economic or social choices requiring it to make complex assessment.”80  In these 
situations, the CJEU will only interfere with a measure where it is “manifestly inappropriate 
having regard to the objective” which the measure seeks to achieve.81  In Fedessa, for 
example, the CJEU held that because the legislature had been given discretionary powers 
within the Common Agricultural Policy, review of the measure had to be limited to examining 
whether the measure was the result of either a manifest error or misuse of powers, and 
whether the authority concerned had not manifestly exceeded the limits of discretion.82  
                                                          
76 This has led to arguments that the CJEU does not balance competing interest.  See TI Harbo, ‘The Function of 
the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 158, 171; Craig (n 8) ch 19. 
77 De Burca (n 8) 111–2.  See also Craig (n 8) ch 19; Tridimas (n 7) ch 3. 
78 De Burca (n 8) 111–2; Jan Jans, ‘Proportionality Revisited’ (2000) 27 Legal Issues in Economic Integration 
239. 
79 When considering Member State measures, the CJEU adjusts its approach depending on the level of 
discretion left to the Member State and the division of competence when present. 
80 Craig and De Búrca (n 7) 553. 
81 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State for Health, ex p. Fedessa et al. 
(Case C-331/88) [1990] E.C.R. I-4023, [13]-[14]; British American Tobacco (n.21) [122]-[123].  See also, United 
Kingdom v Commission (Case C-180/96) [1998] E.C.R. I-2265, [96]; Jippes v Minister van Landbouw, 
Natuurbeheer en Visserij (Case C-189/01) [2001] ECR I-5689, [83] 
82 Fedessa ibid [8].  See also, ABNA Ltd v Secretary of State for Health (Joined Cases C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 
and C-194/04) [2005] E.C.R. I-10423, [80]-[84]. 
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Second, the CJEU applies a more rigorous analysis when an individual complains that their 
rights (including EU fundamental rights) have been unduly restricted.83  Here, the CJEU 
engages in a “vigorous scrutiny” of the action in question.  Article 52(1) CFREU requires that 
any limitation on CFREU rights must be provided for in law, respect the essence of the right 
and/or principle, and “[s]ubject to the principle of proportionality … [must be] necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect 
the rights and freedoms of others.”84  This requires an intense analysis of whether a restriction 
is proportionate.  For example, in Schmidberger the CJEU, stating that a fair balance had to 
be struck between the competing right and freedom, considered  
(i) the overall effect of the protest85;  
(ii) the purpose of the protest in that it was not to prevent the exercise of the free 
movement rights86;  
(iii) the measures taken to limit the disruptions caused87;  
(iv) the wider effects of the protest88;  
(v) the margin of discretion afforded to the Member States89;  
(vi) that the imposition of stricter requirements could have been perceived as an 
excessive restriction on the fundamental rights in question; and 
(vii) that all alternative solutions would have created the risk that the demonstration 
was difficult to control and would have been liable to cause much more serious 
disruption to intra-Community trade and public order.90   
I will return to the CJEU’s approach to balancing fundamental rights and interests in Chapter 
5, section 3.  
A similarly rigorous approach is also adopted when the CJEU is faced with a Member State 
measure derogating from EU law.91  This is different to the approach adopted in relation to 
                                                          
83 Council v Hautala (Case C 353/99 P) [2001] E.C.R. I-9565; Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz (Case 44/79) [1979] 
E.C.R. 3727; Schmidberger v Republik Österreich (Case C-112/00) [2003] E.C.R I-5659.  See also the approach 
set out in Article 52(1) CFREU. 
84 Article 52(1) CFREU. 
85 Schmidberger (n.83) [85] 
86 ibid. [86]   
87 ibid., [87] 
88 ibid., [88]  
89 ibid., [90] 
90 ibid., [91]-[93] 
91 See Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano (Case C-55/94) [1996] E.C.R. I-
4165, [37].  "National measures liable to make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms 
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claims involving individual rights, as the CJEU focusses predominantly on whether the 
measure in question is the least restrictive means of achieving the objective pursued.  For 
example, in Danish Bottles, the CJEU held that a Member State should choose the least 
restrictive option when derogating from EU law.92  Similarly, in Cassis de Dijon, the CJEU held 
that a measure prescribing minimum alcohol content was not necessary as it was possible to 
protect consumers in less restrictive ways, such as through the product’s labelling.93  It can be 
argued that the rationale for such an approach is the need to ensure/protect the single 
market and market integration, however, the CJEU will vary the intensity of its analysis 
according to the facts of the case.94  
Third, when considering the proportionality of penalties and costs imposed by legislative 
or administrative acts, the CJEU focusses on whether the burden imposed is excessive.  In 
Bela-Mühle, the CJEU held that the requirement on producers of animal feed to use semi-
skimmed milk rather than soya milk, was disproportionate as semi-skimmed milk was three 
time more expensive than soya.95  Similarly, in Portugal v Commission, the CJEU held an export 
ban on beef to be proportionate as it was impossible in practice to allow exports before 
arrangements of a kind advocated by the Office of Epizootic Diseases’ Animal Health Code 
had been put in place.96   In Man (Sugar), the CJEU held that Intervention Boards decision to 
forfeit the applicant’s entire deposit because they were 4 hours late in completing the 
required paperwork was disproportionate given the function performed by the system of 
export licences.97  Any penalty, the CJEU held, “should have been less severe … than the 
                                                          
guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; 
they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing 
the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to 
attain it.” 
92 Commission v Denmark (Case 302/86) [1988] E.C.R. 4607, [6]; See also Cassis de Dijon (Case 120/78) [1979] 
E.C.R. 649, [10]-[14]; Commission v Luxembourg (Case C-319/06) [2008] E.C.R. I-4232, [52]-[53].  In the sphere 
of EU competition law, see Wouters v Algememe Raad van de Nederlandse Order van Advocaten (Case C-
309/99) [2002] E.C.R. I-1577, [97]-[109]. 
93 Cassis de Dijon, ibid, [14]-[15] 
94 See Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn 
(case C-36/02) [2004] E.C.R. I-9609.   Here the CJEU adjusted their analysis despite the measure pursuing an 
objective not recognised under EU law but protected under a Member State’s Constitution. 
95 Bela-Mühle Josef Bergmann KG v Grows-Farm GmbH & CO. KG. (Case 114/76) [1977] E.C.R. I-1211 
96 (Case C-365/99) [2001] E.C.R. I-5645, [55]-[58] 
97 The Queen, ex parte E. D. & F. Man (Sugar) Ltd v Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce (IBAP) (Case 
181/84) [1985] E.C.R. I-2889, [30]. 
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forfeiture of the entire security and it should have been more consonant with the practical 
effects of such a failure.”98 
 
3.3 Summary 
The above has shown how the CJEU resolves conflicts by balancing the competing objectives 
and interests through a proportionality analysis.  In doing so, the CJEU considers whether the 
restriction or limitation is suitable for achieving the objective pursued; does not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the objective pursued; and, does not impose an excessive 
burden.  The CJEU, in applying such an approach, varies its review according to the context of 
the conflict.  Section 3.2 has shown that the CJEU’s approaches can be loosely categorised 
into three groups.  First, the CJEU adopts a manifestly inappropriate standard when reviewing 
an EU measure or a national measure implementing EU law, granting a wide margin of 
discretion.  Second, where the measure restricts individual rights, or derogates from EU law, 
the CJEU adopts a more intense application of the proportionality assessment.  This approach 
is also present when considering fundamental rights protected by EU law and the CFREU.  
Third, when considering the proportionality of a cost or penalty imposed by legislative or 
administrative acts, the CJEU examines whether the cost or burden imposed is excessive to 
the objective pursued. 
 Can we identify a proportionality assessment in Albany?  As has been already been 
identified, the CJEU in Albany balanced the competing objectives, concluding that the social 
policy objectives outweigh competition policy’s objectives where the stipulated conditions in 
Albany are met.  What is not immediately obvious from the CJEU’s decision is how the CJEU 
conducted its balancing exercise.  Did the CJEU adopt a proportionality approach, and if so, 
how did it conduct the analysis?  These questions shall form the basis of the discussion in 
section 4.  The section will show that the CJEU balanced the competing objectives through a 
proportionality assessment stricto sensu, and that the CJEU’s proportionality assessment 
differs from those set out above.  It will show that the CJEU focussed on balancing the 
competing objectives, not the necessity of the restriction. 
 
                                                          
98 ibid. 
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4. A Balance – Can we see how the CJEU in Albany balanced the competing 
objectives?? 
In Albany, the CJEU was faced with conflicting objectives pulling in different directions.  The 
social policy objectives permitted (and encouraged) collective bargaining and collective 
agreements, competition policy’s objectives potentially prohibited them.  In concluding that 
collective agreements fall outside the Treaty competition provisions, the CJEU balanced the 
competing objectives.  In the CJEU’s view, the social policy objectives outweigh the objectives 
pursued by EU competition policy where Albany’s stipulated conditions are met.  What is 
unclear from the CJEU’s decision is how it balanced the competing objectives present.  This 
section will examine whether we can identify the approach adopted by the CJEU in balancing 
the competing objectives. 
Applying a proportionality approach to trade union activities has been criticised as 
inappropriate.99  Bercusson, for example, has argued that the very nature of collective 
negotiations, in that they are ongoing, prevents a proportionality assessment: “[a]t what 
stage of this process and against what criteria is the test of proportionality to be applied?”100  
Additionally, it has been argued that a proportionality assessment gives the CJEU and national 
courts the opportunity to become “back-seat drivers” importing their own views onto the 
collective bargaining process and social partners.101  If we consider the approach to 
proportionality adopted under the free movement rules,102 courts may “identify alternatives 
without considering their effectiveness in the bargaining process.”103  However, as will be seen 
below, the CJEU’s balancing exercise in Albany avoids these issues.  In considering the 
competing objectives as a genus, the CJEU was not concerned with applying proportionality 
                                                          
99 See Brian Bercusson, ‘The Trade Union Movement and the European Union: Judgment Day’ (2007) 13 
European Law Journal 279; Tonia Novitz, ‘A Human Rights Analysis of the Viking and Laval Judgments’ in 
Catherine Barnard (ed), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, vol 10 (Oxford: Hart, 2013); AC. 
Davies, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ’ [2008] Industrial Law 
Journal 126. 
100 Bercusson (n 99). 
101 This issue has been a significant factor in the UK courts approach to granting injunctions for industrial action 
and the introduction of the “golden formula” seen in s.219 TULRCA. 
102 The Court’s analysis consists of two steps.  First, is there evidence of a breach of the economic right caused 
by the social right?  If so, second, can it be justified based on a breach of the social right in order to protect 
workers’ interests and proportionality to be shown by the trade union. 
103 ACL Davies, Perspectives on Labour Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009 2nd ed) 143. 
Although referring to industrial action, Davies’ point also applies in the context of collective agreements and 
collective bargaining.  For example, the CJEU could consider the use of a works council to achieve the same 
result as a less restrictive option. 
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to an ongoing process, nor did the CJEU assess whether the benefits achieved by collective 
agreements can be achieved via less restrictive means. 
 The CJEU’s wording implies that the CJEU adopted a proportionality approach stricto 
sensu, considering simply whether the harm to the social policy objectives outweighed the 
need to achieve the competition policy objectives.  This can be seen if we apply Alexy’s “Law 
of Balancing” to the CJEU’s reasoning.  To recap, Alexy’s theory of balancing is that the court 
considers the degree of non-satisfaction or detriment caused to principle, P1, the importance 
of satisfying the competing objectives, P2, and then balances the weights assigned to the 
competing objectives.104  In assigning weights to the conflicting objectives, both qualitative 
and quantitative weights are required, which when combined, give the total weight of the 
competing objectives. The qualitative aspect concerns the importance of the objective; the 
quantitative, how much the objective is infringed or satisfied.  These weightings can be seen 
within the CJEU’s decision in Albany.   
If we consider the qualitative weights first; the importance given to an objective, an 
immediate issue raised is how we assess the importance of an objective in the abstract.  In 
the context of EU objectives, an objective’s weight may be assigned according to Treaty 
statements indicating the importance of an objective.105  Whilst it can be debated whether 
the Treaty appellations mean anything,106 the Treaty does indicate the importance assigned 
to some objectives.  For example, the Treaties state that some objectives are to be given a 
“high level of protection”.107  However, these statements relate to an objective’s abstract 
weight, and do not provide an indication of an objective’s relative (or quantitative) weight.108  
It could be that despite having a high level of importance/protection, an objective is only of 
marginal importance in a specific situation.   
We can identify the relative qualitative weightings given by the CJEU to the competing 
objectives in Albany.  If we consider the social policy objectives, the CJEU’s reference to 
                                                          
104 Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (n 60) 47–8; Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing and Rationality’ 
(n 70) 135–7. 
105 Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy (n 3) 294–5. 
106 See Ludwig Kramer, EC Environmental Law (4th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2000) 6–9; G Monti, ‘Article 81 EC 
and Public Policy’ (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 1057, 1075. 
107 See for example, Article 9 TFEU. 
108 Townley, ‘Is Anything More Important than Consumer Welfare (in Article 81 EC)? Reflections of a 
Community Lawyer’ (n 9) 296–7.  Townley argues that it is unclear what the difference is between a high and 
“non-high” level of importance, and also that we can split ach given level of protection into further 
subcategories. 
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numerous provisions encouraging collective bargaining indicates that it had a ‘high’ 
weighting.109  For example, the CJEU makes explicit reference to Article 2 EC which provided 
that a particular task of the Community was to promote a “high level of employment and of 
social protection.”110  With regard to the competition policy objectives, the CJEU again makes 
reference to Treaty provisions.111 The CJEU stated that, in the context of the competition 
provisions, “the importance of … [Article 101 TFEU] … prompted the authors of the Treaty to 
provide expressly … that any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to that article 
[Article 101(2)] are to be automatically void.”112 (emphasis added)  This implies that the 
economic objectives also had a high level of importance, and thus of potentially equal 
qualitative weight to the social policy objectives being weighed against them.  The CJEU 
appears to assign both objectives a “high” qualitative weighting.   
It is in the quantitative weights of the policy objectives that the potential weight 
disparities in Albany can be seen.  This is a difficult assessment, which raises questions around 
how accurately the CJEU can assess such weights.  Such weights should be assessed by 
reference to an overarching, or ultimate, goal that the balancing exercise is trying to achieve. 
However, the CJEU in Albany does not refer to a single overarching goal which its balance is 
seeking to achieve.  It simply stated that the exemption followed from an “interpretation of 
the provisions of the Treaty as a whole which is both effective and consistent.”113  This is, 
though, far too vague to help identify the overarching goal of the balancing exercise.  Had the 
CJEU pointed to a single goal, i.e. the single market imperative, this might have helped in 
assigning quantitative weights to the competing objectives.  Second, can an infringement on 
an objective be quantifiably assessed where the effects are potentially long-ranging and 
ongoing?  Although such assessments are frequently made when assessing damages and 
issuing fines, is this possible with objectives? Trying to provide relative weightings in advance 
is very difficult, and in some cases futile.114 
In Albany, the CJEU does not explore the quantitative weights in detail.  The CJEU 
simply stated that certain restrictions on competition were inherent in collective agreements, 
                                                          
109 ibid., [54]-[58] 
110 ibid., [54] 
111 ibid. 
112 ibid., [53] 
113 Albany (n.1) [60] 
114 For example, if Albany were to be applied to a much wider area of trade union activities, the relative 
weights would differ significantly and trying to identify these in advance would achieve no further aim. 
99 
 
“[h]owever, the social policy objectives pursued would be seriously undermined if … subject 
to Article [101 TFEU].”115  Although not identifying the quantitative weights of the competing 
objectives present, the CJEU’s decision clearly implies that the importance of achieving the 
economic objectives were less than the harm caused to social policy objectives.  If not, then 
the CJEU would not have created an exemption.  It would have applied Article 101 TFEU.  
In concluding that the social policy objectives outweighed the competition policy 
objectives where the two stipulated conditions are met, the CJEU creates a conditional 
relation of precedence.116  In Albany, the CJEU held that the social policy objectives (P1) 
outweigh the competition policy objectives (P2) where a collective agreement is between 
management and labour and aimed at improving working terms and conditions.  Applying the 
Treaty competition provisions would void a collective agreement, thus seriously undermining 
the social policy objectives pursued.  Where these conditions are met, the agreement is 
outside the scope of the Treaty competition provisions: if one of these conditions is missing, 
the exemption does not apply.  A good example of this can be seen in FNCBV where the CJEU 
held that the exemption did not apply as the agreement was not between management and 
labour (the first condition in Albany).117  As such, the balance between the competing 
objectives shifted, with the economic objectives taking precedence and Article 101 TFEU 
applying to the agreement in question. 
That the exemption does not apply to all collective agreements, only those satisfying 
its stipulated criteria, implies that the CJEU symmetrically balanced the competing objectives.  
The CJEU considered both the harm to the social policy objectives as against the need to 
achieve competition policy’s objectives, and the harm to competition policy’s objectives as 
against the need to achieve the social policy objectives pursued by collective agreements, 
within its balancing exercise.  Albany’s stipulated conditions imply that exempting all 
collective agreements would disproportionately harm competition policy’s objectives: the 
stipulated conditions provide the point at which the balancing exercise is in favour of the 
social policy objectives.  In other words, it was not necessary to exclude all collective 
                                                          
115 ibid., [59] 
116 This is where as Principle 1 outweighs/takes precedence over Principle 2, where Principle 1 gives rise to 
certain legal consequences Q in circumstances C.  Alexy writes this formally as “If principle P1 takes precedence 
over principle P2 in circumstance C: (P1 P P2) C, and if P1 gives rise to legal consequences Q in circumstances C, 
then a valid rule applies which has C as its protasis and Q as its apodosis: C→ Q.”  See Alexy, A Theory of 
Constitutional Rights (n 60) 54. 
117 FNCBV and others v Commission (Case T-217/03) [2006] E.C.R. II-4987, [100].   
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agreements to achieve the social policy objectives pursued.  This side of the balance, however, 
is missing from the CJEU’s explanation of its decision.   
However, it could be argued that Albany’s stipulated conditions define the CJEU’s 
understanding of a collective agreement.  Where an agreement is not between management 
and labour (and/or their representatives) and/or is not aimed at improving conditions of work 
and employment, it is not a collective agreement.  As such, the exemption covers all collective 
agreements.  This draws parallels with Viking Line, where it can be argued that the CJEU 
considered that an essential element of industrial action was that it was exercised for the 
protection of workers.118  In Viking Line, the CJEU held that the restriction on the freedom of 
establishment would be disproportionate where industrial action did not seek to protect 
workers.  This potentially adopts a narrow definition of a collective agreement.   I will return 
to this point in Chapter 5, section 4.2 when discussing the scope of any potential right to 
negotiate and conclude collective agreements under Article 28 CFREU. 
To summarise, the above shows that the CJEU in Albany applied a proportionality 
approach stricto sensu, balancing the harm and benefits of the competing 
objectives/interests.  It has shown that the CJEU’s balance differed from those generally 
adopted by the Court.  The CJEU focussed on balancing the competing objectives present, 
rather than focusing on the necessity of the restriction on competition.  This difference can 
be explained through the equivalence of the objectives being balanced; both are Treaty 
objectives contained within Article 3(3) TEU.  In balancing objectives of equivalent value, 
proportionality stricto sensu is arguably more appropriate. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter has shown that, although not entirely transparent, the CJEU in 
Albany followed a structured balancing approach.  The CJEU’s decision is arguably correct.  
The CJEU, as shown in section 4, weighed the degree of non-satisfaction of (or harm to) the 
social policy objectives pursued by collective agreements against the importance of achieving 
the economic objectives pursued by the Treaty competition provisions.  The CJEU concluded 
that the social policy objectives always outweigh competition policy’s objectives where the 
agreement is between management and labour and aim at improving conditions of work and 
                                                          
118 International Transport Workers Federation v Viking Line ABP (Case C-438/05) [2008] 1 C.M.L.R. 51, [77]. 
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employment.  Where these conditions are not met the balance shifts; the exemption does 
not apply.  That the exemption potentially does not apply to all collective agreements implies 
that the CJEU conducted a symmetrical balance, balancing the harm to the social policy 
against the need to achieve competition policy’s objectives, and the harm to competition 
policy’s objectives against the need to achieve the social policy objectives pursued by 
collective agreements.  It is arguable that Albany’s stipulated conditions identify the point at 
which the balancing exercise falls in favour of the social policy objectives. 
 The chapter also showed that the Treaty integration clauses and the CJEU’s 
teleological approach provide an alternative to balancing the competing objectives.  Section 
2 argued that the Treaty integration clauses and the CJEU’s teleological approach require that 
EU law is interpreted in a manner which considers the wider objectives pursued by the EU.  In 
the context of Albany, where Article 101 TFEU can be interpreted and applied in a manner 
which gives adequate weight to the social policy objectives pursued by collective agreements, 
the exemption may not be necessary.  In such a situation, the social policy objectives would 
not be seriously undermined as they would have been appropriately considered.  Whether 
such an interpretation of Article 101 TFEU is possible will be explored in Chapters 6 and 7 
where the thesis will examine how we could apply Article 101 TFEU to a collective agreement. 
 Before examining whether we can interpret Article 101 TFEU in such a way, Chapter 5 
will examine the potential effect of EU fundamental rights and the CFREU on the CJEU’s 
approach in Albany.  The Chapter will explore the effect of adding such considerations to the 
balance in Albany.  This is important as including fundamental rights considerations within 
the balance may alter it such that Albany’s exemption needs to be either adjusted or removed 
altogether.  Where this is the case, the decision in Albany may no longer be correct.  The 
discussion in Chapter 5 will also explore how fundamental rights and the CFREU fit within the 
EU legal order and expand further on how the CJEU resolves conflicts between fundamental 
rights and the fundamental freedoms.  The discussion will also build on the discussion in 
section 2 above, providing the basis for the discussion in Chapters 6 and 7.   
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5. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 4 showed that the CJEU in Albany balanced the competing policy objectives present 
through the proportionality principle.  This can be seen through the way in which the CJEU 
predetermined the balance in favour of the social policy objectives where two conditions are 
met: the agreement is between management and labour (or their representatives) and aimed 
at improving conditions of work and employment.1  As such, it can be argued that the CJEU 
considered exempting all collective agreements to be disproportionate.  Chapter 4 also 
demonstrated that the Treaty integration clauses and the CJEU’s teleological approach 
require that wider objectives are included in the application and interpretation of EU law.  It 
argued that, when applying EU competition law, the CJEU should take account of wider 
objectives.  Whether the social policy objectives could be included within the application of 
Article 101 TFEU was not considered by the CJEU in Albany.  Where Article 101 TFEU can be 
interpreted in such a manner that does not deprive them of their essence, the social policy 
objectives may not be seriously undermined.  Whether such an interpretation is possible shall 
be examined in Chapters 6 and 7. 
This chapter will examine the potential effects of EU fundamental rights on the Albany 
exemption.  Article 28 CFREU provides that workers and employers, or their representatives, 
have the right “in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices, to negotiate 
and agree collective agreements…”2  This potentially impacts the CJEU’s approach in Albany.    
As no such right was recognised in 2000, a right to collective bargaining and collective 
agreements was not considered within the CJEU’s decision in Albany.3  Therefore, it is possible 
that fundamental rights considerations may alter the outcome of the balance in Albany such 
that we may need to reconsider the Albany exemption.  
The discussion in this chapter will do the following.  Section 2 will place fundamental 
rights and the CFREU within the EU’s constitutional order.  Section 3 will examine how 
                                                          
1 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie (Case C-67/96) [2000] 4 C.M.L.R. 
116, [59]-[60] 
2 Article 28 CFREU. 
3 Albany (n.1) [AG157]-[AG163].  AG Jacobs argued that even if there was a specific right, it would not have 
been sufficient to protect collective agreements from the scope of European competition law.   
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conflicts involving fundamental rights are resolved through balancing.  As explained in 
Chapter 4, section 3, the CJEU balances the competing rights/objectives through a 
proportionality assessment.  This will be followed in section 4 with discussion of how 
fundamental rights considerations potentially affect the exemption in Albany.  First, section 
4.1 will explore whether Article 28 CFREU is a right or principle.  This is important.  If Article 
28 CFREU is a right it has greater normative weight against competition policy’s objectives.  
Principles contained within the CFREU only have effect where they have been implemented 
by EU or national law.  Second, section 4.2 will examine the scope of the Article 28 CFREU 
right.  Whether Article 28 CFREU contains a positive and/or negative right may affect its 
weight when balanced against a competing right or objective.  Third, section 4.3 will discuss 
the effect of Article 28 CFREU and the right to collective bargaining on Article 101 TFEU.  
Section 5 will conclude the chapter.  
 
2. The position of fundamental rights within the EU legal order 
Fundamental rights initially developed to protect the supremacy and effectiveness of EU law,4 
and assumed a prominent position within the EU legal order.  As general principles of EU Law,5 
the protection of fundamental rights is “ensured within the framework of the structure and 
objectives of the Community.”6  .”7  Fundamental rights were not initially contained within 
the Treaties, with a binding catalogue of rights only being introduced post-Lisbon by the 
CFREU.  Fundamental rights therefore initially developed within the CJEU’s jurisprudence 
In identifying fundamental rights within EU law, the CJEU drew on a wide range of 
sources.  This included the constitutional provisions of Member States and any relevant 
                                                          
4 Jason Coppel and Aidan O’Neill, ‘European Court of Jutice: Taking Rights Seriously, The’ (1992) 12 Legal 
Studies 227, 228–9.  See also Joseph Weiler and Nicholas Lockhart, ‘Taking Rights Seriously Seriously - The 
European Court and Its Jurispudence - Part 1’ (1995) 32 Common Market Law Review 51; Joseph Weiler and 
Nicholas Lockhart, ‘Taking Rights Seriously Seriously - the European Court and Its Jurisprudence 2’ (1995) 32 
Common Market Law Review 579.  This was in response national courts asking whether fundamental rights 
protected by Member State’s Constitutions were also protected by EU law.  See, for example, Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft von Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1974] C.M.L.R. 540 (Solange I); 
Re Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 225 (Solange II) 
5 Stauder v City of Ulm (Case 26/69) [1970] C.M.L.R. 112, [7]; Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr-
und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (Case 11/70) [1972] C.M.L.R. 255 [4]. 
6 ibid. 
7 ibid. 
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international conventions.8  This approach was confirmed in Hauer, where the CJEU gave 
specific mention to the position of the ECHR within EU law.9  The CJEU’s approach to 
identifying fundamental rights showed a determination that Union/Community institutions 
should be bound by fundamental rights, providing further emphasis and support for the social 
aspects of the Treaties and EU; yet, at the same time an intention to secure the autonomy of 
Community policy.10  This enabled the CJEU to give fundamental rights a wide scope, holding 
that fundamental rights applied where Member States were implementing EU law,11 
derogating from EU law,12 and acting “within the scope of EU law”13  This allowed the CJEU to 
consider EU fundamental rights as autonomous to the rights protected within Member States 
and international documents.14    
As general principles of EU law, fundamental rights have primary law status, placing 
them on an equal footing with Treaty provisions (including the free movement provisions.)15  
This position has been significantly strengthened post-Lisbon, with Article 6(1) TEU and Article 
51(1) CFREU codifying the equivalence of fundamental rights to provisions of the Treaties.  
Article 6(1) TEU states that the “Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out 
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union … which shall have the same 
legal value as the Treaties”16.  Article 51(1) CFREU states that EU institutions and Member 
States “shall respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application of” the 
CFREU “in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of 
                                                          
8 Nold KG v Commission (Case 4/73) [1974] E.C.R. 491, 507. In IRCA, AG Warner stated that “a fundamental 
right recognised and protected by the constitution of any Member State must be recognised and protected in 
Community law”; Opinion 2/94 [1996] E.C.R. I-1759, [33]-[34].    
9 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz (Case 44/79) [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 42, [15].  The CJEU stated that the ECHR can 
supply guidelines that should be followed within the framework of EU law.  See also, Rutili v Ministre de 
l’Interior (Case 36/75) [1975] E.C.R. 1219; ERT (Case 260/89) [1991] E.C.R. 2925.  Article 52(3) CFREU provides 
that where a CFREU right corresponds with a right guaranteed by the ECHR, the CFREU right shall have the 
same meaning and scope as the EHCR right, however the CFREU can provide for more extensive protection. 
10 See Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press 2006) 303–
7. 
11 Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft (Case 5/88) [1989] E.C.R. I-2609 
12 Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi (Case C-260/89) [1993] E.C.R. I-2925  
13 Åkerberg Fransson (Case C-617/10) ECLI:EU:C:2013:105 [19]; Annibaldi (Case C-309/96) [1997] E.C.R. I-7493. 
14 See Internationale Handesgesellschaft (n.5) [4]. 
15 See, Tridimas (n 10) 51.; Nold (n.8); Hauer (n.9); Eugen Schmidberger Internationale Transporte Planzuge v 
Austria (Case C-112/00) [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 34; Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs GmbH v 
Bundesstadt Bonn (Case C-36/02) [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 5.   
16 Article 6(1) TEU.  c.f. Schiek who argues that the purpose of human rights protection is to provide a “meta-
layer of rights, which enjoy priority over other law, including Internal Market law.” Dagmar Schiek and others, 
EU Social and Labour Rights and EU Internal Market Law. (Directorate General for Internal Policies: Policy 
Department A - Economic and Scientific Policy 2015) 79. 
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the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties.”17  These provisions also strengthen fundamental 
rights’ normative weight.  For example, in Schmidberger the CJEU stated that fundamental 
rights have equivalence with the free movement provisions of the Treaty.18  As such, a fair 
balance had to be struck between the competing rights and freedoms.19 
Fundamental rights, and provisions of the CFREU, have three significant functions 
within EU law.20  First, fundamental rights act as an aid to interpretation: “as general principles 
of EU law, the Charter … serves as an aid to interpretation, since both EU secondary law and 
national law falling within the scope of EU law must be interpreted in light of the Charter.”21  
With regard to Treaty provisions, the CJEU will, where possible, interpret the Treaty provisions 
in a manner compatible with the CFREU right.  For example, in the context of the free 
movement rights, the CJEU has held that fundamental rights constitute a legitimate interest 
capable of restricting the exercise of a free movement right.22  In relation to the application 
of EU competition law to collective agreements, this means that Article 101 TFEU must be 
interpreted in a manner which takes account of the Article 28 CFREU right to collective 
bargaining.   Second, fundamental rights can be relied upon as providing grounds for judicial 
review.  EU legislative action in breach of the CFREU and/or general principles is void, and 
national measures must be set aside when in conflict.23  In ERT, for example, the CJEU held 
that it had a duty to ensure that measures derogating form EU law adequately respected 
fundamental rights, including where a measure restricts the free movement provisions.24 
                                                          
17 Article 51(1) CFREU. 
18 Schmidberger (n.15) [78] 
19 ibid., [81].  See also, Tridimas (n 10) 338. c.f. Schiek and others (n 16) 86.  Schiek argues that some rights 
contained in the CFREU are of a higher status than Treaty provisions.  Schiek argues that this is due to some 
rights being guaranteed as free-standing rights, which are not limited or guaranteed, in accordance with EU 
law; for example, Article 12 CFREU, the right to freedom of association.  As such, where mutual maximisation 
of conflicting interests is not possible, Treaty provisions are required to cede to the fundamental right.  
Schiek’s argument does not, however, sufficiently consider Article 6 TEU, which gives equivalence, and Article 
52(1) CFREU, which allows for all provisions of the CFREU to be restriction according to the proportionality 
principle. 
20 See Tridimas (n 10) 29; Koen Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 
8 European Constitutional Law Review 375, 376.   
21 Lenaerts (n 20) 376.  The interpretative obligation required by EU fundamental rights also applied pre-
CFREU.  See, for example, Commission v Council (Case 218/82) [1983] E.C.R. 4063, [15]; Ruah v Hauptzollamt 
Nürnberg-Fürth (Case C-314/89) [1991] E.C.R. I-1647, [17]. 
22 See Schmidberger (n.15); Omega (n.15). 
23 See, for example, ERT (n.11) [43]-[45].   
24 ibid.  See C. Smith and T Fetzer, ‘The Uncertain Limits of the European Court of Justice’s Authority: Economic 
Freedom v Human Dignity’ (2004) 10 Columbia Journal of European Law 445, 486; Andrea Biondi, ‘Free Trade, 
a Mountain Road and the Right to Protest: European Economic Freedoms and Fundamental Individual Rights’ 
(2004) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 51. 
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Third, breach of a fundamental rights, as general principles of EU law, gives rise to tortious 
liability. 
The increasing prominence of fundamental rights within the EU legal order increases 
the likelihood of conflict between fundamental rights and Treaty provisions and objectives.  
As shown in Chapter 4, the CJEU resolves conflicts, which cannot be reconciled through 
interpretative techniques, by balancing them through the proportionality principle.  This is 
also the case where the CJEU is faced with a clash between fundamental rights and the 
achievement of a Treaty objective: the qualified nature of fundamental rights means that 
balancing is inevitable.25  The discussion in section 3 will examine how these competing 
interests are balanced, identifying how the CJEU has developed its approach to balancing 
where fundamental right considerations are present.  This expands on the discussion in 
Chapter 4, section 3. 
 
3. Balancing the conflicting rights/interests 
Fundamental rights have equivalence to Treaty provisions within the EU legal order.  This 
requires that the CJEU should balance conflicting rights and freedoms in a manner which 
ensures that the competing interests are restricted to the least extent possible.26  As Trstenjak 
and Beysen argue, “[t]he resolution of conflicts between different fundamental rights or 
between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms should reflect the principle that … 
EU fundamental rights and the fundamental freedoms stand on an equal footing” and should 
“be resolved by determining the right balance between the protected guarantees and 
interests at issue.”27  As constitutional ‘rights’ of equal rank, “it is necessary to find a solution 
which limits each of them as little as possible.”28  The CJEU must conduct a fair balance 
                                                          
25 See Article 52(1) CFREU; Hauer (n.8) [18].  See also, Commission v Germany (Case C-280/93) [1994] E.C.R. I-
4973, [78].  Fundamental rights can be restricted where the restriction corresponds to objectives of general 
interest pursued by the Community and do not constitute a disproportionate interference impairing the very 
substance of the right. 
26 This also applies where the conflict is between competing fundamental rights. 
27 Verica Trstenjak and Edwin Beysen, ‘The Growing Overlap of Fundamental Freedoms and Fundamental 
Rights in the Case Law of the CJEU’ (2013) 38 European Law Review 293, 311–12. 
28 Schiek and others (n 16) 85.  This is that rights are balanced in such a way that they are both optimised as far 
as possible.   
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between the competing rights and freedoms in question.29  This is especially so given that 
both fundamental rights and freedoms are not absolute and can be limited.   
 Such restriction of fundamental rights is expressly provided for by the CFREU.  Article 
52(1) CFREU provides that rights and principles of the CFREU can be limited where such 
limitations are “provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.”  
This is subject to proportionality.  Restrictions on CFREU provisions must be “necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect 
the rights and freedoms of others.”30  Article 52(1) CFREU is based on CJEU case law, with the 
approach of the CJEU in Kjell Karlsson cited in support.31  In Kjell Karlsson, the CJEU stated that  
 
... it is well established in the case-law of the Court that restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of 
fundamental rights, in particular in the context of a common organisation of the market, provided that 
those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and 
do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, disproportionate and unreasonable interference 
undermining the very substance of those rights.32 [emphasis added] 
 
Key to such an approach is that the essence of the right or freedom is respected.  This is 
important in considering whether Albany’s exemption is necessary for collective agreements.  
Does the application of Article 101 TFEU respect the essence of the Article 28 CFREU right to 
collective bargaining?  Does the application of Article 101 TFEU give adequate weight to such 
right?  Whether this is the case will be the focus of the discussion in Chapters 6 and 7.   
 This proportionality approach features within the CJEU’s fundamental rights 
jurisprudence.  The CJEU predominantly considers whether a restriction pursues a legitimate 
interest in a proportionate manner; specifically, whether the restriction/limitation provided 
for by law is suitable, necessary and appropriate?  as was identified in Chapter 4, section 3, in 
relation to the CEU’s general application of proportionality, the CJEU applies differing 
                                                          
29 Trstenjak and Beysen (n 27) 314.; “Commission Proposal on the exercise of the right to take collective action 
within the context of freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services”, COM (2012) 130 final, 
12. See also Schmidberger (n.15); Omega (n.15); McDonagh v Ryanair Ltd (Case C-12/11) [2013] 2 C.M.L.R. 32, 
[62]; 
30 Article 52(1) CFREU.  The Explanations clarify that the reference to general interests recognised by the Union 
includes objectives set out in Article 3 TEU, and other interests protected by specific provisions in Article 4(1) 
TEU and Articles 35(3), 36 and 346 TFEU. 
31 Kjell Karlsson and others (Case C-292/97) [2000] E.C.R. I-2737. 
32 ibid., [45]. 
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standards of review where there are conflicts involving fundamental rights.  This is clearly 
demonstrated by the decisions in Schmidberger and Viking Line.  In Schmidberger, the CJEU 
considered whether a fair balance had been struck between the competing fundamental 
rights and freedoms which maximised the opposing interests/rights.33  In Viking Line, by 
contrast, the CJEU appeared to subordinate the fundamental rights present to the free 
movement interest, adopting a one-sided balance considering only whether the fundamental 
right pursued a further interest which justified restricting the fundamental freedom.34   
The CJEU’s approach in Schmidberger has been described as the “correct” approach 
to balancing involving fundamental rights, with academic literature arguing that the approach 
in Schmidberger adopts a “true” balance of the competing interests.35  In Schmidberger, the 
owner of a transport company incorporated in Germany, challenged the decision of the 
Austrian authorities to allow a protest which closed the Brenner autobahn, a major transit 
route between Austria and Northern Italy, for 30 hours.  The claimant argued that the decision 
to authorise the protest, based on the protesters’ freedom of expression and assembly rights, 
was an unjustified restriction on their right to free movement of goods.  On reference to the 
CJEU, the CJEU concluded that although the protest restricted the claimant’s free movement 
rights, such a restriction was proportionate.36  In reaching such a conclusion, the CJEU 
balanced, through the proportionality approach, the competing interests. 
In Schmidberger, the CJEU held that the protection of fundamental rights was a 
“legitimate interest which, in principle, justifie[d] a restriction of the obligations imposed by 
Community law, even under a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty such as free 
movement of goods.”37 In determining “whether a fair balance was struck between those 
interests”,38 the CJEU considered: (i) the overall effect of the protest39; (ii) the purpose of the 
                                                          
33 See Schmidberger (n.15) [78]-[93] 
34 See International Transport Workers Federation v Viking Line ABP (Case C-438/05) [2008] 1 C.M.L.R. 51.  See 
also Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet (Case C-341/05) [2008] 2 C.M.L.R. 9; 
Commission v Germany (Case C-271/08) [2010] E.C.R. I-7078; Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen (Case C-
346/06) [2008] E.C.R. I-1989.  
35 See Schiek and others (n 16); Dagmar Schiek, Economic and Social Integration: The Challenge for EU 
Constitutional Law; Trstenjak and Beysen (n 27). 
36 One question specifically raised by the Austrian Court was whether “the principles of the free movement of 
goods guaranteed by the Treaty prevails over” fundamental rights.  Schmidberger (n.15) [70] 
37 ibid., [74] 
38 ibid., [81]. 
39 ibid., [85].  The restriction was limited to a single route, on a single occasion during the time period in 
question. The CJEU drew a comparison to the demonstration in Commission v France whereby the protest was 
widespread, on several occasions, and of varying durations. 
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protest in that it was not to prevent the exercise of the free movement rights40; (iii) the 
measures taken to limit the disruptions caused41; (iv) the wider effects of the protest42; (v) the 
margin of discretion afforded to the Member States43; (vi) that the imposition of stricter 
requirements could have been perceived as an excessive restriction on the fundamental rights 
in question; and, (vii) that all alternative solutions would have created the risk that the 
demonstration was difficult to control and would have been liable to cause much more 
serious disruption to intra-Community trade and public order.44 In considering these 
factors, the CJEU considered whether the restrictions on the right to free movement and on 
the freedom of expression and assembly were proportionate to the other; it symmetrically 
balanced the competing rights and freedoms.  In doing so, the CJEU concluded that the 
relevant authorities had taken account of both interests and had taken extensive steps to 
ensure that the protest only limited the fundamental freedom as far as was necessary, and 
that there were no ways of exercising the fundamental rights in question without constituting 
an unacceptable interference with that freedom.45 
 In contrast, the CJEU in Viking Line potentially subordinated the fundamental right to 
the fundamental freedom present.  Viking Line concerned a Finnish company wishing to reflag 
their vessel in Estonia so that it could crew the ship with Estonian sailors on wages at 
significantly lower levels than the existing Finnish crew.  To prevent this, the International 
Transport Workers Federation (ITWF) called on its affiliates to boycott the vessel.  The owners 
of the vessel brought a claim before the English High Court arguing that the action breached 
their Article 49 TFEU freedom of establishment right.  In answering the questions posed by 
the referring court, the CJEU considered that the exercise of the fundamental right in question 
(the right to strike) had to pursue a further legitimate objective to justify a limitation on Article 
                                                          
40 ibid. [86].  The purpose of the demonstration was not to restrict trade of particular goods or trade from a 
particular place.  The participants were exercising their fundamental rights by “manifesting in public an opinion 
which they considered to be of importance to society” 
41 ibid., [87] 
42 ibid., [88].  The demonstration did not “give rise to a general climate of insecurity such as to have a 
dissuasive effect on intra-Community trade flows as a whole…” 
43 ibid., [90].  The CJEU considered that the authorities were entitled to consider that an outright ban would 
“have constituted an unacceptable interference with the fundamental rights of the demonstrators to gather 
and express peacefully their opinion in public” 
44 ibid., [91]-[93] 
45 ibid., [90] The CJEU considered that any further restrictions on the fundamental right would “have 
constituted an unacceptable interference with the fundamental rights of the demonstrators to gather and 
express peacefully their opinion in public.”  
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49 TFEU.  The national court was required to ascertain “whether the objectives pursued by 
the FSU and ITF … concerned the protection of workers”,46 and  “whether the jobs or 
conditions of employment of that trade union’s members … were jeopardised or under 
serious threat.”47 This shifted the weight of the fundamental right, potentially undermining 
the fundamental right’s equivalence to the fundamental freedoms as required under EU law.48  
This arguably created an a priori hierarchy not only between fundamental rights and 
freedoms but potentially within the EU’s fundamental rights catalogue itself, placing civil and 
political rights on a higher plane that labour/social rights.49  
 In applying a proportionality approach, the CJEU in Viking Line focussed on whether 
the trade union had exhausted all less restrictive means of achieving its objective.  The CJEU 
held that  
 
“it is for the national court to examine, in particular, on the one hand, whether, under the national 
rules and law applicable to that action, FSU did not have other means at its disposal which were less 
restrictive of freedom of establishment in order to bring to a successful conclusion the collective 
negotiations entered into with Viking, and, on the other, whether that trade union had exhausted those 
means before initiating such action.”50 
 
Such a requirement undermines the exercise of the fundamental right, creating significant 
uncertainty for those engaging in industrial action.  As Barnard states, how will trade unions 
know when they have exhausted all less restrictive options?51  Will trade unions bargain for 
longer than they normally would to exhaust all less restrictive measures?  This 
misunderstands the point of industrial action: industrial action is a tool to pressurise the 
                                                          
46 ibid., [80] 
47 Viking Line (n.34) [84] 
48 See Trstenjak and Beysen (n 27); Catherine Barnard, ‘A Proportionate Response to Proportionality in the 
Field of Collective Action’ (2012) 37 Industrial Law Journal 117. Trstenjak and Beysen argue that requiring 
collisions be resolved “by determining whether written or unwritten grounds of justification inherent in the 
fundamental rights can justify the restrictions of the fundamental freedoms, sits uncomfortably alongside the 
principle of equal ranking for fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms, for the inability of fundamental 
rights to justify as such, without reference to the written or unwritten grounds of justification a restriction on a 
fundamental freedom suggests a hierarchical relationship between fundamental freedoms and fundamental 
rights which does not exist.” 
49 See Vilija Velyvyte, ‘The Right to Strike in the European Union after Accession to the European Convention 
on Human Rights: Identifying Conflict and Achieving Coherencec’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 73, 90–
3. 
50 Viking Line (n.34) [87] 
51 Barnard (n 48) 123. 
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employer to concede to the union’s demands. The more disproportionate the action, the 
more successful it is likely to be.  This has led to suggestions that the CJEU should adopt a 
‘procedural’ proportionality approach when balancing fundamental rights.52  Rather than 
focussing on whether the restriction was proportionate to the fundamental right pursued, the 
CJEU should focus on whether procedural requirements were complied with, and only where 
the essence of a fundamental freedom is at stake should the CJEU consider the limitation’s 
substantive proportionality.  This, however, is out of step with the use of rights as 
optimisation principles, and the use of the proportionality principle to maximise the 
competing rights and freedoms as much as possible.  What the CJEU did not do in Viking Line, 
as it did in Schmidberger, was consider whether the exercise of a fundamental freedom was 
appropriate and necessary to achieve its objective in light of its impact on the fundamental 
rights present53: the analysis was one-sided.   
 The approaches in Schmidberger and Viking Line can however be reconciled in four 
ways.  First, it can be argued that there is a hierarchy within the EU’s fundamental rights 
catalogue: the CJEU gives greater protection to civil and political rights than labour and social 
rights.54  Second, and linked with the above, the difference in approach could be based on the 
nature of the challenged action.  Where the CJEU is faced with a vertical action – a claim that 
a public authority has restricted an individual (or groups) fundamental rights and/or 
freedoms– it will grant a wider margin of discretion, more akin to the Wednesbury 
unreasonableness standard, to the Member State in balancing the competing rights and 
freedoms.55  Private actors, on the other hand, are required to satisfy a stricter test.  This can 
be supported by the assumption that private actors are unlikely to pursue wider public 
interest goals.   
Third, it may be that the CJEU’s approach in Viking Line reflected its views as to what 
it considered to be an integral element of the fundamental right to strike.   Legitimate 
                                                          
52 ibid 131–2. 
53 Velyvyte (n 49) 97. 
54 See TI Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 158; 
Phil Syrpis and Tonia Novitz, ‘Economic and Social Rights in Conflict: Political and Judicial Approaches to 
Reconciliation’ [2008] European Law Review. Harbo offers a more nuanced argument, arguing that the right to 
strike could be considered an economic right, and that it should only trump another economic right after the 
application of a strict proportionality approach. 
55 See Biondi (n 24) 60; Stephen Weatherill, ‘Viking and Laval: The EU Internal Market Perspective’ in Mark 
Freedland and Jeremias Prassl (eds), Viking, Laval and Beyond: An Introduction (Hart Publishing; Oxford 2016) 
35. On Wednesbury unreasonableness; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation 
[1948] 1 KB 223. 
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industrial action could only be taken where it was “for the protection of workers…”56  Action 
not aimed at such an objective is not protected under the ‘right to strike’ and cannot restrict 
a fundamental freedom.  This mirrors the approach in the UK (interestingly where Viking Line 
was referred from) where the protection of industrial action is limited to situations where it 
is taken in “contemplation or furtherance” of a trade dispute.57  
Finally, the CJEU’s strict application of proportionality in Viking Line can potentially be 
explained through the Säger “market access” or “restrictions” approach.58  In Viking Line, the 
exercise of the fundamental right to strike was aimed at preventing the ship’s owner from 
exercising their fundamental freedom, except on terms acceptable to the FSU and ITF.59  As 
such, it made sense that the CJEU required the trade union to have exhausted all other means 
at its disposal before exercising its rights: only where all less restrictive ways of exercising the 
fundamental right were exhausted could the CJEU allow such restriction of a fundamental 
freedom.  If we compare this with Schmidberger, there is a significant difference to the 
restriction.  In Schmidberger, the restriction on the fundamental freedom was temporary and 
the exercise of the claimant’s free movement rights was possible via different means.  There 
was no market access restriction as seen in Viking Line.   
  
3.1 Summary 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, section 3, and shown by the discussion of Schmidberger and 
Viking Line above, the CJEU adopts a rigorous assessment when balancing fundamental rights 
with other rights or objectives.  In Schmidberger, for example, the CJEU explored in detail the 
factors considered by the Austrian authorities in allowing the protest to restrict the claimant’s 
free movement right.  The CJEU adopted a symmetrical balancing, balancing the restriction 
on the free movement right against the exercise of the fundamental right and the harm to 
the exercise of the fundamental right against the exercise of the fundamental rights.  The 
discussion also demonstrated that the CJEU will alter the focus of its assessment according to 
the context of the case.  
                                                          
56 Viking Line (n.34) [77] 
57 See ss.219 and 244 TULRCA. 
58 Barnard (n 48) 118–124.  Barnard argues that this approach is similar to that seen under the ECHR, but in 
that the focus is on the restriction to the fundamental freedom rather than the fundamental right.  See Säger v 
Dennemeyer & Co Ltd (Case C-76/90) [1991] E.C.R. I-4221. 
59 See Laval (n.34) in relation to the freedom to provide services. 
113 
 
 The above discussion parallels with the approach of the CJEU in Albany.  As 
demonstrated in Chapter 4, section 4, the CJEU in Albany adopted a symmetrical, or “fair”, 
balance between the competing objectives present.  The CJEU balanced the harm to the social 
policy objectives against the need to achieve competition policy’s objectives, and vice versa.  
The exemption provides the point at which the social policy objectives always outweigh 
competition policy’s objectives.  However, it may be that including fundamental rights within 
the CJEU’s balancing exercise in Albany does not alter the balance between the competing 
interests.  Whilst fundamental rights considerations would add additional factors into the 
balance – the Article 28 CFREU right to collective bargaining and, possibly, the Article 16 
CFREU freedom to conduct a business – it may be argued that adding these interests would 
end with the same result.  Where the stipulated conditions in Albany are met, the social policy 
objectives and any right to collective bargaining may outweigh the conflicting competition 
policy objectives and associated fundamental rights.  I shall return to this is section 4.3 below, 
where the chapter will examine the effect of Article 28 CFREU on the exemption in Albany.   
Before exploring the impact of Article 28 CFREU on Albany, section 4 will do two 
things.  First, section 4.1 will explore whether Article 28 CFREU is a right or principle.  This is 
important as categorisation as a right or principle affects the provision’s normative weight.  If 
Article 28 CFREU is a principle, it has limited effect.  Second, section 4.2 will explore the scope 
of Article 28 CFREU.  The scope of Article 28 CFREU will affect any reconsideration of the 
Albany exemption (and balancing exercise) and/or argue against the need for an exemption.  
For example, where Article 28 CFREU provides a positive right for workers or trade unions it 
has greater normative effect than if an ‘empty provision’.  
 
4. The Impact of Fundamental Rights and the CFREU on Albany 
As shown in section 2, fundamental rights have equivalence to the provisions of the Treaties.  
Where present, fundamental rights must be considered by the CJEU, other EU Institutions, 
and Member States when acting within the scope of EU law.  However, in 2000 the EU did not 
recognise a right to collective bargaining as a fundamental right.  AG Jacobs in Albany argued 
that this was due to a lack of convergence by national legal orders and international treaties 
to find such a right in EU law.60  AG Jacobs drew specific attention to the position under Article 
                                                          
60 Albany (n.1) [AG132]-[AG164]. 
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11 ECHR where the ECtHR had not yet recognised the right to collective bargaining within the 
scope of the right to join and form trade unions.  This immediately creates a problem in 
attempting to critique the CJEU’s approach in Albany by reference to fundamental rights.  If 
such considerations were not present when the CJEU balanced the competing objectives, the 
CJEU was right not to consider them.   
 However, this is no longer the case.  The right to collective bargaining has been 
specifically included within the CFREU, and CJEU case law refers to the “right to collective 
bargaining.”61  Article 28 CFREU explicitly states that “[w]orkers and employers, or their 
respective organisations, have, in accordance with Community law and national laws and 
practice, the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at appropriate levels, and 
in cases of conflict of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike 
action.” (emphasis added) This has two effects on the Albany exemption.  First, Article 28 
CFREU requires that Article 101 TFEU is interpreted in a manner compliant with the Article 28 
CFREU right.  As Chapter 4 argued in relation to the Treaty integration clauses and the CJEU’s 
teleological approach, where the application of Article 101 TFEU gives adequate weight to 
such considerations they are not seriously undermined.  Whether we can interpret Article 101 
TFEU in such a manner shall be explored in Chapters 6 and 7.  Second, Article 28 CFREU 
potentially supports the exemption in Albany.  If the application of Article 101 TFEU 
disproportionately restricts Article 28 CFREU, Article 101 TFEU should be disapplied.  I shall 
return to these points in section 4.3 below.   
These two effects assume that Article 28 CFREU is a right, and not a principle.  The 
distinction between rights and principles derives from the CFREU itself, which provides for 
different normative effects.  This difference is like that of Treaty provisions which have direct 
effect, and those which do not.  This distinction can be seen principally within Article 52 
CFREU.  Article 52(5) CFREU states that principles may be implemented by legislative and 
executive acts, and “shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and 
in the ruling on their legality.”62  They do not give rise to direct claims of positive action against 
                                                          
61 See Commission v Germany (n.34); AKT (Case C-533/13) ECLI:EU:C:2015:173; UNIS and Beaudout Pere & Fils 
SARL (Joined Cases C-25 and 26/14) ECLI:EU:C:2015:821. 
62 Article 52(5) CFREU.  The Explanations state that “[p]rinciples may be implemented through legislative or 
executive acts (adopted by the Union in accordance with its powers, and by the Member States only when 
they implement Union law); accordingly, they become significant for the Courts only when such acts are 
interpreted or reviewed.”   
115 
 
EU institutions or Member States.63  Where a principle has not been implemented either by 
European or national legislation, subject to the requirements of Article 51(1) CFREU, it has 
little normative weight in a balancing exercise.64  Rights, on the other hand, have significant 
normative weight; giving rise to an interpretative obligation, providing grounds for judicial 
review, and giving rise to tortious liability when breached. 
This has implications for the impact that Article 28 CFREU could have on Article 101 
TFEU.  If Article 28 CFREU is a principle, it would still need to be considered but would not 
have significant weight.  As a principle, EU institutions and Member States would only have 
to “observe” it.65  It would not need to be included within the application of the Treaty 
competition rules as they do not aim at implementing collective bargaining.  Thus, for Article 
28 CFREU to have any normative effect on Article 101 TFEU, it must be a right.  The following 
subsection will examine whether Article 28 CFREU is a right or principle.  
 
4.1 Is Article 28 a right or principle? 
Article 28 CFREU states that  
 
[w]orkers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance with Community law and 
national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at appropriate 
levels, and in cases of conflict of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including 
strike action. 
 
If Article 28 CFREU is a ‘right’, then the right (and its associative social policy objectives) 
should, as far as is possible, be taken into account when applying Article 101 TFEU.  Where 
this occurs, it may be argued that such considerations are not seriously undermined.  
Although Article 28 CFREU may be restricted, this is only after balancing the right against the 
competitive harm caused.  Where that harm is disproportionate to the fundamental right (and 
                                                          
63 AG Cruz Villalon states that principles contain obligations upon the public authorities, thus contrasting with 
‘rights’, whose purpose is the protection of directly defined individual legal situations, though the specific 
expression of ‘principles’ at lower levels of the legal order is also possible. Public authorities must respect the 
individual legal situation guaranteed by ‘rights’, but in the case of a ‘principle’ the obligation is much more 
general: its wording determines not an individual legal situation, but general matters and ones which govern 
the actions of all public authorities.”  See Association de Mediation Sociale v Union locale des Syndicats CGT 
(Case C-176/12) [2014] 2 C.M.L.R. 41. 
64 Lenaerts (n 20) 399–401. 
65 See Article 51(1) CFREU. 
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social policy objectives) pursued, it would be legitimate to require the parties to adopt a more 
proportionate means of achieving such considerations.  As such, the Albany exemption may 
not be necessary to protect such objectives. 
Determining whether a Charter provision is a right or principle has been subject to 
limited discussion by the CJEU.  The CJEU has tended not to distinguish between rights and 
principles but rather to interpret the challenged legislation in a Charter-friendly manner.66  
Indeed, the CJEU has avoided the issue in recent cases.67  For example, in AMS and Glatzel,68 
the CJEU focussed on whether the legislation in question was compliant with the Charter 
provision.  The case law, Dominguez and AMS specifically,69 does however allow for a general 
approach to be identified.  In both cases, the CJEU adopted a systematic, teleological 
approach, focussing on considerations such as where the provision is in the Charter, and its 
wording.  As such, it is possible to predict whether a CFREU provision is a right or principle.70 
In Dominguez, the question was whether Article 31(2) CFREU was a right or principle.71  
Although the CJEU does not address this point, AG Trstenjak is clear that Article 31(2) CFREU 
is a right.72  AG Trstenjak argued that as Article 31(2) CFREU’s wording is very clear, worded 
in an individual manner, and its language differs from that used in other provisions of the 
solidarity chapter;  this would be sufficient to establish Article 31(2) CFREU as a right.73  AG 
                                                          
66 Jasper Krommendijk, ‘Principled Silence or Mere Silence on Principles? The Role of the EU Charter’s 
Principles in the Case Law of the Court of Justice’ (2015) 11 European Constitutional Law Review 321, 340–50.. 
See also AG Bot in Kamberaj v Instituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano (Case C-
571/10) [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 43, who argued that the case provided a good opportunity to develop the scope of 
conditions and restrictions and the way in which rights and principles could be reconciled. 
67 See, for example, Monika Kusionová v SMART Capital a.s. (Case C-34/13) (2014) OJ C409/7; Pohotovost s.r.o. 
v Vasuta (Case C-470/12) (2014) OJ C112/9; Kamberaj, ibid.  Denman argues this suggest that the CJEU sees the 
distinction as unimportant. D Denman, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2010) 4 European Human Rights 
Law Review 349, 369–70. 
68 Glatzel v Freistaat Bayern (Case C-356/12) [2014] 3 C.M.L.R. 52 
69 Dominguez v Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique and Prefet de la region (Case C-282/10) [2012] 
2 C.M.L.R. 14; AMS (n.70) 
70 House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee ‘The application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
in the UK: a state of confusion’ Forty-Third Report of Session 2013-2014, HC 979; paras [92]-[93].  See also 
Steve Peers and Sacha Prechal, ‘Article 52 - Scope and Interpretation of Rights and Principles’ in Steve Peers 
and others (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart Publishing; Oxford 2014)., who 
argue that given the fact-specific nature of the CFREU’s application, “it is highly questionable whether a 
distinction between rights and principles can or should be drawn for each Charter article in the abstract and 
for once and for ever.” [52.184] 
71 Article 31(2) CFREU holds that “[e]very worker has the right to limitation of maximum working hours, to 
daily and weekly rest periods and to an annual period of paid leave.” 
72 Dominguez (n.69) [AG75].  AG Trstenjak cites her opinion in Criminal Proceedings against Gysbrechts (Case 
C-205/07) [2009] 2 C.M.L.R 2, [AG38], and AG Tizzano in BECTU (Case C-173/99) [2001] 3 C.M.L.R. 7, [AG28]. 
73 Dominguez, ibid., [AG76]-[AG77] 
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Trstenjak further argues that due to the “proximity … substantive connections and structural 
similarities” of Article 31(2) CFREU with Articles 28 and 29 CFREU, which grant subjective 
rights, Article 31(2) CFREU also contains “a subjective right.”74  In AMS, the same approach 
led the Court to conclude that Article 27 CFREU was a principle and not a right.75  The Court 
held that for Article 27 CFREU “to be fully effective, it must be given more specific expression 
in European Union or national law.”76  The Directive did not “concretise” Article 27 CFREU, 
thus the provision could not be relied upon.77  It did not “confer on individuals a right which 
they may invoke.”78     
In AMS, AG Cruz Villalón is more structured in his approach.  He states that the first 
thing to note is that Article 27 CFREU is found in the Chapter labelled “Solidarity”, reflects 
“Article 21 of the European Social Charter and … the Community Charter of the Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers”, and appeared in EU secondary legislation pre-CFREU.79  This implied 
that Article 27 CFREU was a right.  However, other factors, AG Cruz Villalon concluded, 
negated this and meant that Article 27 CFREU was a principle.  For structural reasons, AG Cruz 
Villalon states that Article 27 CFREU implies a principle and not a right.80  The scope of the 
provision is “extremely weak … [t]he content is so indeterminate that it can be interpreted 
only as an obligation to act.”81  Article 27 CFREU only requires Member States “to determine 
the objective content (information and consultation of workers) and certain outcomes…”82  
Furthermore, AG Cruz Villalon adopts a teleological approach arguing that the wording of 
most provisions in the solidarity chapter have similar forms of wording.83  “That means that 
there is a strong presumption that the fundamental rights set out in that title belong to the 
category of “principles”. Although the position of a provision in the Charter can only be 
                                                          
74 ibid., [AG78]; this is on the basis that both provisions state that individual holders of the fundamental right 
have a “right” thus grant subjective rights. 
75 Article 27 CFREU states that “[w]orkers or their representatives must, at the appropriate levels, be 
guaranteed information and consultation in good time in the cases and under the conditions provided for by 
Union law and national laws and practices.” 
76 AMS (n.63) [45]. 
77 ibid., [48] 
78 ibid., [49] 
79 ibid., [52] 
80 ibid., [AG53] 
81 ibid., [AG54] 
82 ibid. 
83 ibid., [AG55] 
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presumptive of its categorisation, in the case of art.27 this is a feature additional to the ones 
listed above.”84   
The following approach can be distilled from the above discussion.  In determining 
whether a Charter provision is a right or principle, a teleological approach would be adopted.  
First, the Court will look at the wording of the article.  Does the wording define an individual 
legal situation, or does it require further “concretisation”?  The CJEU will also consider wider 
arguments to determine whether the provision is a right or principle.  In both AMS and 
Dominguez, the structure of the provision and its position in the CFREU are considered. For 
example, does the provision match the wording of the other provisions within that section 
and what is the “title” of the section in which it is found?  This is not exhaustive, and other 
considerations will be relevant in individual cases.  This approach is similar to that adopted by 
the CJEU in determining whether a provision has direct effect.85  A provision as direct effect 
where it is sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional.  This is key to both assessments; is the 
provision clearly expressed to protect an individual legal situation.  For example, in AMS, the 
CJEU considered that Article 27 CFREU needed further “specific expression” in EU or national 
law; it was not sufficiently clear, precise or unconditional to be relied upon.86 
Therefore, is Article 28 CFREU a right or principle?  The wording of Article 28 CFREU 
strongly suggests that it is a right.  It states that “[w]orkers and employers … have, in 
accordance with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and 
conclude collective agreements.”87  It can be argued that this clearly defines the content of 
Article 28 CFREU (the negotiation and conclusion of collective agreements) and who is 
covered by it (employers, workers, and their respective organisations).88  Adopting wider 
teleological arguments, the wording of Article 28 CFREU is clearer and more precise than that 
seen in other provisions found in the “Solidarity” section of the CFREU.  This can be seen 
                                                          
84 ibid. 
85 See Van Gend en Loos (Case 26/62) [1963] E.C.R. 1.  For a provision to have direct effect, it must be clear, 
precise and unconditional. 
86 AMS (n.63) [44]-[49] 
87 Article 28 CFREU 
88 It may be argued that Article 28 CFREU does not define “collective agreement” in that it does not identify 
what a “collective agreement”.  It may therefore need further concretisation to be clear and precise.  
However, this is the same for other CFREU provisions which may be rights.  For example, Article 11 CFREU 
provides for the right to freedom of expression, without defining its limits. 
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clearly if compared, for example, with Article 27 CFREU.89  These linguistic differences point 
towards Article 28 CFREU containing a right rather than a principle.90 
Three further arguments can be made in support of this conclusion.  First, AG Trstenjak 
has consistently opined that Article 28 CFREU creates a right and not a principle.91  In 
Commission v Germany, AG Trstenjak reached this conclusion by drawing “inspiration from 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied 
by instruments for the protection of fundamental rights which the Member States have 
collaborated or which they are signatories.”92  Thus, as collective bargaining is recognised as 
a right by various international instruments, “it is beyond question that the right to bargain 
collective[ly] … must be recognised also in the Community legal order as fundamental rights 
which form part of the general principles of Community law.”93   
This links with the second argument supporting such a conclusion.  As the right to 
collective bargaining is protected under Article 11 ECHR,94 Article 52(3) CFREU requires that a 
reciprocal right is found under Article 28 CFREU.  Article 52(3) CFREU holds that where a 
Charter right corresponds with a right guaranteed under the ECHR, the meaning and scope 
given to the Charter right shall be the same.  Although the explanations to the Charter do not 
list Article 28 CFREU as being of equivalence to the ECHR right, this does not defeat the above 
argument.  To find that Article 28 CFREU does not have equivalence to the right to collective 
bargaining under Article 11 ECHR would be illogical.  It would mean that the right to collective 
bargaining receives less protection under EU law than the ECHR.  It could lead to situations 
where individuals claim that their Article 11 ECHR right is infringed by the exercise and 
implementation of EU law.  The ECtHR could be asked to assess EU law for compliance with 
human rights.  This would question the effectiveness of EU law.   
                                                          
89 Note the difference between the words “must … be guaranteed” in Article 27, with “have … the right to” in 
Article 28. 
90 In AMS, AG Cruz Villalon argues that the group of provisions contained under the heading “Solidarity” 
“incorporates rights mainly regarded as social rights with respect to their substance, for the content of which a 
form of wording such as that in Article 27 is preferred.  This means that there is a strong presumption that the 
fundamental rights set out in that title belong to the category of ‘principles.”  See AMS (n.63) [AG55] 
91 Commission v Germany (n.34); Dominguez (n.69) 
92 Commission v Germany, ibid., [76]. 
93 ibid., [77]-[78]. AG Trstenjak cites the European Social Charter, the Community Charter of the Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers, and even the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union itself. 
Interestingly, AG Trstenjak does not cite the position taken in relation to Article 11 ECHR. 
94 Demir and Baykara v Turkey (2009) 48 E.H.R.R. 54, [154]. 
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The CJEU has also held that, in regard to fundamental rights, it will draw “inspiration 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines 
supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member 
States… are signatories.”95  On this basis, it would be counter-intuitive to argue that Article 28 
CFREU is not a right, thus creating a lacuna in protection for the right to collective bargaining 
under EU law.  Indeed, in Demir the ECtHR cited Article 28 CFREU as one of the international 
instruments recognising the right to collective bargaining.96  As such, it is logical to conclude 
the right to collective bargaining is a right under the Charter.97  
This conclusion, that Article 28 CFREU is a right, does not consider its scope within EU 
law.  Therefore, section 4.2 shall briefly explore whether Article 28 CFREU provides any 
‘positive’ rights for workers or trade unions, or whether it simply provides a ‘negative’ right 
against interference.  Does Article 28 CFREU provide substantive protection, or is it an ‘empty 
provision’?  The scope of Article 28 CFREU may affect any reconsideration of the Albany 
exemption and/or argue against the need for such an exemption.   
 
4.2 The Scope of Article 28 CFREU  
Article 28 CFREU states that “[w]orkers and employers, or their representative organisations, 
have, in accordance with Union law and national law and practices, the right to negotiate and 
conclude collective agreements.”98 (emphasis added) Its scope, therefore, is subject to the 
protection granted by EU and national law.  It is “heavily contingent on Community law and 
national laws being in place to give effect to the right…”99 and “arguably does not provide any 
positive duty to guarantee the right to bargain collectively.”100  This does not mean that Article 
28 CFREU does not carry any weight.  Article 28 CFREU may carry weight as a negative right 
                                                          
95 See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n.5) [4]; Nold (n.7) [13]; ERT (n.11) [41].   
96 ibid., [150] 
97 It could be argued that we would have to read the restriction on the right to collective bargaining provided 
by Article 11(2) ECHR, due to Article 52(3) CFREU, however, this may not be necessary as Article 28 CFREU can 
be restricted by Article 52(1) CFREU. 
98 The emphasis on the right being in accordance with national laws and standards reaffirms the position in 
Protocol 30.  Protocol 30 states that the Charter only grants justiciable rights within the United Kingdom and 
Poland as far as they are already provided for in national law.  For further discussion in relation to the UK, see 
NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ. 990; NS v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (Joined Cases C-411/10 and 493/10) [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 9. 
99 Keith Ewing, ‘The Death of Social Europe’ (2015) 26 Kings Law Journal 76, 84.  See also, Commission v 
Germany (n.51) [38]; and Article 52(6), which states that “[f]ull account shall be taken of the national laws and 
practices as specified in this Charter.” 
100 Unite v United Kingdom [2017] I.R.L.R. 438, [62] 
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against interference, including against the application of Article 101 TFEU or other Treaty 
provisions.  This section will examine the scope of Article 28 CFREU. 
The right contained in Article 28 CFREU potentially has the same meaning and scope 
as Article 11 ECHR.  Under Article 52(3) CFREU, where a Charter right corresponds with a 
Convention right, “the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same…”101  Given the 
uncertainty as to what the Article 11 ECHR right to collective bargaining provides, it is arguable 
that similar concerns arise under Article 28 CFREU.  It could, as Ewing argues, “not impose any 
obligation on States to ensure that collective bargaining is conducted or even to promote the 
exercise by workers or employers of this right.”102   
This, however, is qualitatively different to protecting existing collective agreements.  
As can be seen from Demir, Article 11 ECHR provides a negative right against interference.  In 
Demir, the ECtHR held the right to collective bargaining to be “essential element, in principle,” 
of the right to join or form a trade union under Article 11.103  The ECtHR held that States have 
a wide margin of appreciation in how they regulate the right, however restrictions that affect 
the “essential elements of trade union freedom” are prohibited.104  Provided that a restriction 
which does not leave the right to collective bargaining devoid of any substance, as was the 
case in Demir, it is unlikely to violate Article 11 ECHR.  This wide margin also features in the 
ECtHR’s decision in Unite.  In Unite, the ECtHR held that there was no positive obligation under 
Article 11 ECHR on the State to enable collective bargaining.  The UK Government’s decision 
to abolish a statutory, compulsory bargaining mechanism, the Agricultural Wages Board, was 
not an unjustified interference with the right to collective bargaining.  Significant in this 
regard, the ECtHR held, was that the union and its members could still bargain voluntarily, 
access the statutory recognition procedure and conclude legally enforceable agreements, and 
use industrial action to ‘force’ an employer to engage in collective bargaining.105   
                                                          
101 Article 52(3) CFREU.  The right under Article 28 CFREU should contain, as a minimum, the same protections 
as the right to collective bargaining under Article 11 ECHR.  
102 Ewing (n 99) 84.  Ewing describes this as meaning that Article 28 CFREU is “empty of substance.”  See also, 
Steve Peers (ed), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart Publishing 2014) para 28.84. 
103 See Demir (n.94) [154] 
104 ibid., [144]. This includes the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike.  On the right to strike see 
Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey (Application No. 68959/01) judgment delivered 21 April 2009 
105 Unite (n.100) [65] 
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The decisions in Demir and Unite appear to confirm that Article 11 ECHR only protects 
a right to voluntary collective bargaining.106  Both cases argued that a restriction on voluntary 
bargaining could only be justified by a “pressing social need”.  This narrow view of the right 
to collective bargaining arguably confirms the ECtHR’s position in Wilson and Palmer107: the 
right to collective bargaining only allows workers to instruct or permit their union to make 
representations to their employer.  As implied from the concurring decisions in Demir and 
Unite, the right to collective bargaining only prevents States from interfering with voluntary 
collective bargaining and prohibiting the conclusion of collective agreements where the 
parties want to conclude one.108   
It is possible that the CJEU would adopt a similar narrow view of Article 28 CFREU; only 
providing the right for workers and employers (and their representatives) to voluntarily 
bargain collectively and conclude collective agreements.109  It is probable that Article 28 
CFREU contains no positive duty to enable collective bargaining between the social partners, 
but only a negative protection against interference with voluntary agreements.110  In the 
context of Albany, where a voluntary collective agreement is challenged under Article 101 
TFEU as anti-competitive, the negative right under Article 28 CFREU is highly significant.  
Where the competing objectives/interests/rights are balanced, Article 28 CFREU potentially 
provides significant weight in the balancing exercise.  However, this does not necessarily 
mean that the balance in Albany is altered.   
The narrow scope of Article 28 CFREU does not affect the interpretative obligation 
that arises from the CFREU.  As already discussed, rights contained in the CFREU (as 
fundamental rights of the EU) are also general principles.  Thus, they can be used to limit the 
application of Treaty provisions and require that the EU and Member States interpret EU 
legislation in a manner compatible with Charter Rights.  Section 4.3 will examine the potential 
impact of Article 28 CFREU on Article 101 TFEU. 
 
                                                          
106 See Kalina Arabadjieva, ‘Another Disappointment in Strasbourg: Unite the Union v United Kingdom’ (2017) 
46 Industrial Law Journal 289. 
107 Wilson and Palmer v United Kingdom [2002] I.R.L.R. 568 
108 See Judge Spielmann in Demir (n.94) [10]. 
109 See RJ Harvey, Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law. (Butterworths 2001) para N1[903.18]. 
110 It should be noted that Article 52(3) CFREU does allow the CJEU to provide greater protection than that 
provided under the ECHR. 
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4.3 Collective bargaining as a CFREU Right 
Article 51(1) CFREU states that the Charter’s provisions are “addressed to the institutions and 
bodies of the Union with due regard to the principle of subsidiarity and to Member States 
when they are implementing Union law.”111  EU institutions and Member States must “respect 
the rights [contained in the CFREU] … in accordance with their respective powers.”112  As such, 
Article 28 CFREU places an obligation on the CJEU to interpret Article 101 TFEU in a manner 
“which renders it compatible with the Treaty and the general principles of law.”113  Article 101 
TFEU should therefore be interpreted in a manner compatible with the Article 28 CFREU right 
to collective bargaining.  This would ensure that the Article 28 CFREU right is considered 
within an Article 101 TFEU analysis.  This approach fits with the Treaty integration clauses and 
teleological approach discussed in Chapter 4.  They require that a wide interpretation of 
Article 101 TFEU is adopted which takes account of the social policy objectives pursued by 
collective agreements.  Where this is possible, the application of Article 101 TFEU to a 
collective agreement may not seriously undermine the policy objectives pursued by such 
agreement.  Whether we can interpret Article 101 TFEU in such a manner shall form the basis 
of the discussion in Chapters 6 and 7.  The chapters will explore whether we can interpret 
Article 101 TFEU in a manner compatible with Article 28 CFREU (and the social policy 
objectives pursued by collective agreements).   
If such an interpretation is not possible, the CJEU will have to balance the competing 
objectives: the economic objectives, and any relevant fundamental rights, pursued by Article 
101 TFEU with the social policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right.  This would be through 
a balancing approach as set out in section 3 above, considering whether the application of 
Article 101 TFEU to the collective agreement in question disproportionately restricts the 
exercise of the right to collective bargaining.114  This should include whether the application 
of Article 101 TFEU considered the fundamental right. As set out in section 3, fundamental 
rights can be limited where such limitation is (i) provided for by law; (ii) respects the essence 
of the right and/or freedoms; and (iii) is proportionate: the restriction is necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest.115  This can be by other CFREU rights (Article 
                                                          
111 Article 51(1) CFREU 
112 ibid. 
113 See Tridimas (n 9); Commission v Council (n.21); Ruah (n.20). 
114 See also the decisions in Nold (n.7); Hauer (n.8), [19]-[30]. 
115 See Article 52(1) CFREU; Kjell Karlsson (n.31) [45]; Wachauf, (n.11) [18]. 
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52(1) CFREU), or Treaty objectives (Hauer).  One can also argue that some rights are limited 
in that they are only guaranteed in accordance with EU law.116  For example, Article 28 CFREU 
states that the right to collective bargaining is in “accordance with Union law and national 
laws and practices”.  This implies that the right to collective bargaining should expect to be 
subject to the application of Article 101 TFEU.  This does not mean that a collective agreement 
will fall foul of Article 101 TFEU but that Article 101 TFEU should in principle apply.  This 
conclusion can be implied from the decision in Hennigs and Mai, where the CJEU held that 
the right to collective bargaining had to be exercised in conformity with EU secondary law.117  
Article 28 CFREU could not mitigate the application of the Framework Directive.118   
Key to considering whether any restriction on Article 28 CFREU is proportionate is that 
the right is not deprived of its essence.  In balancing the competing objectives/rights the CJEU 
must ensure that the essence of the respective right is protected.  This is important.  Can we 
conceive of a situation where collective agreements could be subjected to Article 101 TFEU 
without depriving them of their essence?  This is where the symmetrical balancing approach 
identified in section 3 above, and discussed in Chapter 4, section 4, is vital.  Where this 
approach is adopted, it is possible that neither competing interest(s) is deprived of its essence.  
This ensures that the interests are maximised as much as possible.  The discussion in Chapter 
4, section 4, argued that such an approach was adopted by the CJEU in Albany.  The exemption 
protects the essence of both the social and competition policy objectives.  This is through the 
qualified, limited nature of the CJEU’s exemption.  A collective agreement only falls outside 
the scope of Article 101 TFEU where it meets Albany’s stipulated conditions.  This implies that 
it sees those two criteria as being essential to the attainment of the social policy objectives 
pursued by such agreements.  Furthermore, where the agreement does not fall within the 
scope of Albany’s exemption, Article 101 TFEU applies.  This provides some, albeit limited, 
scope for the application of Article 101 TFEU to collective agreements. 
In this regard, including the Article 28 CFREU right to collective bargaining within the 
CJEU’s balancing exercise in Albany may not alter its balance.  Whilst this may bolster the 
balance in favour of exempting collective agreements, it may not extend the scope of the 
                                                          
116 See Schiek and others (n 16) 85. 
117 See Hennigs v Eisenbahn-Bundesamt; Land Berlin v Mai (Joined Cases C-297/10 and 298/10) [2011] E.C.R. I-
7965, [67]-[68]. 
118 ibid.  The CJEU did assess the proportionality of the Directive’s limitation of Article 21 CFREU’s prohibition 
on discrimination. 
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exemption.  As argued in section 4.2 above, the scope of Article 28 CFREU is potentially 
restricted to a negative right against interference: Article 28 CFREU may only provide 
protection against interference in voluntary agreements.  Thus, the protection provided by 
the Albany exemption may already ensure that the essence of the Article 28 CFREU right is 
protected.  Albany protects collective agreements which are between management and 
labour (or their representatives) and aim at improving working terms and conditions.  
Voluntarily agreed collective agreements, protected under Article 28 CFREU, would generally 
meet these criteria. 
However, where Article 101 TFEU can be interpreted in a manner which renders it 
compatible with the Article 28 CFREU right it is probable that any restriction on collective 
bargaining and collective agreements would be proportionate.  Are such interests seriously 
undermined where they are given adequate consideration within the application of Article 
101 TFEU?  This assessment was missing from the CJEU’s decision in Albany.  If the application 
of Article 101 TFEU sufficiently protected the social policy objectives, an exemption may not 
have been necessary.  Whether this is possible shall be explored in Chapters 6 and 7, which 
will explore what would happen were Article 101 TFEU to be applied to a collective 
agreement. 
 
5. Summary and concluding comments 
The discussion in this Chapter has shown that fundamental rights considerations may affect 
Albany’s exemption.  First, the discussion has shown that when EU fundamental rights conflict 
with other fundamental rights and Treaty provisions and objectives, the CJEU resolves the 
conflict through a proportionality analysis.  Section 3 showed that such an approach seeks to 
achieve a fair balance, applying a ‘double or symmetrical balancing’.  This ensures that the 
essence of the competing rights and interests is respected and is consistent with the 
constitutional approaches identified in Chapter 4, section 3.  Under such an approach, neither 
right is devoid of its essence.   This approach, section 4.3 argued, can be seen in the CJEU’s 
balancing in Albany.  In Albany, the CJEU’s creation of a limited exemption implies that 
exempting all collective agreements from EU competition law was disproportionate.  Rather 
than preventing any application of EU competition law, the CJEU retained a limited area of 
application for Article 101 TFEU.  Thus, it was argued, adding fundamental rights 
considerations to the balance may not alter anything.  The Albany exemption may already 
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ensure that the essence of the Article 28 CFREU right is protected.  It may, as section 4.3 
suggested, be that Albany’s stipulated conditions are considered an integral element of the 
(negative) Article 28 CFREU right.  Including such interests would overcomplicate an already 
complex balancing exercise for little practical benefit.   
 The chapter has also shown that EU fundamental rights have an interpretative 
obligation.  This stems from the CJEU’s development of EU fundamental rights as general 
principles of EU law.  As such, and as shown in sections 2 and 4.3, EU law should be interpreted 
as far as possible in a manner compatible with EU fundamental rights (and CFREU provisions).  
In the context of Albany, the Chapter argued that this means that Article 101 TFEU should be 
interpreted in a manner which gives appropriate weight to the Article 28 CFREU right to 
collective bargaining.  This links with the arguments in Chapter 4, section 2, which showed 
that the Treaty integration clauses and CJEU’s teleological approach require that wider 
objectives are included within the application and interpretation of EU law.  This, chapter 4 
argued, requires that Article 101 TFEU be interpreted to include the social policy objectives 
pursued by collective agreements.  As such, where Article 101 TFEU can be interpreted in a 
way which gives appropriate weight to the social policy objectives and the right to collective 
agreements, such interests are not seriously undermined.  As such, the exemption in Albany 
may not be necessary. 
The discussion in Chapters 4 and 5 has focussed on how the CJEU has attempted to 
resolve the conflict present in Albany between the competing objectives, and not whether a 
wider interpretation of Article 101 TFEU makes the Albany exemption unnecessary.  Chapters 
6 and 7 will examine whether Article 101 TFEU can be interpreted in a way which considers 
both the social policy objectives pursued by collective agreements and the Article 28 CFREU 
right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements.  Chapter 6 will consider Article 101(1) 
TFEU; Chapter 7, Article 101(3) TFEU.  The discussion in these chapters will examine whether 
we can include such considerations within Article 101 TFEU, giving them appropriate weight 
in the provision.  As such, any restriction on the social policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU 
right may not be disproportionate and seriously undermine such objectives; the Albany 
exemption potentially may not be needed.  Chapters 6 and 7 will also challenge the 
assumption that inherent restrictions contained in collective agreements infringe Article 101 
TFEU.  The discussion will examine whether collective agreements fall within the scope of 
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Article 101 TFEU, without needing to interpret Article 101 TFEU in a manner compatible with 
the social policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right.  
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Chapter 6 – Do we need an exemption? The application of Article 101 
to collective agreements. 
 
1. Introduction  
Chapters 4 and 5 explored the constitutional aspects of the CJEU’s decision in Albany, 
examining the potential impact of the Treaty integration clauses, the CJEU’s teleological 
approach, and EU fundamental rights on the CJEU’s decision.  The discussion showed two 
things.  First, the chapters explored how the CJEU resolves conflicts between objectives, 
rights, and interests by balancing through the proportionality principle.  It showed that the 
CJEU in Albany balanced the competing objectives present through the proportionality 
principle, balancing the harm to the social policy objectives against the need to achieve the 
competition policy objectives present.  In doing so, the CJEU concluded that the social policy 
objectives outweighed competition policy’s objectives where its stipulated conditions were 
met.1  The Chapters concluded that the CJEU’s approach was legally correct.  Second, Chapters 
4 and 5 showed that the Treaty integration clauses, the CJEU’s teleological approach, and EU’s 
approach to fundamental rights, require that EU law show be interpreted in a manner which 
takes account of wider EU objectives and EU fundamental rights.  The chapters proposed that 
this provides an alternative to the Albany exemption.  Where the social policy objectives and 
Article 28 CFREU right to collective bargaining (and agreements) are given adequate weight 
in the application of Article 101 TFEU, they are not seriously undermined.  As such, an 
exemption may not be necessary. 
 The purpose of Chapters 6 and 7 is to explore whether we can reconcile the competing 
interests through the application of Article 101 TFEU.  The chapters will examine whether 
Article 101 TFEU can be interpreted in a manner which gives adequate weight to the social 
policy objectives pursued by collective agreements and the Article 28 CFREU right to collective 
bargaining and agreements.  Whether this is possible, was not explored by the CJEU in Albany.  
The CJEU simply held that collective agreements contained inherent restrictions on 
competition, and that applying EU competition law would seriously undermine the social 
policy objectives pursued by such agreements.  It did not assess whether the social policy 
                                                          
1 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie (Case C-67/96) [2000] 4 C.M.L.R. 
116, [59]-[60]. 
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objectives pursued were seriously undermined, nor whether Article 101 TFEU prohibited the 
agreement in question.  Where a collective agreement does not fall within Article 101 TFEU, 
or where the application of Article 101 TFEU gives adequate weight to the social policy 
objectives and Article 28 CFREU right, are such objectives undermined?  Only where a 
collective agreement falls fouls of Article 101 TFEU is it possible to assess whether the social 
policy objectives pursued would be seriously undermined.   
This chapter, Chapter 6, will examine whether a collective agreement falls within 
Article 101(1) TFEU including examining whether social policy objectives and the Article 28 
CFREU right can be included within the Article 101(1) analysis.  Chapter 7 will focus on Article 
101(3) TFEU.  The discussion in this Chapter will do the following.  First, Section 2 will explore 
whether a collective agreement could fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU without needing to 
consider the social policy objectives pursued by it.2  The discussion will focus on the Vertical 
Block Exemption Regulations, whether the agreement has an appreciable effect on trade, and 
whether the agreement appreciably restricts competition.  The discussion will show that a 
collective agreement may fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU without considering its wider policy 
objectives.  This, however, will not be in all cases.  As such, the social policy objectives, and 
fundamental rights interests may need to be included within the Article 101(1) TFEU analysis 
to ensure that they are not seriously undermined. Section 3 will explore how the social policy 
objectives and Article 28 CFREU right can be included within Article 101(1) TFEU.  The section 
will also examine the implications that such an approach has for the Albany exemption.  
Section 4 concludes the chapter.   
 
2. Article 101(1) TFEU – A Restriction on Competition? 
Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits agreements which may affect trade between Member States 
and have as their “object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 
within the internal market”.3  Whether an agreement has the object or effect of restricting 
competition is fact specific.  Restrictions are classified as ‘by object’ where an analysis of the 
purpose of the agreement, taking account of its clauses and economic context, reveals a 
                                                          
2 See Christopher Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy (Oxford: Hart, 2009) 313. Townley points out that 
there is no point in considering whether Article 101 should include public policy where there is no 
infringement of Article 101. 
3 Article 101(1) TFEU 
130 
 
sufficiently deleterious impact on competition.4  The effects of such agreements are 
irrelevant.5  Where there is no object restriction, an extensive analysis of the agreement’s 
effects on the market will be conducted to determine whether the agreement restricts 
competition by effect.6  This requires a detailed analysis of the agreement in its context,7 
including a clear market definition8 and the establishment of a counterfactual.9 
In Albany, AG Jacobs stated that a collective agreement on wages and working 
conditions restricts competition between employees (and employers).10  They cannot offer to 
work on terms and conditions below that set by the agreement.  For example, an agreement 
setting wages is potentially an object restriction.  Such an agreement sets the price for an 
‘input’ into the production process.  The purpose of such an agreement, as identified by AG 
Jacobs, is to increase the wages that workers are paid and prevent wage competition.  In the 
absence of such an agreement, competition in the labour market would reduce wages below 
the level set by the collective agreement, to the detriment of workers’ terms and conditions, 
and allow employers to set their own wage levels.  A “race to the bottom”, or the level set by 
legislation, would occur. 
Collective agreements may also have horizontal impacts.  An example of this is where 
an industry-wide union uses its position to co-ordinate firm behaviour through controlling the 
conditions upon which its members offer their services.  This is like a hub-and-spoke cartel 
where the supplier of an input uses its conditions of supply to alter employer behaviour. Here 
the union acts as the “hub” in an employer ‘conspiracy’; acting as an enforcer to ensure that 
employers adhere to the terms of the agreement.  This depends on the union’s ability to 
control both its members and employers.  For example, can a trade union cause sufficient 
economic harm through the use of industrial action to force employers to comply with the 
                                                          
4 See Sociéte Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (Case 56/95) [1966] E.C.R. 235, 249; 
GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission (Joined Cases C-501/06, C-513/06, C-515/06, C-519/06 P) 
[2010] 4 C.M.L.R. 2, [55]-[58]. 
5 See Bureau National Interprofessional De Cognac v Guy Clair (Case 123/83) [1985] E.C.R. 391, [22].  The 
“object” and “effect” categories are alternative conditions, and although both may simultaneously exist, it is 
only necessary to prove one.  See Okeoghene Odudu, ‘Interpreting Article 81(1): Object as Subjective Intent’ 
(2001) 26 European Law Review 60. 
6 See Brasserie de Haecht SA v Consorts Wilkin-Janssen (Case 23/67) [1968] E.C.R. 407, 415 
7 Delimitis v Henning Brau AG (Case C-234/89) [1991] E.C.R. I-935, [14] 
8 ibid, [16]-[18].  This allows the effects of an agreement on to be analysed to determine whether it has as its 
effect the restriction of competition. 
9 In this context, the counterfactual would be the situation absent a collective agreement. See O2 (Germany) 
GmbH v Commission (Case T-328/03) [2006] E.C.R. II-1231, [65]-[117] 
10 Albany (n.1) [AG178] 
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terms of a collective agreement?  Furthermore, centralised bargaining also leads to significant 
employer (and worker) coordination extending beyond the collective bargaining relationship.  
For centralised bargaining to work, employers, through their federation, and workers, 
through their union, must coordinate their bargaining position.  Where no collective 
agreement is reached, it is possible that employers (or workers) may agree to adopt such 
terms and conditions anyway.  This stifles competition between employers for employees 
(and vice versa); competition over terms and conditions of employment would be lessened.  
This may ultimately harm consumers as a competitive workforce leads to better goods and 
services.  
However, despite such potentially anti-competitive object and/or effects, a collective 
agreement may not fall within Article 101(1) TFEU. This is regardless of the policy objectives 
that the agreement pursues.  Where a collective agreement falls within the Vertical Block 
Exemption Regulation (VBER)11; does not have an appreciable effect on trade; and/or does 
not have an appreciable effect on competition, it falls outside the scope of Article 101(1) 
TFEU.  As such, the social policy objectives are not undermined.  This means that the Albany 
exemption may not be necessary.  The discussion in section 2 will do the following.  Section 
2.1 will examine whether a collective agreement could benefit from the VBER.  Where an 
agreement satisfies the Regulation’s requirements, it is outside of Article 101(1) TFEU.  There 
is no need to consider whether it has an appreciable effect on trade and/or competition   
Section 2.2 will examine whether a collective agreement may appreciable affect trade.  Where 
it does not, it does not fall within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.  Section 2.3 will explore 
whether a trade union appreciably restricts competition. 
 
2.1 The Vertical Block Exemption Regulation 
As set out in Chapter 1, a collective agreement is a vertical agreement.  It is an agreement 
between two or more undertakings operating for the purposes of the agreement at different 
levels of the production chain, which relates to the conditions for the purchase of services.12  
As such, a collective agreement may benefit from the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation 
                                                          
11 Commission Regulation 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices [2010] O.J. 
L102/1. 
12 Article 1(a) VBER 
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and thus is outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU.    The VBER holds that “Article 101(1) … shall 
not apply to vertical agreements”13 where the market share held by the supplier does not 
exceed 30% of the market on which it sells the contract services, and the market share of the 
buyer does not exceed 30% of the relevant market on which it purchases the contract 
services.14   
Article 4 of the VBER removes from the scope of the Regulation agreements which 
constitute “hardcore” restraints as defined within the provision.15  When considering a 
collective agreement, Article 4 potentially covers an agreement setting wages.  It could be 
classified as an agreement which has as its objective “the restriction of the buyer’s ability to 
determine its sale price, without prejudice to the possibility of the supplier to impose a 
maximum sale price or recommend a sale price, provided that they do not amount to a fixed 
or minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the 
parties.”16  Such an agreement would set the “minimum price” at which the employer can hire 
workers.  Collective agreements not setting wages would not fall within the hardcore 
restraints listed under Article 4 and thus would benefit from the VBER where the market share 
of the union(s) and employer(s) do not exceed 30% of the relevant market. 
 
2.2 Do collective agreements have an appreciable effect on trade? 
A collective agreement will also fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU where it does 
not have an appreciable effect on trade between Member States.  This is a jurisdictional 
criterion defining the scope of EU competition law that must be assessed separately in each 
case.17  The Commission has issued guidance setting out the approach to be taken regarding 
whether an agreement has an appreciable effect on inter-state trade, drawing on CJEU 
jurisprudence.18  Where a collective agreement meets the requirements set out in the 
                                                          
13 Article 2(1) VBER 
14 Article 3(1) VBER 
15 These are (i) where there is an RPM controlling the buyer’s ability to determine its sale price; (ii) territorial 
sale restrictions on the buyer; (iii) the restriction of sales by a member of a selective distribution system (SDS); 
(iv) the restriction of cross-supplies between appointed distributors of a SDS; and, (v) a restriction on the 
sellers ability to sell goods as spare parts to end-users or repairers or other service providers not entrusted by 
the buyer with repairing or servicing its goods.   
16 Article 4(a) VBER 
17 See Etablissements Consten S.A. and Grundigverkaufs-GmbH v Commission (Cases 56/64 and 58/640 [1966] 
C.M.L.R. 418, 426 
18 Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2004] O.J. C101/07.  
See the CJEU in Sociéte Technique Miniére (n.4) 
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Guidelines, EU competition law may not apply.19  Reference shall be made to both the case 
law and Guidelines.   
Trade has been given a wide meaning covering all cross-border economic activity,20 
ensuring consistency with “the fundamental objective of the Treaty to promote free 
movement of goods, services, persons and capital.”21  In order for an agreement to “affect” 
trade, it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient level or degree of probability on the 
basis of a set of objective factors of law or fact, that the agreement may have an influence, 
direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States.22  
Despite the use of words such as indirect and potential, a person claiming that there is an 
effect on trade must be able to explain how and why such an effect exists.23  Hypothetical 
effects are insufficient.     
Whether a collective agreement has an effect on trade depends on the individual 
circumstances.  Where an employer is engaged in cross-border trade, it is arguable that a 
collective agreement will have an effect on trade.24  This can be extrapolated from the CJEU’s 
decisions in Govia25 and AGET Iraklis26 under the free movement provisions.  Similarly, if the 
agreement makes it more difficult for undertakings in other Member States to “penetrate the 
market”, either the whole market or a significant part of it, then such an agreement is likely 
to affect trade between States.27  Therefore, sectoral or national-level agreements are likely 
to have an effect on trade.  Collective agreements restricting competition between workers 
and employers make it difficult for firms from other Member States to enter the market 
where they operate with lower labour costs and tighter profit margins.  For example, wages 
above the market equilibrium could have foreclosure effects. 
                                                          
19 Guidelines have no binding force under EU law; see Article 288 TFEU. 
20 See, for example, Gerhard Züchner v Bayerische Vereinsbank AG (Case 172/80) [1981] ECR 2021, [18]; Firma 
Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz (Case C-475/99) [2001] ECR I-8089, [49]; Effect on trade 
Guidelines (n.18) [19]-[22] 
21 Effect on trade Guidelines (n.18) [19] 
22 See Sociéte Technique Miniére (n.4) 249; Züchner (n.20); Effect on trade Guidelines (n.18) [23].  In some 
cases, the Court has added wording to effect that the agreement was capable of hindering the attainment of 
the objectives of the single market; see Volkswagen (Case T-62/98) [2000] E.C.R. II-2707, [179] 
23 Effect on trade Guidelines (n.18) [25]-[43] 
24 Albany (n.1) [AG75] 
25 Govia Thameslink Railway Ltd v ASLEF [2016] I.R.L.R. 686 
26 AGET Iraklis v Ypourgos Ergasias, Koinonikis Asfalisis kai Koinonikis Allilengyis (Case C-201/15) [2016] E.C.R. 
00 
27 See Effect on trade Guidelines (n.18) [86]-[92] 
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Collective agreements which have an effect on trade will only fall within Article 101(1) 
TFEU where they have an “appreciable” effect on trade.28  Agreements which affect trade in 
an insignificant way due to their weak position on the market, fall outside the scope of EU 
competition law.29  Thus, the Commission states, where the aggregate market share of the 
parties does not exceed 5% and the annual Community turnover of the supplier in a vertical 
agreement does not exceed €40 million, an agreement will not be considered to have an 
appreciable effect on trade.30  Where the parties to a collective agreement fall within these 
thresholds, the collective agreement may, on the basis of the Guidelines, not have an 
appreciable effect on competition. 
 
2.3 Do collective agreements have an appreciable effect on competition? 
Agreements which only have an insignificant effect on the market fall outside the scope of 
Article 101 TFEU.31  Therefore, a collective agreement that does not have an appreciable effect 
on competition will fall outside of Article 101(1) TFEU.  The Commission has issued a Notice 
on agreements of minor importance,32 not binding on Member States, which is intended to 
provide guidance.33  The Notice states that where the parties to an agreement fall under 
certain market share and/or turnover thresholds, an agreement between them may be 
presumed not to have an appreciable effect and falls outside the scope of Article 101(1) 
TFEU.34  Agreements which restrict competition by object are held to have an appreciable 
effect.35  Such agreements are “regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper 
functioning of normal competition.”36  The Notice, however, is only binding on the 
                                                          
28 Decentralised collective agreements are highly unlikely to have an effect on trade between member states. 
29 Effect on trade Guidelines, (n.18), [44]; Völk v Etablissements J Vervaecke SPRL (Case 5/69) [1969] E.C.R. 295, 
[7] 
30 Effect on trade Guidelines (n.18) [52].  The Commission relies on the decisions in Miller (Case 19/77) [1978] 
E.C.R. 131, [9]-[10] and Musique Diffusion Française (Joined Cases 100/80 and ors) [1983] E.C.R. 1825, [86]  
31 Völk (n.28) [7]; see also Beguelin Import Co v GL Import-Export SA (Case 22/71) [1971] E.C.R. 949 
32 Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance that do not appreciably restrict competition under 
Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2014] O.J. C 291/1. 
33 See the decision in Expedia Inc v Autorité de law concurrence and Others (Case C-226/11) [2013] 4 C.M.L.R. 
14, [28]-[31] 
34 De Minimis Notice (n.32) [8]-[11].  Where the parties to the agreement have either an aggregate market 
share of 10% (where they are competitors) and 15% (where they are non-competitors) on the any of the 
markets affected by the agreement, the Commission considers the agreement not to appreciably restrict 
competition 
35 ibid, [2]; Expedia (n.33) [37] 
36 Expedia, ibid, [36], [AG50]; see also Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society (BIDS) (Case 
C-209/07) [2008] E.C.R. I-8637, [17]; Angela Ortega González, ‘Restrictions by Object and the Appreciability 
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Commission: Member States are “not required to” take the thresholds into account when 
determining whether an agreement has an appreciable effect.37 
 The decision of the CJEU in Expedia, that object restrictions are automatically 
considered appreciable restrictions, has been criticised.  Akman, for example, argues that this 
diverges from the modern economic approach to competition.38  In her view, it is 
“unacceptable in a modern system of competition” that an agreement with a 2% market share 
can, or will, have an appreciable effect on competition.39  However, if the agreement only 
affected 2% of the market it would probably not fall within the effect on trade criterion under 
Article 101(1) TFEU anyway.  Furthermore, in determining whether a restriction is by object 
or by effect, the Court will assess the restriction in its legal and economic context.40  Parties 
concluding an agreement with the object of restricting competition, intend that such 
restriction has an appreciable effect.41 
 Therefore, collective agreements which have as their object a restriction of 
competition have an appreciable effect on competition.  Whilst this presumption applies, one 
assumes that this will not be in all cases.  Whilst a collective agreement may have as its object 
a restriction on competition, for example setting wages, other collective agreements may not; 
for example, an agreement setting working hours.  Thus, the following discussion shall assume 
that the agreement is a potential effect infringement and examine whether there is an 
appreciable restriction of competition.  In doing so, the discussion shall assume that the 
Notice thresholds are exceeded and focus solely on qualitative criteria such as the conduct in 
question, the nature of the product, features of the market and the position of the parties 
and their competitors.42 
                                                          
Test: The Expedia Case, a Surprising Judgment or a Simple Clarification?’ (2013) 34 European Competition Law 
Review 457, 462. 
37 Expedia, ibid., [31] 
38 Pinar Akman, ‘The New Shape of the de Minimis Defence for Anti-Competitive Agreements’ [2014] 
Cambridge Law Journal 263.  See also Saskia King, ‘The Object Box: Law, Policy or Myth?’ (2011) 7 European 
Competition Journal 269, 11., who argues that in assessing whether an agreement is an object or effect 
restriction in its legal and economic context, appreciability will have to be assessed. 
39 ibid 267. 
40 See GlaxoSmithKline (n.4) [58]; ASNEQ-EQUIFAX (Case C-238/05) [2006] E.C.R. I-11125, [49] 
41 Expedia (n.32) [AG50].  See AG Kokott’s opinion for further explanation. 
42 See Pablo Ibanez Colomo, ‘Market Failures, Transaction Costs and Article 101(1) TFEU Case Law’ (2012) 5 
European Law Review 541.  See also Delimitis (n.8) where the CJEU asked whether the supplier made an 
appreciable contribution to market foreclosure; and Gottrup-Kilm v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab AmbA 
(Case C-250/92) [1994] E.C.R. I-5641 where the CJEU considered the strong suppliers and rivals, small parties, 
and varying prices in assessing the appreciability of a restriction. 
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2.3.1 Application to collective agreements 
Whether a collective agreement appreciably restricts competition is highly fact-specific.  The 
effect on competition will differ according to the specific agreement under examination.  As 
such, the following discussion will examine at a generalised level whether a collective 
agreement can appreciably restrict competition in both labour and goods markets.  The 
discussion shall start with labour markets, before addressing the goods market. 
In Albany, AG Jacobs considered “appreciability”43 in both the goods and labour 
markets as a method of supporting the need for an exemption.44  AG Jacobs concluded that 
in labour markets collective agreements “probably do not have an appreciable effect on 
competition between employers.”45  An employer “normally … remains free to offer more 
advantageous conditions to his employees.”46  Whilst employers are prevented from 
competing downwards, they are free to offer more advantageous conditions to employees.47  
As such, there is no appreciable effect on competition between employers.48  This argument 
can be expanded to contend that there is no restriction on competition between workers.  
Every worker within the labour market can theoretically access the improved terms and 
conditions; that they are currently not employed on the collectively agreements terms and 
conditions is irrelevant.  As such, one would expect competition between workers to increase 
for jobs in the unionised sector as, absent union membership requirements, an employer can 
cherry-pick the best applicants for any vacancy and any job seeker in the market can apply.  
Three arguments, however, restrict the applicability of this argument.  First, a union’s 
power in the labour market derives from its ability to eliminate competition between workers.  
Although employers may be able to compete upwards, there may be a reduction in 
competition between workers.  Second, a collective agreement will restrict competition in the 
labour market unless it imposes no additional costs on employers.  Where the collective 
agreement sufficiently raises the costs of production, prices will rise.  This means that there 
                                                          
43 Appreciability is used as short-hand for appreciable effect. 
44 Albany (n.1) [AG180].  Note that the claimants argued before the Court that there was an appreciable 
restriction as the agreement affected the entire sector.  This, the claimants argued, was aggravated by the fact 
that there was a cumulative effect of making affiliation to pension schemes compulsory in numerous sectors of 
the economy. 
45 ibid., [AG182] 
46 ibid. 
47 ibid., [AG182] 
48 Note that AG Jacobs statements were made pre-Expedia. 
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will be room for fewer firms, fewer workers are employed, and/or the probability of 
unemployed workers being hired diminishes.  Only where demand for goods is inelastic will 
there be no effect in the labour market; employers will be able to pass the increased costs 
onto customers and not reduce their workforce.  Where a collective agreement only covers 
part of the labour market, spill-over effects can be seen in non-union firms.  Workers 
unemployed due to union-imposed conditions contained in a collective agreement seek 
employment in other firms.  This potentially creates an oversupply of labour depressing the 
competitive wage.49  Third, the argument assumes that the level set by a collective agreement 
is not high enough to create a fixed level at which firms do not, or are not able to, deviate 
from.  Where a fixed level is created, there is a reduction in the demand elasticity of labour, 
as horizontal competition between employers and workers is nullified.50   However, this 
assumes that an existing employer or new entrant is unable or unwilling to offer terms and 
conditions above this level to entice new workers.  If a firm has efficient capital equipment it 
may be profitable for the firm to do so.   
As with the labour market, whether there is any effect on competition in the goods 
market, let alone whether it is appreciable or not, is highly fact specific.  As previously 
mentioned, higher costs imposed by better terms and conditions of work may lead to higher 
prices in the goods market.  This is more likely to occur within centralised, rather than 
decentralised, bargaining systems.51  This relies on two predominant assumptions.  First, it 
assumes that there is minimal demand elasticity, or there are monopolistic or collusive 
markets.  Where the goods market is competitive, any firm raising prices may lose customers, 
and increased bargaining power leads solely to a redistribution of rent between employers 
and workers.  This is even where there is a small competitive sector.  Second, it assumes that 
there are no compensating factors for price increases, for example, increased productivity or 
improved quality.  Such considerations may create positive competitive effects. 
                                                          
49 George J Borjas, Labor Economics (6th Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2013) 448. 
50 See, Alan Krueger and Orley Ashenfelter, ‘Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise 
Sector’ [2018] IZA Discussion Paper No. 11672., who show that non-poach agreements in franchise contracts 
reduces the number of competitors within the market, reduces labour elasticity, and depresses wages relative 
to the marginal product of labour. 
51 Robert Flanagan, ‘Macroeconomic Performance and Collective Bargaining: An International Perspective’ 
(1999) 37 Journal of Economic Literature 1150, 1158.  More generally, see Ronald G Ehrenberg and Robert 
Stewart Smith, Modern Labor Economics: Theory and Public Policy (10th Edition, Boston, Mass; London: 
Pearson/Addison-Wesley 2009) 36, 72. 
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In Albany, AG Jacobs argued that collective agreements, at industry and firm level, lead 
to cost harmonisation.52  This harmonisation is only for one of many production costs, and 
does not affect other inputs such as materials or equipment.  As such, “the final price of the 
products or services in question will be influenced by many other factors before they reach 
the market.”53  However, where firms substitute away from labour due to increasing costs, 
demand for those inputs is affected.  This can affect the equilibrium in other markets that use 
the substituted inputs.  In addition, AG Jacobs argued that labour costs cannot be said to be 
homogenous; a distinction can be made between wages and the real cost of labour.54  One 
cannot determine cost until one looks at an individual worker’s productivity, determined by 
reference to professional skill, motivation, output, work organisation and so forth.55  Whilst 
there may be higher than equilibrium costs in the general sense, the productivity of a worker 
may outweigh the cost; higher productivity may be achieved through accepting higher costs.56  
Where productivity is increased to cover the increased costs, there is no increase in final price.  
If this is true, then one would expect firms to pay higher wages anyway.  However, one must 
accept that this may not always be true.  An employer has just as much influence on these 
factors as the union.  It could be argued that efficient labour management may be just as, if 
not more, important than any collective agreement or trade union membership on 
productivity.  An efficient workforce does not need to be the most highly paid workforce or 
have the “best” terms and conditions.   
AG Jacobs backs up his argument by arguing that in the 40 years that the competition 
provisions had been in force at the time, Albany was the first case to be brought challenging 
the provisions of a collective agreement as being anti-competitive.57  AG Jacobs points out 
that having surveyed national systems, he could not find a single challenge to agreements on 
wages and working conditions.58  This indicates a lack of appreciable effect in goods markets: 
where a collective agreement has a sufficiently appreciable effect on competition, one would 
expect to see a competition law challenge.  However, this assumes that no other 
                                                          
52 Albany (n.1) [AG182] 
53 ibid. 
54 ibid. 
55 ibid. 
56 See, for example, George J Borjas, Labor Economics (6th Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2013) 451; 
Robert Lande and Richard Zerbe, ‘Reducing Unions’ Monopoly Power: Costs and Benefits’ (1985) 28 Journal of 
Law and Economics 297, 302.  
57 Albany (n.1) [AG182] 
58 Without realising, AG Jacobs is possibly making several strong assumptions. 
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considerations were taken.  If we consider AG Jacobs’ survey of Member States’ approaches, 
policy considerations either expressly exempt collective agreements from competition 
enforcement or meant that national competition law was not enforced.59  
To summarise, the above has shown that whether collective agreements appreciably 
restrict competition is highly fact specific.  A collective agreement is more likely than not to 
exhibit restrictive effects in the labour market; however, this is subject to the prevailing 
economic and market conditions.  For example, an employer with efficient capital equipment 
may be able to profitably offer terms and conditions above any level fixed by a collective 
agreement.  Similarly, whether a collective agreement has restrictive effects in the goods 
market is unclear.  The discussion showed that where the goods market is competitive it is 
unlikely that a collective agreement will appreciably restrict competition, and that the setting 
of terms and conditions harmonises only one of many production costs.  Therefore, it is 
possible that some collective agreements may not have appreciable effects on competition, 
and thus not fall within Article 101(1) TFEU. 
 
2.4 Summary 
The above has shown that a collective agreement may fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) 
TFEU without having to consider the social public policy objectives and fundamental rights 
interests such agreements pursue.  Section 2.1 showed that a collective agreement can 
benefit from exemption under the VBER.  Where an agreement does not fall within the 
hardcore restraints listed under Article 4, and the market shares of the union(s) and 
employer(s) do not exceed 30% of the relevant market, it does not fall within Article 101(1) 
TFEU.  Sections 2.2 and 2.3 demonstrated that an agreement may not have an appreciable 
effect on trade and/or competition respectively.  Where an agreement does not, it does not 
fall within Article 101(1) TFEU.  In such a situation, the social policy objectives and Article 28 
CFREU right would not arguably be undermined as Article 101 TFEU would not apply.  
Therefore, do we need to exempt collective agreements from Article 101 TFEU if they may 
not constitute an appreciable restriction on competition?  
 However, such arguments are highly fact-sensitive, and there will inevitably be 
collective agreements that do not benefit from the above.  A good example is centralised 
                                                          
59 Albany (n.1) [AG80]-[AG112] 
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agreements setting wage rates, or where a collective agreement constitutes an object 
restriction.  The application of Article 101(1) TFEU to such agreements may, therefore, 
seriously undermine the social policy objectives and fundamental rights interests present.  As 
such, and as was argued in Chapters 4 and 5, Article 101(1) TFEU should be interpreted in a 
way which considers the social policy objectives and fundamental rights interests pursued.  
Where such interests are given adequate weight within Article 101 TFEU, they may not be 
seriously undermined.  This shall be the focus of section 3.  Section 3 will show how we can 
include wider public policy objectives within Article 101(1) TFEU and discuss its implications 
for the exemption in Albany.  It will question whether, given the ability to balance the 
competing interests within Article 101(1) TFEU, the exemption in Albany is necessary. 
 
3. Social policy objectives and Article 101(1) TFEU 
Section 2 showed that there are routes by which a collective agreement may not fall within 
the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.  A collective agreement may fall within the VBER, and/or not 
have either an appreciable effect on competition and/or trade.  The discussion pointed out 
that this is highly fact-sensitive, and that not all collective agreements would benefit from 
such arguments.  It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether we can include the wider 
social policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right within Article 101(1) TFEU.  Where such 
considerations are given adequate weight in the application of Article 101(1) TFEU, they are 
not undermined and the exemption in Albany may be unnecessary. 
 This section will do the following.  Section 3.1 will show how we can include wider 
policy objectives and fundamental rights considerations within Article 101(1) TFEU.  It will 
show that a restriction on competition falls outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU where it 
is necessary to achieve a legitimate aim.  This, section 3.2 will demonstrate, challenges the 
exemption in Albany.  Where we can balance the competing objectives within Article 101(1) 
TFEU, an exemption is not needed.  The section concludes that, despite being differentiated, 
Albany’s exemption and the approach identified in section 3.1 potentially achieve the same 
formal outcome.  Section 3.3 will therefore explore which approach is best.  It will conclude 
that the greater certainty and predictability achieved by Albany potentially overshadows the 
benefits of the individual balancing approach identified in section 3.1.  Section 3.4 summarises 
the section. 
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3.1 How can we include public policy objectives in Article 101(1)? 
In Brasserie du Haetch, the CJEU held that an agreement “cannot be examined in isolation 
from [its] context … from the factual or legal circumstances causing it to prevent, restrict or 
distort competition.”60  Although it has been argued that such an examination is restricted to 
the economic effects of an agreement,61 CJEU case law has adopted an expansive approach.  
In considering the wider context of an agreement, the CJEU should consider the social policy 
objectives and Article 28 CFREU right to collective bargaining (and agreements) within Article 
101(1) TFEU.  This questions the need for the Albany exemption.  Where such interests are 
given adequate weight within Article 101(1) TFEU, they are not seriously undermined. 
In considering whether a restriction on competition falls within Article 101(1) TFEU, 
the CJEU has introduced a proportionality assessment within Article 101(1) TFEU.62 In Wouters 
and Pierre Fabre, the CJEU held that a restriction on competition does not fall within Article 
101(1) TFEU where the restriction is necessary to achieve the legitimate aim pursued.63  This 
allows balancing to take place within Article 101(1) TFEU, removing agreements, decisions or 
concerted practices from Article 101(1) TFEU where a restriction on competition is 
proportionate.64  This incorporates the Cassis de Dijon analytical framework into Article 101(1) 
TFEU.65  First the Court weighs the restriction against its pro-competitive effects.  If the 
restriction outweighs the pro-competitive effects, then the Court balances the negative 
effects against both the pro-competitive effects and non-competition objectives.66  As such, a 
                                                          
60 Brasserie de Haecht SA v Consorts Wilkin-Janssen (Case 23/67) [1968] E.C.R. 407, [41] 
61 See Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) [2004] O.J. C101/97, [24]; Littikhuis v Verenigde 
Cooperatieve Melkindustrie Coberco (Case C-399/93) [1995] E.C.R. I-45415; Renato Nazzini, ‘Article 81 EC 
between Time Present and Time Past: A Normative Critique of “Restriction of Competition” in EU Law’ [2006] 
Common Market Law Review 497, 516. 
62 Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (Case C-309/99) [2002] E.C.R. I-1577 
[97]-[109]; Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique v Président de l’Économie, de l’Industrie et de l’Emploi (Case C-
439/09) [2011] E.C.R. I-9419 [41]-[43]. 
63 Wouters, ibid. See also, Meca Medina and Majcen v Commission of the European Communities (Case C-
519/04 P) [2006] E.C.R. I-6991 [42]; Ordem dos Technicos Officias de Contas v Autoridade da Concorrencia 
(Case C-1/12) [2013] 4 C.M.L.R. 20, [93]; Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi v Autorita Garante della Concorrenza 
e Del Mercato (Case C-136/12) [2013] 5 C.M.L.R. 40, [53]. 
64 Nazzini (n 61) 526. 
65 ibid 522.  The Cassis de Dijon approach is that a restriction is not prohibited if it pursues a mandatory 
requirement of public policy of a Member State, and the restriction is inherent in the pursuit of that obligation.  
See Cassis de Dijon (Case 120/78) [1979] E.C.R. 649; Ian Forrester, ‘Where Law Meets Competition: Is Wouters 
Like a Cassis de Dijon?’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and I Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 
2004: The Relationship between Competition Law and (liberal) Professions (Bloomsbury Publishing 2006). 
66 Note that this is only where the potential restriction is an effect not object restriction.  Where there is an 
object restriction, no Cassis-type balancing can occur in Article 101(1) TFEU, i.e. of the pro- and anti-
competitive effects.   
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restriction on competition contained in a collective agreement would fall outside the scope 
Article 101(1) TFEU, where it is necessary to achieve its social policy objectives and/or the 
Article 28 CFREU right.  This questions to the need for an exemption, to which I shall return 
to in sections 3.2 and 3.3 below.    Although the discussion below refers to Wouters, the same 
arguments apply to Pierre Fabre. 
The extent to which Wouters is a “European rule of reason” is unclear.67  The CJEU did 
not initially clarify Wouters’ scope,68 with initial academic discussion arguing that Wouters 
was restricted to public interest considerations, like the Cassis de Dijon doctrine,69 or even to 
regulatory acts.70  Odudu, for example, argued that Wouters was misclassified as a 
competition issue; the case should have been heard under the free movement rules.71  He 
argued that a distinction must be drawn between public and private acts; competition 
regulates private acts whereas free movement regulates public acts.72  If this argument is 
accepted, Wouters should be restricted to public, regulatory acts.73  However, the approach 
in Wouters extends beyond regulatory acts and public interest considerations, and considers 
                                                          
67 The rule of reason is an approach under US antitrust, where the court analyses the pro- and anti-competitive 
effects of an agreement to determine whether it should be prohibited or not.  For discussion in the EU context, 
see Craig Callery, ‘Should the European Union Embrace or Exorcise Leegin’s “Rule of Reason”?’ (2010) 32 
European Competition Law Review 42; Richard Whish and Brenda Sufrin, ‘Article 85 and the Rule of Reason’ 
(1987) 7 Yearbook of European Law 1.  See more generally, the US Supreme Court decisions in Leegin Creative 
Leather Products Inc v PSKS Inc 551 U.S. 877 (2007) 
68 See Montecatini SpA v Commission (Case C-235/92 P) [2001] 4 C.M.L.R. 18, where the CJEU, although not 
reaching a conclusion on the facts, at [133] does not rule out that approach completely.  See Meca-Medina 
(n.64), [42]-[46] where the CJEU applies Wouters to the IOC’s doping rules. 
69 Nazzini (n 61) 535; Edith Loozen, ‘Professional Ethics and Restraints of Competition’ (2006) 31 European Law 
Review 28, 47. 
70 Peter Lanchidi, ‘The CISAC Case under the Wouters Exception’ (2012) 33 European Competition Law Review 
109, 113–4; Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 127. 
71 Okeoghene Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81 (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press 2006) 53. See also G Monti, ‘Article 81 EC and Public Policy’ (2002) 39 Common Market 
Law Review 1057, 1088–9.  Monti argues that the cases adopting such an approach also were challenged on 
free movement grounds. 
72 Odudu (n 71) 53. 
73 This argument follows Whish’s description of Wouters as being a case of regulatory ancillarity, and not a 
general balancing approach under Article 101(1); see Whish and Sufrin (n 67) 130–4. See also Komninos who 
describes Wouters are being a pure conflict case, whereby the CJEU retreats to using a constitutional 
methodology. See A Komninos, ‘Non-Competition Concerns: Resolution of Conflicts in the Integrated Article 81 
EC’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and I Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2004: The Relationship 
between Competition Law and (liberal) Professions (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2006); Loozen (n 69). Loozen 
argues that Wouters introduces a marginal review of non-competition considerations within Article 101(1) and 
contradicts the Treaties’ basic assumption that the state safeguards the public interest. 
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quality concerns within Article 101(1) TFEU.74  In OTOC and CNG, the CJEU extended this to 
national level considerations. 
The approach in Wouters has also been criticised on the basis that it renders Article 
101(3) TFEU redundant.75  In considering the pro- and anti-competitive effects under Article 
101(1) TFEU, there is no need for Article 101(3) TFEU to balance them again.76  As the 
Commission states, were Article 101(1) TFEU to include an analysis of an agreement’s harmful 
and beneficial effects, Article 101(3) TFEU would be restricted “to those cases in which the 
need to ensure consistency between competition policy and other Community policies took 
precedence over the results of the competition analysis.”77  In this regard, it would be easy to 
adopt a CFREU-compliant interpretation of Article 101 TFEU and consider wider social policy 
objectives within EU competition law: reconciling such interests with competition policy 
would occur under Article 101(3) TFEU.  However, the Commission expresses the view that 
this approach would undermine the purpose of Article 101(3) TFEU.  It would “run the risk of 
diverting Article [101(3)] from its purpose, which is to provide a legal framework for the 
economic assessment of restrictive practices and not to allow application of the competition 
rules to be set aside because of political considerations.”78  I will return to Article 101(3) TFEU 
in Chapter 7.  
The approach in Wouters questions the need for the Albany exemption.  Where a 
restriction contained in a collective agreement is proportionate to the legitimate aim(s) 
pursued (the social policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right) it would fall outside the scope 
of Article 101(1) TFEU.  As such, the social policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right would 
                                                          
74 OTOC (n.63) [97].  In OTOC, the CJEU does link this to “the sound administration of undertakings’ accounting 
and taxation matters…”  See also CNG (n.63); Julian Nowag, ‘Wouters, When the Condemned Live Longer: A 
Comment on OTOC and CNG’ (2015) 36 European Competition Law Review 39, 42; R O’Loughlin, ‘EC 
Competition Rules and Free Movement Rules: An Examination of the Parallels and Their Furtherance by the 
ECJ Wouters Decision’ (2003) 24 European Competition Law Review 62, 68. 
75 Whish and Sufrin (n 67); P Manzini, ‘The European Rule of Reason - Crossing the Sea of Doubt.’ (2002) 23 
European Competition Law Review 392; Beverly Robertson, ‘What Is a Restriction of Competition?  The 
Implications of the CFI’s Judgment in O2 Germany and the Rule of Reason’ (2007) 28 European Competition 
Law Review 252. Note that Wouters was decided pre-Regulation 1/2003 and could not benefit from Article 
101(3). 
76 See P Nicolaides, ‘The Balancing Myth: The Economics of Article 81(1) and (3)’ (2005) 35 Legal Issues in 
Economic Integration 123. Nicolaides argues that an economics-based approach means that balancing is 
inevitable under Article 101(1). 
77 White Paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty [1999] O.J. 
C132/1, [56]-[57].  See also, Nungesser v Commission (Case 258/78) [1982] E.C.R. 2015, affirming this 
approach. 
78 ibid., [57].   
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not be seriously undermined by the application of Article 101 TFEU.  A broad exemption for 
collective agreements may not be necessary to protect such considerations. 
 
3.2 The Implications for Albany  
The CJEU’s approach in Wouters and Pierre Fabre shows that it is possible to consider a 
collective agreement’s wider policy considerations under Article 101(1) TFEU.  Where a 
collective agreement restricts competition, either by object or effect, it will fall outside the 
scope of Article 101(1) TFEU where such restriction is necessary to achieve the agreement’s 
social policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right.  Such approach adequately protects both 
the fundamental right interest and social policy objectives present.  Only where the restriction 
imposed on competition by the agreement is disproportionate to its objective, will Article 
101(1) TFEU apply.  
Such an approach is consistent with the discussion in Chapters 4 and 5, allowing the 
CJEU to balance the competing objectives/interests present.  It allows for a more nuanced 
approach than that taken by the CJEU in Albany.  Individual balancing through a 
proportionality assessment would allow for the “true” values of the competing objectives to 
be considered.  This could remedy any lack of flexibility in the CJEU’s approach in Albany.  In 
Albany, the CJEU predetermines the balance in favour of the social policy objectives where its 
stipulated conditions are met.  The nature of balancing (and policy objectives), however, 
means that the weights of the competing interests/objectives will differ according to the case 
in question.  However, a key question that arises is why the approach in Albany is different to 
that in Wouters.  Why does Albany remove most collective agreements from the scope of 
Article 101 TFEU, rather than require individual balancing as seen in Wouters?  Are there 
deep-rooted differences between the approaches adopted, or are they the same outcome 
but a different process?  This is important given that the CJEU in Wouters makes no mention 
of the CJEU’s approach in Albany. 
We can differentiate Albany and Wouters in three ways.  First, we can argue that the 
CJEU in Wouters sought to reconcile the Treaty competition and free movement provisions.  
Monti argues that the CJEU in Wouters sought to ensure that the Treaty competition 
provisions could not be used to secure a result different to that achieved through the free 
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movement provisions; here the freedom to provide services.79  Had Wouters been considered 
within the free movement provisions, the regulation would have benefited from the 
mandatory requirements derogation in Cassis de Dijon.80  This is missing from Albany; the 
agreement in question only fell within the Treaty competition rules: the CJEU was not 
concerned with ensuring consistency between different parts of the Treaties.  It is logical, 
therefore, for the CJEU to have adopted different approaches.   
Second, Albany and Wouters differ in that although both adopt proportionality 
approaches, the interests balanced and the way the balance was conducted differ.  As set out 
in Chapter 4, section 3.2, the CJEU adjusts its proportionality assessments according to the 
interests being balanced.  In Wouters, the CJEU adopts a strict approach to proportionality, 
requiring that the restriction is the least restrictive means available.  This can be explained in 
that the CJEU was balancing European objectives (competition policy) with a national interest.  
Additionally, as the CJEU was arguably attempting to reconcile the Treaty competition and 
free movement provisions it is probable that the same rigorous approach would be adopted.81  
By contrast, the CJEU in Albany adopted a simple balancing exercise assessing whether the 
importance of achieving one objective outweighed the restriction on the other.  The CJEU was 
not concerned with whether the restriction on competition was necessary.  This, as suggested 
in Chapter 4, section 4, is because the CJEU in Albany was balancing competing EU Treaty 
objectives.82   
Third, the approaches in Albany and Wouters differ in that the regulatory acts in 
Wouters, and subsequent cases, pursued both competition and non-competition related 
interests.83  In Wouters, for example, the CJEU considered how the Regulation in question 
ensured both the sound administration of justice (the non-competition interest) and the 
proper functioning of the profession for the benefit of the consumer (the competition 
                                                          
79 Monti (n 71) 1087–9. 
80 ibid.  Monti uses Bosman to demonstrate his point.  In Bosman, the CJEU held that the it did not have to 
consider the competition grounds as the rules breached the free movement provisions.  Monti implies that this 
ensures consistency between the case-law, especially where the measure in question can equally fall within 
the free movement and competition realm. 
81 See Wolf Sauter, ‘Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act?’ (2013) 15 Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies 439. 
82 See, for example, the approach of the CJEU in Schmidberger where the competing free movement and  
83 Constanze Semmelmann, ‘The Future Role of the Non-Competition Goals in the Interpretation of Article 81 
EC’ (2008) 1 Global Antitrust Review 15, 30. 
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interest).84  The weight given to these interests will vary significantly according to the specific 
facts of the case, making individual balancing in such cases more appropriate.  These dual 
interests were not present within Albany: there were no competition interests pursued by 
collective agreements.   
However, despite the above arguments justifying the different approaches in Wouters 
and Albany, Wouters and Albany achieve the same outcome in a formal sense.  Both 
approaches would allow for collective agreements to fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) 
TFEU following a balancing of the competing objective and interests present.  The approach 
in Wouters ensures that the social policy objectives and CFREU interests are adequately 
protected and that the true weights are assigned to the competing objectives.  However, 
adopting Wouters’ approach would reduce the number of collective agreements falling 
outside of Article 101(1) TFEU.  This is through considering whether the restriction on 
competition is necessary to achieve the legitimate aim pursued; something not required 
under Albany.  A collective agreement which only incidentally improves working terms and 
conditions, for example, would satisfy the requirements under Albany, yet would probably 
not meet the requirements under Wouters.  Whether Albany’s one-off balancing is preferable 
to Wouters’ case-by-case approach will be explored in section 3.3.  The section will argue that 
the approach in Albany is preferable. 
 
3.3 Is the Albany approach better than Wouters’ individual balancing? 
Albany’s one-off balance is more efficient than the approach in Wouters.  It allows the social 
partners to collectively bargain free in the knowledge that Article 101 TFEU will not apply 
where they stay within its boundaries.  Here, we can draw a comparison to Easterbrook and 
Fischel’s description of US corporate laws as efficient.85  Corporate rules, Easterbrook and 
Fischel argued, provide “off-the-rack” rules enabling corporate ventures to save on the cost 
of contracting.  This is what Albany provides, a clear rule that reduces the cost of competition 
enforcement against a collective agreement; Wouters does not.  The social partners know 
when Article 101 TFEU will apply to collective agreements.  There is no need to re-litigate the 
                                                          
84 Wouters (n.62) [100]-[105].  See similar arguments in CNG (n.63) [55], “providing guarantees to consumers”; 
OTOC (n.63) [68], “guarantee the quality of the services offered by chartered accountants”. 
85 Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Repr, Harvard Univ 
Press 1998). 
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same question each time a collective agreement is challenged as anti-competitive.  This 
creates legal certainty which benefits both workers and employers.   
These benefits are significantly reduced by the approach in Wouters.  Although the 
CJEU’s approach allows for competing interests to be considered/balanced, it does not 
provide the level of efficiency, predictability and certainty that Albany achieves.  The social 
partners will still need to be mindful of whether the restriction created by a collective 
agreement is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.  This can only be assessed by the 
CJEU on the facts of the case and does not always provide a clear indication in advance.  
Although there will be situations where the social partners are able to predict in advance the 
outcome, there are more grey areas in its application.  Considering whether an agreement 
concerning non-core areas of collective bargaining proportionately restricts competition is 
difficult.  The subjective values placed on these benefits may differ considerably from those 
objectively given by the CJEU.   
However, Wouters provides flexibility in how the balance between the competing 
objectives is struck, potentially achieving a ‘true’ balance of the competing objectives.  In 
ensuring that any restriction is necessary, the varying strengths of the competing interests 
are considered according to the facts of the case.  It avoids situations possible under Albany 
where the restriction on competition goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the social 
policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right; for example, an agreement which has significant 
anti-competitive effects yet only aims at a minor improvement of conditions of work and 
employment.  Applying Wouters’ approach would ensure that any restriction is necessary, 
and that the efficacy of collective agreements is protected in a proportionate manner, 
achieving a better optimisation of the competing objectives.    Considering the necessity of 
any restriction would, as noted above, reduce the number of collective agreements falling 
outside of Article 101(1) TFEU.  Such an assessment is not required under Albany, thus 
widening Albany’s scope. 
This creates a trade-off between the efficiency and certainty achieved by Albany’s 
single balance and the more dynamic, flexible approach seen in Wouters.  My view is that the 
certainty and predictability of Albany is better than, and preferable to, the flexible, more 
nuanced balance under Wouters.  This is for two reasons.  First, the certainty achieved by 
Albany ensures that the parties to a collective agreement can rely on its terms.  Albany gives 
the social partners a bright line by which they can assess the likelihood of falling within Article 
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101 TFEU: Wouters less so.  The ability of the social partners to on the terms of the agreement 
is especially important where they are incorporated into individual employment contracts.  
Second, Albany reduces the possibility of EU competition law being used to undermine 
collective bargaining and trade union membership.  Where a collective agreement can be (and 
is consistently) challenged as being anti-competitive, unions are less likely to conclude 
collective agreements, rendering collective bargaining illusory.  This could (would) be 
accompanied by a reduction in union density.  The detrimental effects identified in the thesis’ 
Introduction are still possible; even where the social policy objectives are given adequate 
weight.  Additionally, as highlighted in Chapter 4, section 4, the individual approach seen in 
Wouters gives courts the opportunity to import their views into collective bargaining.  For 
example, in assessing whether the restriction is necessary to pursue a legitimate objective, 
courts could identify alternative means “without considering their effectiveness” is collective 
bargaining.86  Although a case-by-case balance, as in Wouters, maximises the objectives 
present, these concerns overshadow this.  I shall return to this in the conclusion of this thesis. 
 
3.4 Summary 
The above has shown that social policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right can be included 
within Article 101(1) TFEU.  In considering whether an agreement restricts competition by 
effect or object, the CJEU in Wouters and Pierre Fabre considered whether a restriction was 
necessary to achieve its legitimate objective.  This provides an alternative to the approach 
adopted in Albany, allowing for a more nuanced balance to be had in each individual case.  It 
allows for the ‘true’ weight of individual objectives/interests to be included within the 
balance.   
Section 3.2 demonstrated three ways in which we can explain the differences between 
Albany and Wouters.  First, the CJEU in Wouters sought to reconcile the competition and free 
movement provisions to prevent a conflict between those provisions arising on the facts of 
the case; something not present in Albany.  Second, the different interests present required 
the CJEU to adopt different approaches.  Albany concerned only EU objectives; Wouters 
concerned EU and national level interests.  Third, the CJEU in Wouters was faced with both 
competition and non-competition interests, and not two competing objectives.  As such, 
                                                          
86 ACL Davies, Perspectives on Labour Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009 2nd ed) 143. 
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individual balancing was more appropriate.  The arguments in section 3.2, however, do not 
negate the argument that applying Wouters to collective agreements may achieve a similar 
outcome to that in Albany, albeit on an individualised level.  Section 3.3, however, argued 
that the exemption in Albany is preferable than adopting the approach in Wouters.  Albany is 
an example of an efficient rule which reduces the cost of litigating collective agreements 
under EU competition law and creates a clearly defined rule giving certainty to social partners 
when concluding collective agreements.  Why conduct an individual balance when Albany has 
already predetermined the balance?  The approach in Albany also prevents EU competition 
law from being used to undermine collective bargaining and trade union membership.  Even 
where an agreement is exempt through Wouters, the possibility of such litigation could have 
a chilling effect. 
 
4. Concluding Comments 
This chapter has shown that it cannot be assumed that a collective agreement will 
automatically fall within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.  Section 2 showed that a collective 
agreement may fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU without recourse to the social 
policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right.  The discussion showed that a collective 
agreement may fall outside of Article 101(1) TFEU because it either falls within the VBER, 
and/or does not have an appreciable effect on trade and/or competition.  Section 2.1 argued 
that a collective agreement may benefit from exemption under the VBER, where the market 
shares of the parties to the agreement do not exceed 30% on the respective markets.  Section 
2.1 argued, however, that an agreement on wages may not be exempt by the VBER.  Such an 
agreement is a price fixing agreement, potentially removed from the scope of the VBER by 
Article 4.  Section 2.2 showed that where market turnover thresholds are not exceeded, a 
collective agreement may not have an appreciable restriction on trade.  Section 2.3 
demonstrated that collective agreements are likely to appreciably restrict competition.  A 
collective agreement restricting competition by object always appreciable restricts 
competition following Expedia; and a collective agreement restricting competition by effect 
has probable appreciable restrictive effects.  For example, where the level set by a sectoral 
collective agreement is sufficiently high enough, this could create a fixed level.  The discussion 
in section 2 is, however, highly fact specific and subject to detail economic analysis.  Although 
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section 2 demonstrates how a collective agreement could fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU, the 
arguments made are largely theoretical. 
Given the fact-sensitive nature of the discussion in section 2, section 3 showed that 
the social policy objectives and right to collective bargaining can be considered in determining 
whether there is a restriction on competition.  In Wouters, the CJEU held that a restriction on 
competition falls outside of Article 101(1) TFEU, where it is necessary to achieve a legitimate 
aim.  This allows for competing objectives and interests to be balanced within Article 101(1) 
TFEU itself.  This, sections 3.1 and 3.2 argued, has implications for the Albany exemption; 
specifically, whether Albany’s exemption is needed.  The approach in Wouters allows for the 
social policy objectives and CFREU interests to be considered.  It allows for the competing 
objectives to be balanced, providing an alternative to the approach in Albany. 
Section 3.2 argued that we can explain the difference of approach in Albany and 
Wouters in three ways.  First, the approach in Wouters was necessary to reconcile the Treaty 
competition and free movement rules.  In Wouters the challenged regulation could equally 
have infringed the free movement provisions.  Had Wouters been argued under the free 
movement provisions, the regulation in question would have benefited from the mandatory 
requirements justification.  Second, the approaches differ due to the interests being balanced.  
Wouters concerned national interests; Albany, EU policy objectives.  Thus, the balancing 
exercises adopted would inevitably be different.  Third, the section argued that Wouters 
concerned restrictions pursuing both competition and non-competition interests.  The dual 
interests pursued require individual balancing to be adopted.   
 Section 3 concluded by considering whether the approach in Albany or Wouters is 
preferable.  Section 3.3 argued that Albany is an efficient rule.  Why balance the competing 
objectives on a case-by-case basis when Albany has predetermined the balance in advance 
where its stipulated conditions are met?  It reduces the cost of defending (or challenging) a 
collective agreement under the Treaty competition provisions. The section also argued that 
the one-off balance in Albany also creates certainty and predictability for the social partners 
when concluding collective agreements, something reduced through the approach in 
Wouters.    Wouters, however, allows for a more flexible, nuanced balance, seeking to achieve 
a ‘true’ balance of the competing interests.  This enables the CJEU to maximise achieving the 
competing objectives where possible.  Section 3.3 concluded that the certainty provided 
under Albany is better for the social partners than the flexible, nuanced balancing under 
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Wouters. It reached this view based on two considerations.  First, it argued that the certainty 
provided by Albany enables the social partners to bargain safe in the knowledge that a 
resulting collective agreement meeting Albany’s stipulated conditions will fall outside of 
Article 101 TFEU.  They can rely on the terms of the agreement.  This is especially important 
where they are incorporated into individual employment contracts.  Second, adopting the 
Wouters approach increases the opportunity for EU competition law to be used to undermine 
collective bargaining and trade unions more widely.  Constant challenges to collective 
bargaining (and trade unions) would lead to fewer collective agreements and lower union 
density.   
The discussion in this chapter has shown that a collective agreement may not 
constitute a restriction on competition.  However, this is highly fact specific, and a collective 
agreement may infringe Article 101(1) TFEU.  In this situation, it must be considered whether 
a collective agreement benefits from exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.  As such, Chapter 
7 will consider whether, and how, we can include wider public policy considerations within 
Article 101(3) TFEU.  It may be argued, however, that there is no need to consider public policy 
objectives within Article 101(3) TFEU as they have already been considered within Article 
101(1) TFEU.  Chapter 7 will explore this, seeking to answer the OTOC confusion: namely, 
where balancing should best take place.  Chapter 7 will conclude by drawing together the 
discussion in the two chapters. 
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Chapter 7 - Article 101(3) TFEU 
 
1. Introduction 
In Albany, the CJEU assumed that collective agreements restrict competition, thus infringing 
Article 101 TFEU (ex-Article 85 EC).1  It did not consider whether the collective agreement in 
question infringed EU competition law.  Where a collective agreement does not infringe 
Article 101 TFEU, or where the social policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right are given 
adequate weight within Article 101 TFEU, there is potentially no need to exclude collective 
agreements from EU competition law.  The social policy objectives would not be seriously 
undermined.  This is the purpose of Chapters 6 and 7; to examine whether the application of 
Article 101 TFEU to a collective agreement seriously undermines the social policy objectives 
pursued.  Where it can be concluded that it does not, there is no need for the Albany 
exemption. 
Chapter 6 examined whether collective agreements would fall within Article 101(1) 
TFEU.  It showed that collective agreements may fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU 
in two ways.  First, Chapter 6 demonstrated that a collective agreement may fall outside the 
scope of Article 101(1) TFEU regardless of its wider policy objectives.  It argued that a 
collective agreement may: (i) benefit from the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation2; (ii) not 
appreciably affect trade; and/or (iii) not have an appreciable restriction on competition.  
These arguments are highly fact specific and only apply to agreements not restricting 
competition by object.  Second, Chapter 6 showed that a collective agreement may fall 
outside of Article 101(1) TFEU, where the restriction on competition caused by such 
agreement was necessary to achieve its social policy objectives.3  This, Chapter 6 argued, 
allows the CJEU to give adequate weight to the social policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU 
right.   
                                                          
1 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie (Case C-67/96) [2000] 4 C.M.L.R. 
116, [59]-[60]. 
2 See Commission Regulation 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices [2010] 
O.J. L102/1. 
3 See Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (Case C-309/99) [2002] E.C.R. I-1577 
[97]-[109];  
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This chapter will examine whether a collective agreement that infringes Article 101(1) 
TFEU, can benefit from exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.  Article 101(3) TFEU exempts 
agreements falling within Article 101(1) TFEU where four cumulative conditions are met.4  The 
chapter will explore whether it is possible to interpret Article 101(3) TFEU so that the social 
policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right can be included within its purview.  If such 
considerations are given adequate weight within Article 101(3) TFEU’s analysis, they are not 
seriously undermined.  As such, Albany’s exemption may not be needed.     
Section 2 will examine whether, and how, the social policy objectives pursued by 
collective agreements and Article 28 CFREU right could be considered under Article 101(3) 
TFEU.  In section 2.1, the chapter will explore whether we can include non-economic 
considerations more generally within Article 101(3) TFEU.  Section 2.2 will build on this, 
examining how we can include the social policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right to 
collective bargaining within Article 101(3) TFEU.  The section will identify two approaches; 
first, by balancing the competing objectives through the approach identified in Metro5; and 
second, by interpreting Article 101(3) TFEU in a manner which takes account of the social 
policy objectives and fundamental rights interests present.  Whether Article 101(3) TFEU can 
be interpreted in such a way will be explored in section 2.3.  Section 3 seeks to answer the 
question posed in the conclusion of Chapter 6: where should we balance non-competition 
factors within Article 101 TFEU?  It will seek to answer the OTOC confusion.6  In OTOC the 
CJEU conducted the same balancing exercise within in Articles 101(1) and (3) TFEU.   Section 
4 will conclude the chapter and summarise the contribution of Chapters 6 and 7 to the thesis. 
 
2. Can we consider social policy objectives within Article 101(3)? 
Article 101(3) TFEU exempts anti-competitive agreements where the agreement’s pro-
competitive benefits outweigh its anti-competitive effects.7  The conditions set out in Article 
                                                          
4 Article 101(3) TFEU exempts agreements which (1) contribute to improving the production or distribution of 
goods, or to promoting technical or economic progress; (2) allow consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit; (3) is not indispensable for obtaining those objectives; and (4) does not allow undertakings to 
eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
5 Metro SB-Grossmarkte v Commission (Case 26/76) [1977] E.C.R. 1875; Remia BV v Commission (Case 42/84) 
[1985] E.C.R. 2545 
6 Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas v Autoridade da Concorrência (Case C-1/12) [2013] 4 C.M.L.R. 20, [98]-
[103] 
7 Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) [2004] O.J. C101/97 [11]. 
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101(3) TFEU are cumulative8 and apply all restrictions of competition falling under Article 
101(1) TFEU.9  Article 101(3) TFEU states that the provisions of Article 101(1) TFEU may be 
declared inapplicable where an agreement:  
 
contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: 
a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable for the attainment of 
these objectives; 
b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
products in question. 
 
In applying Article 101(3) TFEU, the Commission adopts a “pure economic” approach.  The 
Commission states that under Article 101(3) TFEU the pro-competitive effects of an 
agreement are to be balanced against its anti-competitive effects.10  “When the pro-
competitive effects of an agreement outweigh its anti-competitive effects the agreement is 
on balance pro-competitive and compatible with the objectives of the Community 
competition rules.”11 The purpose of Article 101(3) TFEU, the Commission states, is “to 
provide a legal framework for the economic assessment of restrictive practices and not to 
allow the application of competition rules to be set aside because of political 
considerations.”12   
This focus on economic efficiency features heavily within the academic literature, 
which argues that non-economic factors should not be included within the economic 
analysis.13  Odudu, for example, states that public policy goals should not be included within 
                                                          
8 See VBVB and VVVB v Commission (Case 43/82) [1984] E.C.R. 19, [61] 
9 Matra Hachette v Commission (Case T-17/93) [1994] E.C.R. II-595, [85]; GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v 
Commission (Joined Cases C-501/06, C-513/06, C-515/06, C-519/06 P) [2010] 4 C.M.L.R. 2 [247]-[252]. 
10 Article 81(3) Guidelines (n.7) [33]. The heading of the discussion of the first criterion under Article 101(3) is 
labelled “Efficiency gains.”   
11 ibid. 
12 White Paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty [1999] O.J. 
C132/1 [56] 
13 See Okeoghene Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81 (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press 2006) chs 6, 7; Lars Kjolbie, ‘The New Commission Guidelines on the Application of 
Article 81(3): An Economic Approach to Article 81’ [2004] European Competition Law Review; A Maziarz, ‘Do 
Non-Economic Goals Count in Interpreting Article 101(3) TFEU?’ (2014) 10 European Competition Journal 341; 
A Komninos, ‘Non-Competition Concerns: Resolution of Conflicts in the Integrated Article 81 EC’ in Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann and I Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2004: The Relationship between 
Competition Law and (liberal) Professions (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2006). 
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a competition analysis because they prevent economic efficiency from being achieved: anti-
competitive practices should only benefit from exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU where 
there are pro-competitive economic benefits.14  The focus of Article 101(3) TFEU is, Odudu 
states, productive efficiency15; including non-economic considerations is illegitimate and 
undermines the effectiveness of the provision.16  If we consider this in view of competition 
law’s consumer welfare and economic efficiency objectives, it is the improvement of 
economic and technical factors that achieves these objectives. 
The “pure economic” approach also featured within AG Jacobs’ opinion in Albany.  AG 
Jacobs opined that, on the basis of the Commission’s written submissions, collective 
agreements are unlikely to be exempt under Article 101(3) TFEU because “it is said, that [that] 
provision does not allow social objectives to be taken into account.”17  Although AG Jacobs 
stated that Article 101(3) TFEU allows special characteristics of the market on which the 
restrictions exists to be taken into account,18 this is only to the extent that those market 
characteristics affect the economic considerations put forward by the parties seeking an 
exemption.19  AG Jacobs, however, did not consider that the social policy objectives pursued 
by collective agreements can be considered in this way.   
It is possible that the social policy objectives present can be “economised” through 
focussing on the “voice” function of trade unions.20  Such an approach is proposed by Van den 
Bergh and Camesasca, who argue that collective agreements should only be exempt where 
there are substantial economies of scale surpassing the firm level.21  Thus, a reduction in 
transaction costs, and the stabilisation of employment caused by a reduced resignation rate 
                                                          
14Odudu (n 13) 170–2. 
15 ibid 137–8. 
16 ibid 164–74.  
17 Albany (n.1) [AG175].  Note also that the case was pre-Regulation 1/2003 and in order to benefit from 
Article 101(3), the parties had to have complied with the prior-notification requirements. 
18 ibid., [AG165] 
19 In support, AG Jacobs cites Verband der Sachversicherer e.V. v Commission of the European Communities 
(Case 45/85) [1987] ECR 405, [58], where the Court accepted that the Commission could consider market 
characteristics in determining whether “the recommendation was a proper means of dealing with that 
situation, but also to assess whether the measure put into effect by the recommendation went beyond what 
was necessary to that end.” 
20 See Richard Freeman and James Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (Basic Books Inc, New York 1984); Richard 
Freeman and James Medoff, ‘The Two Faces of Unionism’ (1979) Working Paper No. 364 NBER Working Paper 
Series 1. 
21 Roger Van den Bergh and Peter Camesasca, ‘Irreconcilable Principles? The Court of Justice Exempts 
Collective Labour Agreements from the Wrath of Antitrust’ (2000) 25 European law Review 492, 506. 
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which improves production,22 could form the basis of an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.  
Furthermore, where collective bargaining leads to improvements in productivity they can 
benefit from exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.  However, it is unclear whether such 
economic benefits would outweigh the anti-competitive effects of collective agreements.  
Freeman and Medoff, for example, accept that they are ‘probably’ insufficient to outweigh 
the anti-competitive effects present.23  Similarly, if we consider the decisions in Metro,24 
Remia,25 and Matra Hachette,26 discussed in the next section, the employment considerations 
accepted by the CJEU and Commission were part of a matrix of different pro-competitive 
benefits.  In Matra Hachette, for example, there were significant improvements in the product 
and the manufacturing process operating alongside the employment considerations.27  Can 
non-economic factors be considered within Article 101(3) TFEU?  Can we balance non-
economic factors against the anti-competitive effects under Article 101(3) TFEU?  These 
questions will be explored in the following sections.  Section 2.1 will first show that we can 
consider such considerations within Article 101(3) TFEU. 
 
2.1 Can we consider non-economic factors under Article 101(3) TFEU? 
The Commission’s “pure economic” approach departs from existing CJEU jurisprudence.28  
The CJEU – and indeed the Commission – have included non-economic factors within Article 
101(3) TFEU.  This creates uncertainty as to whether non-economic factors may be included 
within Article 101(3) TFEU.29  In Albany, AG Jacobs stated that “[b]oth the Court and … 
                                                          
22 See Robert Lande and Richard Zerbe, ‘Reducing Unions’ Monopoly Power: Costs and Benefits’ (1985) 28 
Journal of Law and Economics 297, 302; George J Borjas, Labor Economics (6th Edition, New York: McGraw-
Hill/Irwin, 2013) 451; Steve Allen, ‘Unionized Construction Workers Are More Productive’ (1984) 99 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 251; Charles Brown and James Medoff, ‘Trade Unions in the Production Process’ (1978) 
86 Journal of Political Economy 355. 
23 See Freeman and Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (n 20) 109–10; Richard Posner, ‘Some Economics of Labor 
Law’ (1984) 51 The University of Chicago Law Review 988, 1000–2. Any benefits would need to be supported 
by a “detailed, robust and compelling analysis that relies in its assumptions and deductions on empirical data 
and facts.”  See MasterCard (Case COMP/34.579) [2009] O.J. C264/8, [690]; affirmed in MasterCard v 
Commission (Case T-111/08) [2012] 5 C.M.L.R. 5, [200]-[202]. See also Metro (n.4) where the Court was also 
concerned with technical and product improvements. 
24 Metro (n.5) 
25 Remia (n.5) 
26 Matra Hachette (n.8) 
27 ibid., [109]-[111] 
28 See Nicolas Petit, ‘The Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) EC: A Critical Review’ Working Paper 
Institut D’etudes Juridique Europeenes No 4/2009; Christopher Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy 
(Oxford: Hart, 2009) ch 7. 
29  See Paul Lugard and Leigh Hancher, ‘Honey, I Shrunk the Article! A Critical Assessment of the Commission’s 
Notice on Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty’ (2004) 25 European Competition Law Review 410, 418. 
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Commission have on occasion recognised the possibility of taking account of social grounds 
in that contract, in particular by interpreting the conditions of Article [101(3)] broadly so as 
to include concerns for employment.”30  Similarly in BIDS, the Court held that “[i]t is only in 
connection with Article [101(3)] that … [legitimate objectives] … such as those relied on by 
BIDS may, if appropriate be taken into consideration for the purposes of obtaining an 
exemption from the prohibition laid down in Article [101(1)].”31   
The Article 101(3) Guidelines allow public and social policy considerations a limited 
role within Article 101(3) TFEU.  In the Commission’s view, public/social policy considerations 
can only be included within Article 101(3) TFEU where they can be subsumed within the 
provision’s criteria; that is, produce quantifiable economic efficiency benefits.32  In reaching 
this conclusion, the Commission relies on the CJEU’s decisions in Matra Hachette33 and 
Metro.34  In Metro, the Court held that “the establishment of supply forecasts for a reasonable 
period constitutes … stabilizing factors with regard to the provisions of employment which, 
since it improves the general conditions of production, especially when market conditions are 
unfavourable, comes within the framework of the objectives which reference may be had 
pursuant to Article 85(3).”35   
In Metro, the CJEU also introduced a Wouters-type analysis under Article 101(3) TFEU.  
The CJEU held “that the requirements for the maintenance of workable competition may be 
reconciled with the safeguarding of objectives of a different nature and to this end certain 
restrictions of competition are permissible, provided they are essential to the attainment of 
those objectives and do not result in the elimination of competition for a substantial part of 
the common market.”36 (emphasis added) Such an approach is near identical to the approach 
in Wouters, explored in depth in Chapter 6.37  Therefore, where a collective agreement 
satisfies the approach set out in Wouters, it will probably satisfy the approach in Metro, 
                                                          
30 Albany (n.1) [AG193] 
31 Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society (BIDS) (Case C-209/07) [2008] E.C.R. I-8637, [21].  
BIDS argued that the agreement structuring the market was not an object restriction because it pursued other 
legitimate objectives, namely to rationalise the beef industry to make it more competitive by reducing 
overcapacity in the market structure. 
32 Article 81(3) Guidance (n.7) [42].  
33 Matra Hachette (n.8), [139].  The Guidance at footnote 54 states that this is implicit in paragraph 139. 
34 Metro (n.5) [43] 
35 ibid. 
36 Metro (n.5) [21].  See also Metropole Television v Commission (Case T-112/99) [2002] E.C.R. II-2459, [118]; 
OTOC (n.6) [98]-[103].  
37 See Wouters (n.3) 
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provided that the restriction does not eliminate competition in a substantial part of the 
common market.  Where Wouters’ necessity requirement is not met, the restriction will not 
be “essential” under Metro.  This creates the danger, shown by the CJEU’s decision in OTOC, 
where the same balance is conducted under Articles 101(1) and (3) TFEU.  This creates 
confusions as to what is balanced where.  I shall return to this in section 4 below which 
examines where public policy objectives should be considered and balanced. 
If we consider the cases which have considered employment as a factor under Article 
101(3) TFEU, this was only to the extent to which it contributed to improving productivity.  In 
Metro, the Court held that the stabilising effect on employment, caused by the obligation on 
suppliers to conclude 6-month supply contracts, improved the general conditions of 
production.  In Remia,38 the Court held that the provision of employment comes within the 
“framework of objectives to which reference may be had pursuant to Article [101(3)] because 
it improves the general conditions of production, especially when market conditions are 
unfavourable.”39  Similarly, the Commission in Matra Hachette held that the direct creation 
of 5000 jobs and the indirect creation of another 10,000 “would not be enough to make an 
exemption possible unless the conditions of Article [101(3)] were fulfilled, but it is an element 
which the Commission has taken account of.”40  Although contributing to the harmonious 
development of the Community, and market integration, such considerations were not 
decisive in exempting the agreement under Article 101(3) TFEU: the agreement produced 
economic efficiencies.  On appeal, the CJEU arguably accepted the Commission’s approach, 
holding that the creation of jobs “would not be enough to make an exemption possible unless 
the conditions of Article [101(3)] were fulfilled, but it is an element which the Commission has 
taken account of.”41 
What these cases show is that the employment considerations were not themselves 
considered economic benefits under Article 101(3) TFEU.42  This has led to confusion as to the 
approach adopted under the provision.  Jones and Sufrin, for example, state that the decisions 
                                                          
38 Remia (n.5) 
39 ibid., [42]; see also Synthetic Fibres (Case IV/30.810) [1984] O.J. L207, [37]; Stichting Baksteen (Case 
IV/34.456) [1994] O.J. L131. 
40 Ford/Volkswagen (Case IV/33.814) [1993] O.J. L20, [36].  The case concerned a joint venture between 
Ford/Volkswagen for the creation of a new MPV. 
41 Matra Hachette (n.8) [139].  The General Court simply repeats that the Commission had considered the 
employment considerations “were taken into consideration by the Commission only supererogatorily.” 
42 Kjolbie (n 13) 571. 
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in Matra Hachette and Ford/Volkswagen are difficult to reconcile with a pure efficiency 
approach.43  They symbolise the “infiltrations of other policy objectives into EU competition 
law.”44  Similarly, Faull and Nikpay argue that job creation was a relevant consideration in the 
Commission’s decision to grant an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.45  However, if non-
economic considerations have been included in Article 101(3) TFEU, it should be possible to 
see the CJEU and Commission in each case considering them when applying Article 101(3) 
TFEU.  As set out above, this is not so.  The employment considerations were only present 
due to their productivity-enhancing aspects.  For example, in Ford/Volkswagen the 
Commission is clear that job creation alone would not have been enough to warrant an 
exemption.46  Although the Commission argued on appeal that the first condition of Article 
101(3) TFEU, economic and/or technical progress, could be interpreted to include the 
maintenance of employment, the CJEU did not explore this further.47  I shall return to the 
application of Article 101(3) TFEU to a collective agreement in section 2.3 below. 
The approach seen in the above cases is also present where other policy 
considerations are considered within Article 101(3) TFEU.  In CECED,48 Exxon/Shell,49 and 
DSD,50 the Commission quantified the relevant environmental policy concerns in terms of 
economic efficiency.  In CECED, for example, the Commission focussed on the clear 
technological improvements the practice in question encouraged: the development of more 
technically efficient machines and focusing future R&D on furthering energy efficiency.51  
Similarly in Stichting Baksteen and Synthetic Fibres, the Commission considered industrial 
                                                          
43 Alison Jones and BE Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Sixth edition, Oxford University 
Press 2016) 256. 
44 ibid. 
45 Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay, Faull and Nikpay: The EC Law of Competition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2nd ed 2007) para 2.131. c.f. Giuliano Amato, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power: The Dilemma of Liberal 
Democracy in the History of the Market (Oxford: Hart Publishing 1997) 61. Amato argues that employment 
policy was of “ambiguous relevan[ce]/irrelevan[ce] … to the social profile of the affair.”  
46 Ford/Volkwagen (n.40) [36] 
47 Matra Hachette (n.8) [96].   
48 CECED (Case IV.F.1/36.718) [2000] O.J. L 187 
49 Exxon/Shell (Case IV/33.640) [1994] O.J. L 144.  The Commission held that a reduction in pollution would 
lead to a technical improvement. 
50 Duales System Deutschland (Cases COMP/34493 and others) [2001] O.J. L 319.  The Commission exempt 
under Article 101(3) on the basis that the agreement contributed to improving the production of goods and 
promoting technical or economic progress.; see also ARA, ARGEV, ARO (Case D3/35473) [2004] O.J. L 75; 
Philips/Osram (Case IV/34.252) [1994] O.J. L 378, 
51 CECED (n.48) [47]-[50] 
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policy within their Article 101(3) TFEU analysis.  Both environmental policy and industrial 
policy can more easily be quantified and subsumed within the Article 101(3) TFEU criteria.52 
However, in VBVB/VBBB53 and CISAC,54 the Commission and Court framed their Article 
101(3) TFEU analysis by reference to cultural policy.  In VBBB, the Article 101(3) TFEU analysis 
was framed around the cultural argument that the retail price maintenance agreement was 
necessary for the protection of Dutch language books; in CISAC, the Article 101(3) TFEU 
analysis was based on the integration clause in Article 167(4) TFEU.55    How these approaches 
affect whether the social policy objectives and fundamental rights interests pursued by 
collective agreements is unclear and shall be discussed in the next section. 
Sufrin and Schweitzer both agree that the Commission’s position in the Article 101(3) 
Guidance allows national courts and NCAs to apply Article 101(3) TFEU in a consistent 
manner.56  This remedies the criticism that including non-economic factors within Article 
101(3) TFEU could lead to a divergence in decisional practice.57  Requiring that non-economic 
interests are subsumed within Article 101(3) TFEU’s criteria ensures consistency in how 
interests are mapped onto Article 101(3) TFEU’s balance.  As Schweitzer states, the direct 
applicability of Article 101(3) TFEU requires that it applies clearly and unconditionally: “[t]he 
application of directly applicable EU law may not be transformed into the exercise of political 
                                                          
52 On environmental policy and competition, see Hans Vedder, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon and European 
Environmental Law and Policy’ (2010) 22 Journal of Environmental Law 285; Jan Jans, ‘Stop the Integration 
Principle’ (2011) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 1533; Anatole Boute, ‘Environmental Protection and EC 
Anti-Trust Law: The Commission’s Approach for Packaging Waste Management Systems’ (2006) 15 Review of 
European Community & International Environmental Law 146. On industrial policy, Wolf Sauter, Competition 
Law and Industrial Policy in the EU (Clarendon Press 1997); Rosita Bouterse, Competition and Integration: 
What Goals Count? (Kluwer Law International, 1994); Nicolas Petit and Norman Neverinck, ‘Industrial Policy 
and Competition Enforcement: Is There, Could There and Should There Be a Nexus?’ 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2225903. 
53 VBVB/VBBB (n.8) 
54 CISAC (Case COM/C2/38.698) [2003] O.J. L 107 (Overturned on appeal – (Case T-442/08) [2013] E.C.R. 00).); 
STEF v Commission (Case T-428/08) [2013] 5 C.M.L.R. 13; STIM v Commission (Case T-451/08) [2013] 5 C.M.L.R. 
16. CISAC concerned a challenge by the refusal of a member of the International Confederation of Societies of 
Authors and Composers (CISAC), to grant a Community wide license for its broadcasting activities. 
55 ibid., [93]-[95] 
56 Brenda Sufrin, ‘The Evolution of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty’ (2006) 51 Antitrust Bulletin 915, 964.  Sufrin 
argues that this is a practical decision, in that the application of Article 101(3) becomes easier if only 
competition concerns are considered.  “Whereas the Commission … may be in a position to balance 
Community policies against each other, or consider national policies in the Community context, it is a different 
matter as regards national bodies in Member States.”   For the Commission’s position see the Article 81(3) 
Guidance (n.7), [42] 
57 See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, ‘The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy: A Legal and Cultural Revolution’ 
(2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 537; Sufrin (n 56). 
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discretion and choice.”58  The Commission’s position prevents national courts and NCAs from 
using Article 101(3) TFEU to pursue public policy objectives at the expense of competition 
policy.   
Such an approach also protects against the use of non-economic objectives to 
undermine competition law’s objectives.59  This has been a criticism of including non-
economic objectives within Article 101(3) TFEU; including such considerations potentially 
undermines competition law’s objectives in that it prevents the achievement of consumer 
welfare, economic efficiency, and the single market.  The use of public policy objectives to 
exempt anti-competitive conduct could lead to market partitioning, higher-priced goods and 
services, and inefficiency.  This argument goes to the heart of what EU competition law aims 
at achieving.60  If we accept that the aims of EU competition law are consumer welfare, 
economic efficiency and market integration, exempting an agreement under Article 101(3) 
TFEU based on other considerations may prevent these objectives from being fully realised.  
By requiring that such considerations are subsumed within Article 101(3) TFEU’s criteria 
ensures that competition policy’s objectives are maximised.61  For example, Article 101(3) 
TFEU’s requirement that consumers receive a fair share, ensures that consumer welfare is 
enhanced.  As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, in balancing competing objectives the CJEU will 
seek to maximise both.  Such an approach is, however, also possible through the CJEU’s 
approach in Metro identified above.   
However, the approaches seen in the CJEU jurisprudence and Article 101(3) Guidance 
potentially ‘overcomplicate’ the decision-making process.  Courts and NCAs still have to try 
and subsume non-competition considerations within Article 101(3) TFEU’s criteria.  This lends 
support to the argument that the balancing of objectives should be conducted outside of 
Article 101(3) TFEU (or outside of Article 101 TFEU completely).62  As discussed in Chapter 6, 
balancing under Article 101(1) TFEU through the approach set out in Wouters allows for a 
                                                          
58 Heike Schweitzer, ‘Competition Law and Public Policy: Reconsidering an Uneasy Relationship. The Example 
of Article 81"’ EUI Working Papers LAW 2007/30 5. 
59 Townley (n 28) 5. 
60 Komninos (n 13) 13–7., argues that it is better to balance other interests against Article 101 TFEU itself than 
to blur the independence and purity of competition analysis. 
61 Petit argues that this criticism can be overcome using the Modernisation Regulation itself, specifically 
Articles 5(1) and 10.  These provisions prevent NCAs from adopting non-infringement provisions and allow the 
Commission to intervene where necessary.  Thus, where public policy considerations are relied upon, the 
Commission can step in and reconsider the application of Article 101(3).  See Petit (n 28). 
62 See Odudu (n 13). 
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constitutional balancing of competing objectives, without ignoring the provision’s wording.  
Section 3 below will examine where we should balance competing interests in Article 101 
TFEU.  Where and how we balance competing objectives has implications for legal certainty 
and predictability.  In the context of the Albany exemption, if it is unclear how the CJEU 
balances competing objectives within Article 101 TFEU an exemption may be necessary 
despite the inclusion of wider policy objectives.     
To summarise, the CJEU and Commission have included non-competition factors 
within the Article 101(3) TFEU analysis in three ways.  First, wider objectives and fundamental 
rights interests can be considered under Article 101(3) TFEU where they have efficiency-
enhancing effects. As such, where collective bargaining (and agreements) creates stable 
employment rates through better working conditions and higher wages, knowledge and 
experience remain within the workforce.  This may lead to increased productivity which 
reduces overall costs and consumer prices, and a reduction in transaction costs may reduce 
the cost of labour such that consumer prices are lowered.63  This, however, adopts an 
efficiency approach that does not consider the non-economic considerations in and of 
themselves.  This means that Albany’s exemption may be necessary to protect the wider 
objectives and right present in collective agreements.  An agreement which has no, or 
insufficient, efficiency benefits, would not benefit from exemption under Article 101(3).  The 
wider policy interests pursued would be seriously undermined. 
Second, wider policy objectives and fundamental rights interests can be included 
through the approach set out in Metro.  In Metro, the CJEU held that wider public policy 
objectives can restrict competition where such restriction is essential to achieve those 
objectives and do not result in an elimination of competition in a substantial part of the 
common market.64  This allows for the competing objectives and interests to be balanced 
similar to that seen in Wouters.  Third, social and public policy considerations may be used to 
frame Article 101(3)’s TFEU analysis. As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, the Treaty 
integration clauses, the teleological approach, and the CFREU require that Treaty provisions 
are interpreted in a manner which includes wider objectives.  For example, this would include 
the wider social policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right present in collective agreements.  
These two approaches have implications for the exemption in Albany.  Where these factors 
                                                          
63 See Chapter 1, section 4.1.2.2, and the references therein. 
64 Metro (n.5) [21] 
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are given adequate within Article 101(3) TFEU, they are not seriously undermined.  As such, 
an exemption may not be necessary.  Section 2.2 will focus on this, examining how Article 
101(3) TFEU could include the social policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right pursued by 
collective agreements.    
 
2.2 How can we include social policy objectives and the Article 28 CFREU right within Article 
101(3)? 
As set out above, non-economic factors can be included within Article 101(3) TFEU.  As such, 
the social policy objectives and fundamental rights interests pursued by collective 
agreements can be included within an Article 101(3) TFEU analysis.  This section will identify 
the two alternative options available, and their impact on Albany’s exemption. 
The first approach is that set out in Metro.  In Metro, the CJEU held “that the 
requirements for the maintenance of workable competition may be reconciled with the 
safeguarding of objectives of a different nature and to this end certain restrictions of 
competition are permissible, provided they are essential to the attainment of those objectives 
and do not result in the elimination of competition for a substantial part of the common 
market.”65 (emphasis added)  The focus of such an assessment is identical to that in Wouters,66 
discussed at length in Chapter 6, and the approach set out in Schmidberger.67  Where a 
restriction on competition is proportionate and necessary to achieve the social policy 
considerations and/or Article 28 CFREU right present in collective agreements, it would not 
fall under Article 101(1) TFEU and thus not require exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.68  
Including this approach under Article 101(3) TFEU would be pointless; indeed, it could be that 
the same balance is carried out twice.  The only difference is the additional requirement that 
the agreement does not eliminate competition for a substantial part of the common market.  
                                                          
65 Metro (n.5) [21].  See also Metropole (n.36) [118].  In Metropole, the CFI held that Commission can use 
public policy considerations to exempt an agreement under Article 101(3).  Note also the statement of 
Commissioner Monti following the Commission’s decision in CECED; “Commission approves an agreement to 
improve energy efficient washing machines.” IP/00/148, 11 February 2000. 
66 Wouters (n.3) [97]-[109] 
67 Eugen Schmidberger v Republik Österreich (Case C-112/00) [2003] E.C.R. I-5659.  See the discussion in 
Chapter 5, section 3. 
68 As argued in Chapter 6, section 2.2, it is not always a forgone conclusion that an agreement exempt under 
Albany would also be exempt under Wouters. 
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An example of this problem can be seen in the CJEU’s decision in OTOC.69  I shall return to this 
in section 3, which explores where balancing within Article 101 TFEU should best take place.  
The second approach is to interpret Article 101(3) TFEU in a way that takes account of 
the social policy objectives and fundamental rights interests present.70  This would use the 
interpretative obligations of the CFREU, the teleological approach, and the Treaty integration 
clauses.71  The CFREU requires that Article 101 TFEU is interpreted in a manner which, as far 
as possible, renders it compatible with Charter rights.72  Similarly, the teleological approach 
and Treaty integration clauses require that EU law is interpreted in light of the Treaties’ 
objectives to ensure consistency between its policies and activities.  This includes the 
application and interpretation of Article 101(3) TFEU.  Both the Commission and the Court in 
applying and interpreting Article 101(3) TFEU must take “all [EU] objectives into account” 
when they are relevant. 
Whether we can interpret Article 101(3) TFEU in a way which includes the social policy 
objectives and Article 28 CFREU right pursued by collective agreements shall be explored in 
section 2.3.  Section 2.3 will examine whether Article 101(3) TFEU can be interpreted in a 
manner, which exempts collective agreements solely because of their non-economic 
interests/objectives, absent any economic efficiency benefits.  The discussion will not refer to 
economic efficiency benefits because, although such considerations could be used to support 
an Article 101(3) TFEU exemption, they are generally considered insufficient to outweigh a 
collective agreement’s anti-competitive effects.73  It should be noted, however, that there 
might be situations where an agreement creates sufficient efficiency benefits to sustain a 
consumer welfare justification through a traditional application of Article 101(3) TFEU. 
 
 
                                                          
69 OTOC (n.6) 
70 See Christopher Townley, ‘The Goals of Chapter I of the UK’s Competition Act 1998’ (2010) 29 Yearbook of 
European Law 307, 322.  Townley argues that history shows that the CJEU has adopted an expansive 
interpretation of the first condition in Article 101(3) TFEU to include wider social policy considerations. 
71 For general discussion see Chapter 4, Section 2 and Chapter 5 respectively. 
72 See the discussion in Chapter 5, section 2 
73 See Freeman and Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (n 20).  See also the discussion in the Introduction, section 
4.1.2. 
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2.3 How can we interpret Article 101(3) to include the social policy objectives in collective 
agreements? 
Article 101(3) TFEU requires that four conditions are met for an agreement to be exempt from 
Article 101 TFEU.  First, the agreement must improve production or distribution, or promote 
technical or economic progress; second, consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting 
benefits; third, the restriction must be indispensable for the attainment of those objectives; 
and, fourth the restriction must not afford undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.  This section will 
explore whether we can interpret Article 101(3) TFEU in a way that takes account of the social 
policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right.  Can we use such considerations to exempt a 
collective agreement under Article 101(3) TFEU where there are no economic efficiency 
benefits? Where this is possible, it provides an argument against the need for the Albany 
exemption.  If we can exempt an agreement through the application of Article 101(3) TFEU, 
which gives adequate weight to the social policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right, an 
exemption based on the need to protect such objectives may be unnecessary.  
It is possible to include the wider benefits of collective agreements within the first 
condition of Article 101(3) TFEU; that the agreement contributes to “economic progress”.  
From a social policy viewpoint, collective agreements achieving higher wages, greater 
employment protection and stability, ensure economic progress.  Those paid higher wages 
will spend more, pay more in tax and not be reliant on benefits.  In terms of economic 
progress, a collective agreement raising wages and/or improving working terms and 
conditions benefits both workers and society.  This would include the situation in Albany; 
compulsory membership of the sectoral pension scheme, with exemption allowed only where 
the pension scheme in question is more beneficial to workers than the sectoral one.  These 
economic benefits are predominantly possible through achieving other social benefits, i.e. 
solidarity, social peace, and social cohesion,74 and the Article 28 CFREU right.  Through these 
interests, workers can collectively bargain and achieve such benefits.  
 Can these benefits be passed onto consumers?  The second criterion of Article 101(3) 
TFEU requires that consumers receive a fair share of the benefits created by the agreement, 
                                                          
74 FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden (Case C-413/13) [2015] 4 C.M.L.R. 1, per AG Wahl 
at footnote 14. 
166 
 
compensating for the agreement’s anti-competitive effects.75  How narrowly or widely we 
interpret the term “consumer” will affect whether the benefits identified above can be passed 
on.  Where labour costs increase due to a collective agreement (i.e. through a wage increase), 
the employer may be driven to recoup this through higher prices.  If the definition of 
consumer is restricted to those who purchase the products affected by the higher prices, no 
benefit is passed on.76  The social benefits, i.e. solidarity and social cohesion, and the wider 
benefits to workers of collective agreements and collective bargaining, are not passed onto 
consumers of the employer’s products.  Where the definition of consumer includes workers, 
the social benefits of a collective agreement may be passed on.  Only where workers fall 
within the definition of a consumer, can we balance the anti-competitive harm caused against 
the social benefits present.   
The term ‘consumer’ has been given several differing interpretations.  The 
Commission, for example, defines a consumer as “encompassing all direct or indirect users of 
the products covered by the agreement, including producers that use the products as an 
input, wholesalers, retailers and final consumers…”77  Akman proposes a different definition, 
stating that ‘consumer’ has been equated with customer, including intermediate as well as 
final consumers.78  Other definitions have included “individual consumers”,79 “professional 
end users and final consumers”,80 “individual undertakings and consumers”,81 and “the 
parties’ direct customers.”82  Can we include workers within such definitions? 
Workers do not fall within the definition of an end-user, purchaser, or consumer in 
the context of a collective agreement concerning conditions of work and employment.  They 
are not the “customers of the parties to the agreement … [or] … subsequent purchasers.”83  
                                                          
75 See SPO and Others v Commission (Case T-29/92) [1995] E.C.R. II-289, [294]; Metro (n.5) [46]-[48]; Article 
81(3) Guidelines (n.7) [85] 
76 This assumes that quality has not increased, and that consumers do not receive a better product. 
77 Article 101(3) Guidelines (n.18) [84] 
78 Pinar Akman, ‘“Consumer” versus “Customer”: The Devil in the Detail’ (2010) 37 Journal of Law and Society 
315. See also Alison Jones and Albertina Albhors-Llorens, ‘The Images of “Consumer” in EU Competition Law’, 
The Image(s) of the ‘Consumer’ in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and Competition Law (Hart Publishing; 
Oxford 2016). 
79 See Article 107(2)(a) TFEU on state aid  
80 Guidelines on Vertical Restaints [2010] O.J. C130/1, [56] 
81 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB (Case C-52/09) [2011] E.C.R. I-527, [22].  Note also that in 
GlaxoSmithKline (n.8) the Court consider the term consumer to include competitors, consumers and final 
consumers. 
82 See Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy (n 5) 263–272. 
83 Article 81(3) Guidance (n.7) [84] 
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Workers may be “subsequent purchasers” in that they may buy the goods and/or services 
affected by the collective agreement, and associated competitive restraints, however, they 
are not consumers in labour markets.  To consider workers in this way misrepresents the 
employment relationship.  Whilst there are significant power imbalances that trade unions 
seek to rectify, workers are not consumers.  They do not buy the terms and conditions offered 
by employers or achieved through collective bargaining.  Workers provide their services, 
labour, in return for a set of terms and conditions.  Any benefits produced by a collective 
agreement for workers is more appropriately considered as producer surplus, not consumer 
surplus.   
Furthermore, including workers within the definition of ‘consumer’ raises the same 
arguments as those raised against firms in a cartel (and their shareholders) benefiting from 
Article 101(3) TFEU’s exemption.84  For example, if we consider the collective agreement in 
Albany, compulsory affiliation to the supplementary pension scheme of all employers, except 
those employer schemes exempt by the scheme itself, could lead to improved pensions, 
benefiting the workers covered by the agreement.  As with shareholders, workers 
automatically benefit from such cartel behaviour through improved profitability and reduced 
competition in the market: that they are not necessarily a party to the agreement is irrelevant.  
To include them within the definition of a ‘consumer’ would mean that any anti-competitive 
effects would be offset by benefits gained by those ostensibly placed to profit from the anti-
competitive conduct.  Collective agreements are concluded for the benefit of workers (and 
employers); any benefits received by workers are achieved through a reduction in 
competition between them.  For example, a restriction on wage competition benefits workers 
by increasing wages above the market-clearing level: employers are unable to use 
competition between workers to keep wages at equilibrium.  
It is highly unlikely, therefore, that a collective agreement can benefit from exemption 
through Article 101(3) TFEU’s conditions based only on the agreement’s wider social policy 
objectives and the Article 28 CFREU right.  To include workers within the definition of 
‘consumer’ misrepresents their position within the labour market. They are the supplier of an 
input, not a consumer.  Furthermore, if we could conceive of a worker as consuming the 
                                                          
84 See Mastercard v Commission (Case C-382/12 P) [2014] 5 C.M.L.R. 23, where the MIF agreement did not 
benefit from Article 101(3) as the primary beneficiaries of the agreement were the MasterCard organisation 
and participating banks.  
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benefits of a collective agreement, similar arguments to those against shareholders of firms 
in a cartel benefiting from Article 101(3) TFEU apply. 
Whilst it may be possible to interpret Article 101(3) TFEU’s remaining criteria in a 
manner which includes the wider benefits of collective agreements within Article 101(3) 
TFEU, the above conclusion makes such an examination unnecessary.  This means that 
collective agreements can only benefit from exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU based on 
its social policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right through the application of the approach 
in Metro.  As already mentioned in section 2.2, such approach is consistent with the discussion 
in Chapters 4 and 5.  The social policy objectives and relevant CFREU right are included and 
balanced within Article 101 TFEU.  However, as section 2.3 highlighted, this creates the danger 
that the same balancing exercise is carried out in Article 101(1) and (3) TFEU.  Section 3 below 
will explore where we should balance wider objectives and rights within Article 101 TFEU. 
 
2.4 Summary 
In summary, the above has shown that we can include non-economic considerations within 
Article 101(3) TFEU.  It has demonstrated that the Commission and CJEU have included such 
considerations within Article 101(3) TFEU in two ways.  First, non-economic interests have 
been included within Article 101(3) TFEU where they have created economic efficiency 
benefits (and thus subsumed within Article 101(3) TFEU’s criteria).  For example, in Metro, 
Remia and Matra Hachette employment considerations were included within Article 101(3) 
TFEU because they created productive efficiency benefits.  Second, the CJEU has held that 
anti-competitive conduct could benefit from exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU where the 
restriction was essential to the attainment of non-competition objectives and did not result 
in the elimination of competition in a substantial part of the common market.  These options 
provide an argument that we may not need the Albany exemption, provided that the social 
policy objectives and Article 28 CFREU right are given adequate weight within either analysis. 
Section 2.3, however, argued that we cannot interpret Article 101(3) TFEU in a way 
which enables the wider social policy objectives and CFREU rights to form the basis of an 
exemption under that provision.  The discussion demonstrated that the term ‘consumer’ 
cannot be interpreted to include workers.  To consider workers as ‘consumers’ in the context 
of a collective agreement, the section argued, misrepresents and misunderstands their 
position within labour markets.  Workers provide their services in return for a set of terms 
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and conditions offered by the employer.  They are parties to, or subject of, a collective 
agreement, not a consumer of them.   
The conclusion in section 2.3 does not mean that a collective agreement does not 
benefit from exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU through the approach in Metro.  Metro 
provides that a restriction is exempt under Article 101(3) TFEU where it is essential to achieve 
the objectives pursued and does not eliminate competition in a substantial part of the 
common market.  This approach is near identical to that in Wouters, such that where the 
conditions in Metro are met, the restriction would also fall outside of Article 101(1) TFEU.  
This creates the problem seen in OTOC where the CJEU appears to adopt the same balance in 
Articles 101(1) and (3) TFEU.  In OTOC, the CJEU held that because the restriction on 
competition was not necessary to guarantee the quality of services provided under Article 
101(1) TFEU following Wouters,85 it was not essential under Article 101(3) TFEU.86  This makes 
such balancing in Article 101(3) TFEU redundant; an agreement not passing Article 101(1)’s 
TFEU balance would also not pass Article 101(3) TFEU’s balance?  
Where public policy objectives should be balanced and considered within Article 101 
TFEU will be examined in section 3 below.  Section 3 will argue that public policy factors should 
be considered, and balanced, in Article 101(1) TFEU and not Article 101(3) TFEU.  The reason 
being that Article 101(1) TFEU provides a more appropriate, easier approach to balancing 
public policy objectives.  Section 3 will also set out why such an approach is consistent with 
the Treaty integration clauses, the teleological approach, and the CFREU (and fundamental 
rights considerations).   
 
3. Where should the balance be conducted?  Where should public policy 
consideration be included within Article 101 TFEU? 
The discussion above, and in Chapter 6, shows that public policy factors (non-competition 
considerations), here social policy objectives and the Article 28 CFREU right to collective 
bargaining, can be considered within the application of Article 101 TFEU.87  The discussion 
shows that they can be included and balanced within both Articles 101(1) and (3) TFEU.  This, 
however, raises the issue that the same balance is conducted in each part of Articles 101 
                                                          
85 OTOC (n.6) [98] 
86 ibid., [103]   
87 This section will not address whether we should include public policy factors within Article 101 TFEU. 
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TFEU.  This possibility is more certain where the CJEU adopts the approach set out in Wouters 
under Article 101(1) TFEU and that in Metro under Article 101(3) TFEU.   
This ‘double’ balance can be seen in the CJEU’s decision in OTOC.  In OTOC, the CJEU 
was asked whether the system of compulsory training for accountants implemented by OTOC 
was compatible with the Treaty competition provisions.  Specifically, the CJEU was concerned 
with the requirement that training providers had to register with OTOC in order to provide 
professional training.  In holding that such a requirement unjustifiably restricted competition, 
the CJEU applied the same balance within both parts of Article 101 TFEU.  The CJEU held that 
as the elimination of competition was not necessary to guarantee the quality of services 
provided under Article 101(1) TFEU following the approach in Wouters,88 it could not be 
considered as essential under Article 101(3) TFEU.89  The CJEU conducted the same balancing 
exercise under Articles 101(1) and (3) TFEU.  Such an approach defeats the purpose of Article 
101(3) TFEU, and equally the purpose of Article 101(1) TFEU, and the argument that any 
agreement prohibited under Article 101(1) TFEU can, in theory, benefit from exemption under 
Article 101(3) TFEU.90  This section will propose where public policy considerations should be 
balanced within Article 101 TFEU.  Before doing so, I shall briefly explain why a clear 
delineation is important. 
A clear delineation of where we should consider public policy factors within Article 
101 TFEU is important for three main reasons.  First, where the delineation is unclear there is 
a reduction in legal certainty and predictability; those subject to Article 101 TFEU do not know 
what is required under each part of Article 101 TFEU.  This could lead to different balances 
and standards being adopted in different Member States.  This would undermine the effet 
utile of EU competition law as Member States balance objectives in different ways. Second an 
unclear delineation potentially renders Article 101(3) TFEU redundant.  What is the point of 
Article 101(3) TFEU where all the considerations can be, and are, balanced in Article 101(1) 
TFEU?  Having a clear delineation avoids such issues.  Third, where public policy factors are 
considered has implications on the incentives for undertakings when engaging in collusive 
conduct aimed at achieving a public policy objective.  For example, where we include public 
                                                          
88 OTOC (n.6) [98] 
89 ibid., [103]   
90 See Consten and Grundig v Commission (Case 56 and 58/64) [1966] E.C.R. 299, 342-3; Matra Hachette (n.8) 
[85] 
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policy objectives in Article 101(3) TFEU only, the burden is on the party seeking an exemption 
to prove that, on a balance of probabilities, the public policy considerations outweighed the 
restrictions anti-competitive object or effect.91  This could disincentivise undertakings from 
pursuing such objectives.  
Where should we consider public policy factors/objectives within Article 101 TFEU?  
In my view, public policy objectives should be included within Article 101(1) TFEU and not 
Article 101(3) TFEU.  Although Article 101(3) TFEU provides an obvious structured balance 
within which public policy objectives can be included, Article 101(1) TFEU allows for a much 
simpler, clearer balance of the public policy interests with the restriction on competition. Any 
balancing in Article 101(1) TFEU should use the approach in Wouters: is the restriction 
necessary to achieve the legitimate objective pursued?  The reason for this is primarily that 
any balancing of policy objectives is a normative balancing exercise.  Balancing within Article 
101(1) TFEU allows for a much simpler constitutional balance, enabling the competing 
interests/objectives to be maximised when in conflict as the balance is subject to the principle 
of proportionality.  As shown by the discussion in Chapter 4, the restriction must be 
outweighed by the necessity of achieving the competing objective.  This ensures that 
equivalence is given to competing objectives and allows flexibility in the application of the 
test according to the restriction caused and the interest in question.92   
However, it can be argued that balancing the competing objectives under Article 
101(3) TFEU allows for a much more complete, complex balance.  For example, Article 101(3) 
TFEU requires that any restriction is indispensable to achieving the objective pursued and 
does not allow undertakings to eliminate competition “in respect of a substantial part of the 
products in question.”93  However, as can be seen from the discussion in section 2.3, 
interpreting Article 101(3) TFEU to include public policy objectives is not a simple or 
straightforward exercise.  For example, how widely can we interpret the term ‘consumer’ to 
allow for a wider consideration of public policy objectives?  A good example is section 2.3’s 
discussion of whether workers, the prime beneficiaries of the non-competition objectives 
                                                          
91 Sufrin (n 56) 969 ff. 
92 See the discussion in Chapter 3, Section 3.2 which shows how the CJEU has applied the proportionality 
assessment differently according to the interest being pursued and the entity acting. 
93 Article 101(3)(b) TFEU. 
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pursued by collective agreements, can be considered as consumers.94  This potentially 
restricts the public policy objectives that can be considered within Article 101(3) TFEU, 
arguably creating a hierarchy between objectives that can be included and those which 
cannot.95  As argued in Chapters 4 and 5, such an a priori hierarchy is contrary to the Treaties 
and CFREU: any ex post hierarchy is the result of a balancing exercise.  In the context of 
national interests, this also raises issues of competence and subsidiarity.  Where the public 
policy objectives in question fall within the exclusive competence of Member States, failing 
to include them within the balance implies that such interests are not present and that EU 
interests trump national interests expressly reserved by the Treaties to Member States.  This 
could lead to complaints that the CJEU has engaged in “competence creep”.96  
Adopting the approach in Metro under Article 101(3) TFEU would ensure that no a 
priori hierarchy of objectives is present; all objectives, where relevant, can and are included 
within the balance in Article 101(3) TFEU.  All the assessment requires is that the restriction 
is essential to the attainment of its objective(s) and does not result in the elimination of 
competition for a substantial part of the common market.  This, however, collapses the 
requirements set out in Article 101(3) TFEU, potentially ignoring a key aspect of the provision: 
whether consumers receive a fair share of the agreement’s benefits.  Although one assumes 
that consumer interests would be included within the assessment, this is not entirely clear.  If 
it does not, this may lead to two different tests to be applied under Article 101(3) TFEU: one 
for public policy interests, one for economic interests.  However, where both public policy 
and economic efficiencies are present, are these two tests combined or kept separate?  
Although Monti provides one solution to this question through his proposed Article 101(4), 
Monti’s proposal still requires the agreement to produce economic efficiencies.97  Monti 
proposes that an agreement would be exempt where it either “contributes, to increasing 
economic efficiency, and to the promotion of other Community objectives, or is designed to 
                                                          
94 Section 3.3 above showed that including the social policy objectives pursued by collective agreements may 
not be passed on as workers cannot easily be considered as consumers within the meaning of Article 101(3). 
95 This is between those which can be included within Article 101(3) and those which cannot. 
96 This criticism has been made of the CJEU’s decision in Viking Line and Laval, in that the CJEU should not have 
considered the cases as Article 153(5) TFEU specifically states that the EU has no competence in regard to pay, 
the right of association, the right to strike, or the right to impose a lock out.  See AC. Davies, ‘One Step 
Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ’ [2008] Industrial Law Journal 126. 
97 G Monti, ‘Article 81 EC and Public Policy’ (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 1057, 1097–8.  
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ensure that a specific sector continues to operate effectively.”98    As pointed out above in 
relation to Article 101(3) TFEU, Monti’s approach also potentially creates a distinction 
between objectives that can be included within the assessment, and those which cannot.   
Such issues are not present where balancing occurs within Article 101(1) TFEU.  The 
application of Wouters does not ignore Article 101(1) TFEU’s provisions.  A restriction on 
competition would still be established before considering whether the restriction is necessary 
to achieve the legitimate aim pursued.  Additionally, such approach would not collapse the 
requirements of Article 101(1) TFEU.  In establishing that there is a restriction, the court 
should consider whether there is an appreciable restriction on competition or appreciable 
effect on trade.  If it does not, there is no need to consider the wider non-competition issues.  
However, it should be noted that the court may ignore issues of appreciability and simply 
consider the necessity of the restriction. 
One further issue that arises with balancing under Article 101(3) TFEU, is the 
requirement that an element of competition is retained after balancing the competing 
objectives.  Whilst this would allow for a residual element of competition to be retained, and 
maximise the competing objectives, it ignores situations where competition must be 
disapplied to achieve the competing objective(s).  In such situations, exemption under Article 
101(3) TFEU would not be possible as no residual element of competition would be retained.  
In contrast, balancing under Article 101(1) TFEU though the approach in Wouters does not 
have this problem: the CJEU simply considers whether the restriction is necessary to achieve 
its aim.99  This does not require that an element of competition is retained, and allows the 
CJEU to adjust its proportionality assessment according to the facts of the case.100  It allows 
for Article 101 TFEU to be disapplied where the importance of achieving the competing 
objective is at least equal to the detriment caused by restricting EU competition law, including 
where no element of competition remains.101  This fits with the discussion in Chapters 4 and 
5.  In balancing competing objectives and fundamental rights all that is required is that the 
                                                          
98 ibid.  Monti also requires that a fair share is passed to consumers, the restriction is indispensable, and does 
not eliminate competition for a substantial part of the products in question. 
99 See Wouters (n.3) [109]; OTOC (n.6) [98]-[99].  In OTOC, the CJEU considered whether the objective pursued 
could be achieved by a less restrictive means. 
100 See the discussion in Chapter 4, section 3. 
101 See the discussion in Chapter 4. 
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importance of achieving one objective is at least equal to the detrimental caused by restricting 
the other.   
To summarise, the above argues that public policy interests should be considered 
within Article 101(1) TFEU and not Article 101(3) TFEU.  It argues that Article 101(1) TFEU 
provides for a much simpler, clearer balance of the public policy interests and the restriction 
on competition.  Once it has been established that an agreement restricts competition, a 
court or competition authority should consider whether the restriction is necessary to achieve 
the legitimate objective pursued.  For example, there is no wider consideration of whether, 
as under Article 101(3) TFEU, a fair share is passed onto consumers or that competition is not 
eliminated in a substantial part of the common market.  These requirements, it has been 
argued, potentially restricts what public policy objectives can be included within any balance.  
This does not mean that consumer welfare is ignored when balancing under Article 101(1) 
TFEU.  In applying a proportionality assessment, consumer interests will be considered.  For 
example, if we consider the decisions in Wouters and Meca-Medina consumer interests can 
be seen within the Article 101(1) TFEU balance.102  This allows Article 101(3) TFEU to focus on 
economic, consumer welfare considerations. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The discussion in Chapters 6 and 7 has argued that social policy objectives and fundamental 
rights considerations can be included within Article 101 TFEU.  CJEU case law shows that such 
objectives can be and are considered within Article 101 TFEU.  Applying Article 101 TFEU to 
collective agreements would not seriously undermine the social policy objectives pursued, 
where they are given adequate weight within any balancing under the provision and would 
potentially render the exemption in Albany unnecessary.  For example, if following the 
proportionality approaches set out in Wouters or Metro, the competition policy objectives 
outweigh the social policy objectives, the social policy objectives should not be seriously 
undermined.  This is consistent with the constitutional discussion in Chapters 4 and 5.  The 
social policy objectives are considered and included within the relevant balancing exercise.   
                                                          
102 Wouters (n.3) [97], [105] Meca Medina and Majcen v Commission of the European Communities (Case C-
519/04 P) [2006] E.C.R. I-6991, [43] 
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Chapter 6 showed how Article 101(1) TFEU can be applied to take account of the social 
policy objectives pursued by collective agreements, and how a collective agreement may not 
be found to infringe Article 101(1) TFEU without considering the social policy objectives.  The 
chapter argued that a constitutional balancing is possible through the approach in Wouters.  
In Wouters, the CJEU held that agreements that restrict competition fall outside the scope of 
Article 101 TFEU where the restriction is proportionate to the legitimate objective pursued by 
the agreement in question.  This negates the need to balance the competing objectives 
outside of Article 101 TFEU, via Albany’s one-off balancing exercise.  However, as Chapter 6, 
section 3.3 showed, Albany provides for a wider and more certain approach than adopting 
the approach in Wouters.  A collective agreement which only incidentally improves working 
terms and conditions, for example, would satisfy the requirements under Albany, yet may not 
meet the requirements under Wouters. 
Chapter 7 has examined whether a collective agreement infringing Article 101(1) TFEU 
may benefit from exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.  The discussion has shown that Article 
101(3) TFEU would only exempt a collective agreement based on its social policy objectives 
through the approach in Metro.  In Metro, the CJEU held that an agreement benefits from 
exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU where the restriction on competition is necessary to 
achieve a legitimate aim and does not result in the elimination of competition in a substantial 
part of the common market.  This approach is very similar to that seen under Wouters.  
Chapter 7 also demonstrated that it is difficult to interpret Article 101(3) TFEU in a manner 
which takes account of the social policy objectives pursued by collective agreements.  Section 
2.3 argued that it is not possible to interpret the term “consumer” within Article 101(3) TFEU’s 
second criterion to include workers.  The section showed that in the context of a collective 
agreement, it is not possible to include workers within the definition of a consumer.  Workers 
do not ‘consume’ the goods/services covered by the agreement.  Only where a collective 
agreement creates economic efficiency benefits, or social policy benefits created by collective 
agreements go beyond workers, will it benefit from exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU 
express terms. 
Chapter 7 also explored where we should balance non-competition factors within 
Article 101, seeking to resolve the confusion created in OTOC.  Section 3 argued that public 
policy objectives should be weighed against a restriction on competition within Article 101(1) 
TFEU, and not Article 101(3) TFEU.  This conclusion was reached on the basis that a much 
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clearer, easier balancing exercise could be undertaken under Article 101(1) TFEU.  Balancing 
within Article 101(3) TFEU arguably has the opposite effect.  Balancing under Article 101(3) 
TFEU requires that either all four conditions are met or, as required by Metro, that the 
restriction is necessary to achieve the legitimate objective pursued and does not eliminate in 
a substantial part of the common market.  This restricts the scope of any balancing exercise 
under Article 101 TFEU.  First, requiring that a fair share be passed onto consumers restricts 
the objectives which can be included within Article 101(3) TFEU. A good example of this is the 
argument in section 2.3 that workers cannot be considered as consumers in the context of a 
collective agreement.  This prevents the social policy benefits of collective agreements (and 
bargaining) from being considered within Article 101(3) TFEU’s balance.  Second, requiring 
under Metro, that competition must not be eliminated in a substantial part of the market, 
prevents situations where competition must be disapplied to achieve the competing 
objective(s).  This creates tensions with the discussion in Chapters 4 and 5. 
However, two linked issues with the above discussion still exist.  First, the criticisms 
highlighted throughout the Chapters are still present.  Including non-economic considerations 
within Article 101 TFEU will further complicate an already difficult analysis and potentially 
lead to a divergence in the application of Article 101 TFEU.  Although this is partially remedied 
by the discussion in section 3 that any non-competition factors should be balanced only within 
Article 101(1) TFEU, through Wouters’ approach, it still allows for national courts to include a 
very broad range of national interests within Article 101 TFEU.  This could lead to reduced 
legal certainty.   Second, applying competition law to collective agreements, regardless of 
whether Article 101 TFEU can include the social policy objectives present, creates significant 
uncertainty and unpredictability for trade unions, workers and employers.103  Were collective 
agreements to be subject to EU competition law, the certainty with which collective 
agreements could be relied upon to set terms and conditions of employment would be 
significantly reduced.  This could create a “chilling effect” on collective bargaining as trade 
unions and employers become reluctant to conclude collective agreements aimed at 
improving conditions of work and employment.   
In this regard, it may be that the exemption in Albany is better than the approaches 
identified in Chapters 6 and 7, and that the CJEU in Albany was right in balancing the 
                                                          
103 For further expansion, see Chapter 1. 
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conflicting objectives outside of Article 101 TFEU.  Such an approach does not infuse any 
balancing exercise with the requirements of Article 101 and provides a level of certainty and 
predictability for trade unions, employers and workers.  That the outcome of the balancing 
exercise is predetermined does not, as shown in Chapter 4, conflict with the underlying Treaty 
requirements.  Predetermining the balance where the twin conditions in Albany are met is 
consistent from a constitutional basis.  Furthermore, Albany’s balancing exercise arguably 
ensures that the Article 101 TFEU decision-making process is not overcomplicated and is 
consistently applied.  Where the exemption does not apply, analysis under Article 101 TFEU 
is solely of the agreement’s restrictive economic effects.  The social policy objectives have 
already been balanced against competition policy’s objectives and are not seriously 
undermined by any subsequent application of Article 101 TFEU.   
  This chapter concludes the discussion of the application of EU competition law to 
collective agreements.  Chapter 8 will adopt a comparative approach, exploring the approach 
adopted in the United States of America (US) to applying antitrust to collective agreements.  
The application of antitrust to collective agreements, and trade union activities more 
generally, has been of great interest to both unions and academics, with significant literature 
discussing the topic.  The purpose of the chapter, therefore, is to analyse the approaches 
adopted in the US, examining whether the EU can draw anything from the discussion and 
approaches taken.   
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Chapter 8 – How has the US Supreme Court approached trade union 
activities under US antitrust law? 
 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapters explored the relationship between collective bargaining and collective 
agreements and EU competition law, examining whether the Albany exemption is ‘correct’ 
and necessary.  In Chapters 4 and 5, the thesis placed Albany’s exemption with the EU’s 
constitutional framework.  The chapters showed that the CJEU in Albany correctly balanced 
the competing objectives through a proportionality assessment.  The chapters also 
demonstrated that the Treaty integration clauses, the CJEU’s teleological approach, and the 
interpretative obligation under the CFREU require that, where present, wider EU objectives 
should be considered when applying EU law.  This imposes an interpretative obligation on the 
CJEU, which was explored in greater depth in Chapters 6 and 7.  Chapters 6 and 7 explored 
what would happen were Article 101 TFEU to be applied to collective agreements.  The 
discussion showed how the social policy objectives pursued by collective agreements could 
be included within an Article 101 TFEU analysis, such that they were not seriously 
undermined. 
This chapter will examine the approaches adopted in the United States of America 
(US) to applying competition law – antitrust – to trade union activities.  The application of 
antitrust to trade unions has been of keen interest to both unions and academics in the US, 
with a significant amount of literature addressed to this topic.  The aim of this chapter is to 
analyse the approaches taken with a view to examining what can be learnt from the 
discussion and approaches taken.  It will examine whether the approaches taken in the EU 
and US are different, or whether it is the same approach expressed in different ways.   
This chapter will examine the US approaches to applying antitrust laws to trade union 
activities more broadly and not focus solely on collective bargaining.  Congress and the US 
Supreme Court have created two exemptions: one the creation of statute and the other 
implied from Congressional intent as a corollary to the statutory exemption.  The 
development of the statutory exemption is important to the development of the non-
statutory exemption.  The discussion of the statutory exemption for industrial action is 
important for critiquing in Albany approach as arguments developed under the statutory 
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exemption have consistently be used to critique and develop the non-statutory immunity.  
Such considerations add to the critique of Albany provided by this chapter.  The chapter, in 
section 2, will set out US antitrust law and the current exemptions.  Sections 3 and 4 will 
examine how the statutory and non-statutory exemptions have developed respectively.  The 
sections will identify the factors that have been relied upon in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence to develop the exemptions.  Section 5 examines what can learnt from the US 
approaches set out in sections 3 and 4, exploring whether the approach in Albany could, or 
should, be adapted.  Section 6 concludes the chapter. 
 
2. The Antitrust Laws of the United States 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that  
 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.1 
 
A breach of the Sherman Act attracts significant liability.  Breach of the Act can result in treble 
damages being awarded, and criminal punishment of a fine not exceeding $100 million, if a 
corporation, or $1 million, if an individual, and/or imprisonment of up to 10 years.  
 Trade unions fall within the scope of the Sherman Act.2  This has led to both Congress 
and the US Supreme Court creating two exemptions for trade unions from section 1’s scope.  
The exemptions as currently constituted are: 
 
• The statutory exemption – s.1 of the Sherman Act does not apply where the conduct 
in question is lawful under the Norris-La Guardia Act and ss.6 and 20 Clayton Act, does 
not substantially affect commercial competition, and is pursued by the union in its 
own self-interest. 
• The non-statutory exemption – conduct is exempt from the antitrust laws where it 
“[grows] out of and [is] directly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining 
process.”3 
                                                          
1 Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 
2 Loewe v Lawlor 208 U.S. 274 (1908).  See sections 3 and 4 below for further discussion. 
3 See Brown v Pro Football Inc. 518 U.S. 231 (1996), 243-5. 
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These exemptions have developed over time and have relied on a wide number of factors.  
However, there is a single “taproot … [W]hether the challenged activities are seen as 
“legitimate” labor activities directed at the wages, hours, and working conditions of the 
employees.  This principle generally serves to define the proper scope of immunity for both 
the statutory and non-statutory exemption.”4  The applicability of an exemption “turn[s] on 
the courts’ judgments, gross or refined, about antitrust and labour policy.”5 
 
3. The Statutory Exemption 
As set out above, the statutory exemption applies where the conduct in question  
 
(i) falls within the Norris-LaGuardia Act and sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act;  
(ii) does not substantially affect commercial competition; and  
(iii) is carried out unilaterally in the unions’ interest.   
 
The statutory exemption only applies to employees and bona-fide labour organisations.6  In 
defining such an exemption, Congressional intent and statutory interpretation have played 
an important role.  This section will set out how these two “tools” have framed the exemption. 
 
3.1 Early Congressional Intent? 
Early Congressional debates raised the concern that the Sherman Act as initially drafted could 
be used to prohibit unions.7  The bill prohibited conduct designed to raise consumer prices.8  
However, many legitimate union activities resulted in higher consumer prices, and thus 
                                                          
4 Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application (Aspen 1978) para 225c. 
5 ibid. 
6 See Columbia River Packers Association Inc. v Hinton 315 U.S. 143 (1942) 
7 Senators Hoar, Hiscock, Stewart, Teller and George all raised concerns as to the potential interference with 
trade union’s legitimate actions.  See 21 Cong. Rec. 2561 (1890). 
8 The initial bill stated that “[t]hat all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts or combinations between 
two or more citizens or corporations … of different States, or … of the United States and foreign states … made 
with a view or which tend to prevent full and free competition in the importation, transportation, or sale of 
articles imported into the United States or with a view or which tend to prevent full and free competition in 
articles of growth, production or manufacture of any State or Territory … or in the transportation or sale of like 
articles … and all arrangements, trusts, or combinations between such citizens or corporations, made with a 
view or which tend to advance the cost to the consumer of any such articles…” (emphasis added), 21 Cong. 
Rec. 2457 (1890). 
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caught by the Act.9  Although Senator Sherman stated that the Bill would not affect trade 
unions,10 several amendments were proposed that explicitly removed trade unions from the 
scope of the Sherman Act.11   These proposals were not included within the final version as 
passed by the US Senate.  Two interpretations of this are possible.  Either the Committee 
thought that an express exemption was unnecessary, or they did not wish to exempt trade 
unions from the Sherman Act.  All the Committee states is that the Sherman Act was an 
affirmation of “the old doctrine of the common law in regard to all interstate and 
international commercial transactions, and have clothed the United States courts with 
authority to enforce that doctrine by injunction.”12  If the common law restraint of trade 
doctrine did not apply to trade unions, then neither would the Sherman Act.13  
Greenslade states that the view that the Sherman Act did not apply to trade unions is 
correct when viewed in light of its legislative history.14  The Sherman Act was enacted to 
confront the anticompetitive practices of “giant trusts and combinations of capital … 
organized in an effort to control the commercial market by suppression of competition.”15  
That the final version of the Sherman Act did not contain any exemption clause does not 
detract from such a view.16  This uncertainty over the Sherman Act’s applicability to trade 
unions continued in the academic literature.17   
The Courts, however, placed little weight on this view of Congressional intent, with 
the Supreme Court in Loewe holding that the Sherman Act applied to trade unions and their 
                                                          
9 See Joseph Greenslade, ‘Labor Unions and the Sherman Act: Rethinking Labor’s Nonstatutory Exemption’ 
(1988) 22 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 151. 
10 21 Cong. Rec. 2562 (1890) 
11 Senator Sherman, for example, proposed “Provided, that this act shall not be construed to apply to any 
arrangements, agreements, or combinations between laborers, made with the view of lessening the number 
or hours of their labor or of increasing their wages…”  21 Cong. Rec. 2611-12. 
12 21 Cong. Rec. 3146 (1890).  See also Louis B Boudin, ‘The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes: I’ (1939) 39 
Columbia Law Review 1283; Louis B Boudin, ‘The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes: Part II’ (1940) 40 Columbia 
Law Review 14. 
13 See Edward Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act (Russell and Russell 1969) 50.  Note that in the UK context 
the common law restraint of trade doctrine did apply to trade unions.  Legislation was required to prevent the 
common law doctrine from applying; see Trade Union Act 1871 
14 Greenslade (n 9) 156–7. See also James Emery, ‘Labor Organizations and The Sherman Act’ (1912) 20 Journal 
of Political Economy 599, 612.; the purpose of the Sherman Act was to “protect trade and transportation 
between the states and the persons engaged therein…” 
15 Greenslade (n 9) 161. 
16 See Sanjukta Paul, ‘The Roots of the Sherman Act: Farmer-Labor Republicanism and Cooperation Among 
Workers’ https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2996853.. 
17 See, for example, Emery (n 14); Boudin, ‘The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes: Part II’ (n 12); Alpheus 
Mason, Organized Labor and the Law (Duke University Press 1925). 
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activities.18  In Loewe, the trade union engaged in a series of strikes and boycotts of the 
wholesalers of manufacturers of fur hats in other States in order to organise within those 
manufacturers.  To exert more pressure on the manufacturers, the union and the American 
Federation of Labour (hereafter AFL) initiated a general boycott of all products made by the 
wholesalers.  The manufacturers brought a claim under the Sherman Act to combat the 
damage to their businesses.   
In finding that the Sherman Act was applicable to trade unions, the Court was explicitly 
clear: a union “is a combination ‘in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States’ 
in the sense in which those words are used in the act…”19  In reaching this decision, the Court 
considered Congressional intent, stating that “several efforts were made to exempt, by 
legislation, organizations of farmers and laborers from the operation of the Act and that these 
efforts failed, so that the Act remained as we have it before us.”20  Although labelled a weak 
argument,21 if Congressional intent was to exempt trade unions the final Act would have 
reflected this.  As the Sherman Act did not, implies that there was no universal, discernible 
Congressional intent.  This did not mean that all trade union restrictions would breach 
antitrust rules, only that they were subject to antitrust examination. 
 
3.3 A clearer statement of intent? 
Following the decision in Loewe, Congress sought to remedy the situation and expressly 
provide an exemption for trade union activities from the Sherman Act.  As Berman argues, 
Congress shared the blame for the Supreme Court’s decision in Loewe.22 Congress had chosen 
imprecise language.  Had Congress explicitly stated their intention, they would not have had 
to remedy what they saw as an unacceptable decision.23  To remedy this, Congress enacted 
the Clayton Act, which provided an exemption for trade unions from antitrust legislation.24 
 
                                                          
18 Loewe (n.2) 
19 ibid., 292-3 
20 ibid., 301 
21 Wayne Leslie McNaughten and Joseph Lazar, Industrial Relations and the Government (McGraw Hill 1954) 
51. 
22 Berman (n 13). 
23 For discussion of the Congressional debates surrounding the enactment of the Clayton Act, see Gary 
Roberts, ‘Reconciling Federal Labor and Antitrust Policy: The Special Case of Sports League Labor Market 
Restraints’ (1986) 75 The Georgetown Law Journal 19; Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene, The Labor 
Injunction (The MacMillan Company, New York 1930). 
24 38 Stat. 731 (1914) and 38 Stat. 738 (1914) respectively 
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3.3.1 The Clayton Act – The Statutory Immunity 
Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act provided the basis for which trade unions could be 
exempt from the application of the Sherman Act and an express statement of Congressional 
intent.  The sections read together could lead to the conclusion that the Sherman Act no 
longer applied to trade unions.25  This led to the provisions being hailed as an industrial Magna 
Carta.26  The purpose of the Act was to “correct an error, and make it plain and specific, by 
clear-cut and direct language, that the antitrust laws … shall not be applied to labor 
organizations and farmers’ unions.”27  Section 6 states that the  
 
labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.  Nothing in the antitrust laws shall be 
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, 
instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or 
restrain individual members from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such 
organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies 
in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws. (emphasis added) 
 
Section 20 prohibits the granting of an injunction 
 
“in any case between an employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or between 
employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out 
of, a dispute concerning terms and conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable 
injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making the application, for which injury there is no 
adequate remedy at law, and such property or property right must be described with particularity in the 
application which must be in writing and sworn to by the applicant or his agent or attorney.” 
 
Section 20 also prohibits the granting of an injunction to prevent a person, either individually 
or collectively, from the 
 
“peaceful purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading 
any person from work or abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to 
                                                          
25 Berman (n 13) 101. 
26 See Edwin Witte, The Government in Labor Disputes (McGraw Hill 1932) 62. 
27 Representative Henry, 51 Cong. Rec. 9540-1, (1914).  See also, Senator Pittman 51 Cong. Rec. 14588.  Note 
that other members of Congress argued that the Act would be futile if it was only legalising that which already 
legal but dangerous if it accomplished the immunization of labor from the anti-trust laws; see, for example, 51 
Cong. Rec. 9249 (MacDonald), 16283 (Volstead), 14021 (Thomas) 
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such dispute, or from recommending, advising or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means to do 
so; or from paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person engaged in such dispute, any strike 
benefits or other moneys or things of value; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for 
lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such 
dispute by any party thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held 
to be violations of any law of the United States.” 
 
These sections appeared to be clear expressions of Congressional intent.  Trade unions, and 
their ‘legitimate’ objectives, are not combinations in restraint of trade under the Sherman 
Act.  Thus, it appeared that future judicial application of the Sherman Act would be restricted 
to situations where a trade union’s objectives were not legitimate; future challenges should 
concern the legitimacy of a union’s objective.  When combined with the Sherman Act and its 
underlying policy, it is arguable that “Congress never intended that the Sherman Act restrain 
legitimate labor union activities.”28 
The Supreme Court initially accepted this Congressional view, focusing its analysis on 
whether the purpose or intent of the union was to restrain interstate trade.  In the Coronado 
Coal cases, the Supreme Court held that there is only antitrust liability where the purpose of 
the union is an act falling within the Sherman Act prohibitions.  In the Coronado cases, the 
United Mine Workers had used violence to shut down a coalmine in response to a 
management lock out and the attempt to run a non-union operation instead.  In Coronado I, 
the Supreme Court held that there was no evidence upon which to find that there was a 
conspiracy to restrain or monopolise interstate commerce.29  The intent of the union was to 
organise the coalmine: the action as a means of lessening interstate competition for union 
operators was an ancillary motive, insufficient to impose antirust liability.30  In Coronado II, 
evidence indicated that the union saw non-union coal production as a serious threat to 
unionised firms and, by extension, union organisation and union-imposed working conditions.  
The Supreme Court held that there had to be a purpose or intent on the part of those 
preventing the manufacture of production “to restrain or control the supply entering and 
moving in interstate commerce, or the price of it in interstate markets for trade union 
                                                          
28 Greenslade (n 9) 161. 
29 Coronado Coal Co. v United Mine Workers (Coronado I) 259 U.S 344 (1922), 413. 
30 ibid, 408-9. 
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activities to be a direct violation of the” Sherman Act.31  The mere reduction “in the supply of 
an article to be shipped in interstate commerce by illegal or tortious prevention of its 
manufacture or production is ordinarily an indirect or remote obstruction.”32  Thus, union 
liability under the Sherman Act only attached where the union intended to restrain or 
monopolise interstate trade. 
 The “purpose test” remained in subsequent cases, however judicial attention started 
to shift to the provisions of the Clayton Act itself.  This shift appeared to frustrate 
Congressional intent to provide protection for trade unions against antitrust.  In Duplex 
Printing,33 the Supreme Court stated that section 6 does not provide a blanket exemption for 
trade unions from antitrust law.  The Court stated that nothing in section 6 exempts “such an 
organisation or its members from accountability where it or they depart from its normal and 
legitimate objects and engage in an actual combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade.  
And by no fair or permissible construction can it be taken as authorizing any activity otherwise 
unlawful, or enabling a normally lawful organization to become a cloak for an illegal 
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade as defined by the antitrust laws.”34 (emphasis 
added) Thus, where the union’s objectives are not “legitimate” they are not exempt from 
antitrust laws.   
Duplex concerned an attempt by the Machinists Union to unionise and establish 
standardised terms of employment across the industry for producing printing presses.  There 
were only four manufacturers in the industry, three of which had reached agreement with 
the union.  Duplex, however, did not agree to the union’s request and operated with lower 
costs than the other manufacturers in the industry.  The other manufacturers, suffering a loss 
in business, threatened to withdraw from the agreement unless the union imposed greater 
burdens on Duplex.  To do so, the union called a strike of Duplex, and ordered its members 
and affiliated unions to not work on the installation of presses delivered by Duplex in New 
York.  In finding that the union pursued an illegitimate objective, the Supreme Court focussed 
on the applicability of s.20 of the Clayton Act.   
                                                          
31 Coronado Coal Co v United Mine Workers (Coronado II) 268 U.S. 295 (1925), 310. 
32 ibid. 
33 Duplex Printing Press Co. v Deering 254 U.S. 443 (1921) 
34 ibid., 468-9 
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Section 20, as set out above, prevents the Court from granting an injunction where 
the union has engaged in certain type of activity.  In Duplex, the Supreme Court adopted a 
restrictive interpretation, holding that section 20 only extended to employer-employee 
disputes related to terms and conditions of employment.35  Activities outside such disputes 
were not protected from injunctive relief by section 20.  Section 20, in the Court’s view, must 
be narrowly read, and cannot be “regarded as bringing in all members of a labor organisation 
as parties to a “dispute concerning terms and conditions of employment” which “affects only 
a few of them…”36 To do so would enlarge the provisions of section 20 and render it 
inconsistent with section 6 which “deals specifically with the subject and must be deemed to 
express the measure and limit of the immunity intended by Congress to be incident to mere 
membership in such an organisation.”37  This argument is similar to the distinction between 
primary and secondary action under TULRCA38: where does primary action end and secondary 
begin?  The difficulty in making such distinctions argues strongly in favour of a blanket 
exemption. 
The decision in Duplex was subsequently confirmed in Bedford Stone.39  In Bedford 
Stone, Bedford’s refusal to renew their union contract led to industrial action and a lock out.  
This was escalated by the union calling on their members to refuse to work on, or finish 
working on, stone produced by the company.  In finding that the acts complained of fell within 
the scope of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court further narrowed the application of the 
Clayton Act.  The Court differentiated between the objectives sought, and the means used to 
achieve those objectives.  Where the means adopted by the union were unlawful, “the 
innocent general character of the organizations adopting them or the lawfulness of the 
ultimate end sought to be attained, cannot serve as a justification.”40  As the means used by 
the union had the sole object of preventing the use and installation of Bedford’s product in 
other states, “threaten[ing] to destroy or narrow petitioners’ interstate trade”, they attracted 
Sherman Act liability.41 
                                                          
35 ibid., 472 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid. 
38 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 
39 Bedford Cut Stone Co. v Journeymen Stone Cutters’ Association of North America 274 U.S. 37 (1927) 
40 ibid., 55 
41 ibid. 
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In both Duplex and Bedford Stone, Justice Brandeis dissented from the Courts’ 
decision.  However, Justice Brandeis did not adopt a consistent approach.  In Duplex, Justice 
Brandeis argued that if the conduct in question was lawful under Federal labour law, or 
common law, then it was protected by the Clayton Act.  Section 20 of the Clayton Act was 
wider in its application than the interpretation given by the decision of the Court.42  In Bedford 
Stone, Brandeis adopted a more rounded approach, arguing that even if the Sherman Act was 
applicable, the restraints in question would not attract liability as they were entirely 
reasonable.43  On the facts of Bedford Stone, Brandeis argued that the union’s conduct was 
lawful.  The combination complained of contained no “outsider[s]”; there was no attempt to 
boycott the plaintiffs; the dispute was between particular employers and particular 
employees; and, the action was related to the “fundamental matters of union policy of 
general application through the country.”44  Brandeis argued that if a strike could be enjoined, 
Congress created an instrument  
 
for imposing restraints upon labour which reminds one of involuntary servitude ... It would indeed be 
strange if Congress had by the same Act willed to deny to members of a small craft of workingmen the 
right to cooperate in simply refraining to work when that course was the only means of self-protection 
against a combination of militant and powerful employers.45 
 
It has been argued that the above cases effectively nullified the protections provided by the 
Clayton Act to trade union activities.46  For example, Boudin argued that the cases diverged 
from clear Congressional intent to exempt trade unions from antitrust through section 6 – 
labour is not a commodity or article of commerce.47  Had the Congressional debates been put 
before the Court, with argument presented from a labour point of view, trade unions might 
                                                          
42 Duplex (n.33) 486-8.  In Brandeis’ view, s.20 is wider than the employee-employer relationship and where 
the act complained of falls within those set out in section 20 itself, they are not “considered of held to be 
violations of any law of the United States.” 
43 Bedford Stone (n.39) 58; citing the rule of reason test set out in Standard Oil Co v United States 221 U.S. 1 
(1921) 
44 ibid., 60 
45 ibid., 64-5 
46 See David Cavers, ‘Labor v the Sherman Act’ (1941) 8 University of Chicago Law Review; Louis B Boudin, 
‘Organized Labor and the Clayton Act: Part I’ (1942) 29 Virginia Law Review 272; Louis B Boudin, ‘Organized 
Labor and the Clayton Act: Part II’ (1943) 29 Virginia Law Review 395. 
47 Boudin, ‘Organized Labor and the Clayton Act: Part I’ (n 46) 310. 
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have attracted an immunity similar to that enjoyed by professional baseball.48  However, 
neither Duplex nor Bedford Stone concerned primary action directed at the employer’s 
business.  For example, in Bedford Stone the action harmed not only the employer’s interests, 
a legitimate target during industrial conflict, but targeted direct harm at third parties.  The 
union’s intention to prevent non-union made goods entering into the market was what made 
the acts a violation of the Sherman Act.49  There were significant restrictions in the goods 
markets, such that did not follow from the elimination of wage competition in the labour 
market.  If we consider this in light of Coronado Coal’s “purpose test”, it is consistent with 
Congressional intent.  Congress, we can assume, did not intend to exempt unions directly 
restricting or monopolising interstate trade from antitrust law.  Allowing unions to pursue 
illegitimate objectives via unlawful means was not the purpose of any exemption.50 
 The discussion above identifies the emphasis placed on the union’s purpose.  Where 
the union did not have the subjective intent of restraining or controlling interstate trade, it 
fell outside the scope of the Sherman Act.  Only where such intention is present will sections 
6 and 20 be relevant.  Any such immunity, as shown by Duplex and Bedford Stone, would be 
narrowly construed.  However, the Supreme Court revisited this jurisprudence two decades 
later. 
 
3.4 A new interpretation? 
In 1932, Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act51 (hereafter NLGA) to rectify the 
interpretation of the Clayton Act provided by the Court in Duplex and Bedford Stone.52  
Sections 2 and 4 were key in this regard.53  Section 2 provided a policy declaration that 
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Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940), 100-3 
53 Now 29 US Code §§101 and 104 respectively. 
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…the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to 
protect his freedom of labor, and thereby obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, 
wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have 
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to 
negotiate terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, 
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or 
in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection; therefore, the following definitions of, and limitations upon, the jurisdiction and 
authority of the courts of the United States are enacted. (emphasis added) 
 
Section 4 prevented an injunction from being granted “in any case growing out of a labour 
dispute” (emphasis added) in certain circumstances; the main being strikes, workers 
becoming a member of a trade union and assisting, and/or publicising, a labour dispute.   
In 1939, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to remedy the interpretation provided 
by earlier cases.  In Apex Hosiery, the Court was asked whether a sit-in strike at Apex’s factory 
breached the Sherman Act.54  In the factory was 130,000 pairs of finished hosiery destined for 
out-of-state purchasers, which the strikers prevented from being removed and dispatched.  
Apex thereby filed a suit under the Sherman Act for treble damages; the value of the 
restrained products being estimated at $800,000.  The union argued that they were protected 
under the Clayton Act from antitrust liability.  The Supreme Court held that the conduct 
complained of did not breach the Sherman Act.  Justice Stone, delivering the judgment of the 
Court, held that Sherman Act liability only arose where the aim of the union was “some form 
of restraint of commercial competition in the marketing of goods or services.”55  On the facts 
of Apex, “the combination or conspiracy did not have as its purpose restraint upon 
competition in the market for petitioner’s product.”56  Its object was to compel the employer 
to accede to its demands; the delay was “not intended to have and had no effect on prices of 
hosiery in the market, and so was in that respect no more a restraint forbidden by the 
Sherman Act.”57 
Justice Stone’s approach is no different to that identified in section 3.3 above.  Where 
a trade union does not intend to restrain competition in the commercial market, the Sherman 
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Act does not apply.  Only where the aim of the union was a “suppression of competition in 
the market by methods … analogous to those found to be violations in the non-labor cases”58 
would trade union activities be subject to the Sherman Act.  As Justice Stone argued, section 
6 of the Clayton Act was such that “restraints on the sale of the employee’s services to the 
employer, however much they curtail competition among employees, are not in themselves 
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce under the Sherman Act.”59  As 
Handler states, “antitrust laws should not be applied to nor should their application turn 
upon, a finding of an unfair labor practice.  The criterion under antitrust is the effect on market 
competition as explicated in Apex.”60  Apex simply confirms previous Supreme Court 
jurisprudence: only where the purpose is to restrain commercial competition will antitrust 
law apply, and the immunity under the Clayton Act become relevant. 
However, Chief Justice Hughes robustly dissented, arguing that if trade unions were 
not exempt from the Sherman Act and acted outside the legitimate boundaries established 
by section 20 Clayton Act, then labour market restraints should fall under the Sherman Act.  
The purpose of promoting the interests of a labour organisation did not justify a direct and 
intentional restraint on interstate commerce.  The Clayton Act provided an exemption where 
the union engages in “lawful measures … to attain the legitimate objects of labor 
organizations”, not when engaged in “a conspiracy directly and intentionally to prevent the 
shipment of goods in interstate commerce.”61  Such an approach, however, is circular: the 
exemption only applies when a measure is lawful and not a restraint of trade.   Although 
drawing similarities with that of Stone J, Hughes’ approach restricts any exemption for union 
activities to those enumerated under section 20.  It echoes that of Brandeis’ decision in 
Bedford Stone: unlawful union conduct that indirectly restrains interstate trade falls under 
the Sherman Act. 
Apex has been labelled the “commercial competition” test; Sherman Act liability only 
attached where the union has the purpose or intent of restraining market competition.  
Purpose is identified by a “close and objective scrutiny of particular conditions and purposes” 
in each case.62  The ‘Apex approach’ has been favourably received in academic literature: 
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academic literature predominantly proposes returning to it for assessing whether union 
conduct attracts Sherman Act liability.63  Such an approach, however, would require changing 
Supreme Court jurisprudence holding that antitrust applies to competitive restraints in the 
labour market;64 for example, the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association decision.65 
The approach in Apex was followed by the decisions in Hutcheson66 and Allen 
Bradley.67  However, Apex’s clarity and consistency was not strictly followed.  Hutcheson 
concerned a jurisdictional dispute over whether machinists or carpenters were to erect and 
dismantle machinery in Anheuser-Busch.  An agreement between the company and the two 
unions, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and the International Association of 
Machinists, assigned machinists the role, with the Carpenters’ union agreeing to submit all 
disputes to arbitration.  Following a dispute, the Carpenters’ union picketed both Anheuser 
and a company located adjacent to Anheuser’s factory with leaflets and official publications 
requesting that members and their friends refrain from buying Anheuser beer.  The question 
before the Supreme Court was whether such action was an infringement of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. 
In the Court’s view, whether trade union conduct constituted a violation of the Sherman 
Act was determined by reading together the Sherman Act, section 20 of the Clayton Act, and 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.68  According to the majority in Hutcheson, union conduct that was 
lawful under the Norris-LaGuardia Act fell within section 20 of the Clayton Act and did not 
attract liability under the Sherman Act.  Such an approach has very strong elements of 
Brandeis’ decision in Duplex: where an act is lawful under labour law, it is lawful under 
antitrust.  Justice Frankfurter in delivering the opinion of the Court held that   
                                                          
63 See Elinor Hoffman, ‘Labor and Antitrust Policy: Drawing a Line of Demarcation’ (1983) 50 Brooklyn Law 
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[s]o long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups, the licit and the 
illicit under section 20 are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, 
the rightness of wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular activities 
are the means.69 
 
Thus, the statutory exemption does not apply where a union acts in concert with an employer.  
Under Hutcheson, collective agreements may attract liability under the Sherman Act.  
However, by linking the statutory immunity provided for under the Clayton Act with the 
lawfulness of conduct under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Court allowed any future changes 
to the NLGA to automatically adjust the scope of the statutory exemption.  Although Justice 
Roberts’ dissenting opinion questions whether such use of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was 
correct, it ignored the point that the Act was intended to remedy and reverse the decisions 
in Duplex and Bedford Stone.70   
The decision in Allen Bradley reaffirmed the approach in Hutcheson.  In Allen Bradley, 
the union sought closed-shop agreements with all electrical equipment manufacturers and 
contractors to expand its membership, obtain shorter hours and higher wages, and increase 
the employment opportunities of its members.  The agreements required contractors to 
purchase equipment from union-only suppliers, and manufacturers to confine their New York 
City sales to contractors employing union members.  To police this agreement, agencies were 
set up which boycotted recalcitrant parties and prevented the use of materials manufactured 
outside their area. Such enforcement was highly successful, with some manufacturers selling 
their goods outside New York at substantially lower prices.  When asked whether such market 
foreclosure was an antitrust infringement the Court held that had the union acted alone, any 
anti-competitive effects would have been the natural consequence of trade union activities 
protected by the Clayton Act.71  However,  
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when the unions participated with a combination of businessmen who had complete power to eliminate 
all competition among themselves and to prevent all competition from others, a situation was created 
not included within the exemptions of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.72 
 
In the Court’s view, combination was critical: “the same union activities may or may not be a 
violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether the union acts alone or in combination 
with business groups … [There was] no purpose of Congress to immunize labor unions who 
aid and abet manufacturers and traders in violating the Sherman Act.”73 
 The Court moves away from solely considering the purpose of the union’s conduct: 
the union’s purposes, increasing its members’ wages and shortening hours of work, was not 
sufficient to exempt the conduct in question.  This shift can be seen more clearly in the 
accompanying opinions.  Justice Roberts, concurring, held that the purpose of the union was 
to “completely monopolize the manufacture and sale of all electronic equipment and devices 
within New York…”74  Justice Murphy, dissenting, argued that combining with non-labour 
groups should not be decisive: the purpose of the union should determine the applicability of 
the Sherman Act.75 
 
3.5 Two strands or interlinking decisions? 
Post-Hutcheson and Apex two strands of reasoning are present: two approaches to the same 
question.76  The Apex strand adopts an interpretation of the Sherman Act that negates the 
need for an exemption.  The Sherman Act is only applicable to actions and agreements that 
have the purpose of directly restraining goods in the product market.  This approach does not 
require using the Clayton or Norris-LaGuardia Acts to create an exemption: trade union 
activities aimed at improving the position of its members fall outside the scope of the 
Sherman Act.  The Hutcheson strand adopts an exemption based on interlinking statutes.  
Unilateral union conduct falling within the Norris-LaGuardia Act and s.20 of the Clayton Act is 
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exempt from the Sherman Act.  The Courts have adopted this strand of reasoning.77  In 
considering whether the statutory exemption applies, the Court avoids examining the more 
difficult question of determining a union’s purpose. 
The ‘interlinking statute’ approach has been criticised in the academic literature, 
which strongly favours the approach taken in Apex.78  Adopting Apex’s approach would 
remove the need for any statutory exemption, and include collective bargaining and 
agreements.79  As Handler and Zifchak point out, Hutchinson’s approach means that antitrust 
liability is not premised on the finding of an unfair labour practice: “[t]he criterion under 
antitrust is the effect on market competition as explicated in Apex … whether or not union 
conduct violates … labor law should be irrelevant.”80  However, an exemption may still be 
necessary where trade union conduct has both labour and product market effects, especially 
where the conduct in question is lawful under labour law.  Where this is the case, an 
exemption could, as seen from the discussion of the non-statutory exemption below, be the 
result of a balance between antitrust and labour policy.81   
Steffen argues that Hutcheson should be read in conjunction with Apex82; Greenslade, 
with Apex and Allen Bradley.83  Steffen provides no clear explanation as to why this should be.  
However, one can assume that even where there is an intent to restrict interstate commerce 
in the product market, where the union seeks a lawful objective by lawful labour market 
means; it is exempt from antitrust liability.84  Greenslade commends reading Apex-Hutcheson-
Allen Bradley together as “establishing the foundation for a very sensible approach to the 
labor-antitrust problem.”85  According to Greenslade, the cases establish that the Sherman 
Act only prohibits activities aimed at eliminating competition within the commercial market.  
Hutcheson, read with Allen Bradley, conditions the statutory exemption on two factors: the 
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existence of a labour dispute (Hutcheson), and a finding that the union acted alone and, in its 
self-interest (Hutcheson and Allen Bradley).86  Conduct, which may not fall within the 
exemption as defined by Hutcheson and Allen Bradley, still, may not fall under the Sherman 
Act under Apex’s purpose requirement.87 
Leslie points out that Allen Bradley can be read as imposing a restraint on the decision 
in Hutcheson.  Allen Bradley restricts the Hutcheson immunity to situations where the union 
engages in truly unilateral conduct such as a strike.88  Where the union reaches an agreement 
with an employer, the Apex commercial competition test applies.  This approach immediately 
removes the need for a further “non-statutory” exemption.  Unilateral conduct is protected 
under Hutcheson and Allen Bradley, agreements under Apex.  Apex and Hutcheson, when read 
in conjunction with one another, provide protection from antitrust for most trade union 
activities.  However, Hutcheson closes off a wider reading of the statutory immunity.  The 
Supreme Court held that the immunity is lost when the union joins with outsiders or does not 
act in its self-interest.89  Having held that “outsiders” means “non-labor groups”, collective 
bargaining and agreements automatically fall outside the scope of the statutory exemption.  
This is how Hutcheson has been interpreted.90 
 
3.6 Summary 
Handler provides a summary of the statutory exemption as it applies today.91   
 
If union conduct was embraced by Norris-LaGuardia … [Hutcheson] … if it restrains ... competition based 
on differences in labor and not on commercial price competition … [Apex] … and if it was pursued by the 
union solely in its self-interest [Hutcheson; Allen Bradley] … it [is] free of liability.92 (emphasis added) 
 
This shares similarities with the exemption in Albany.  It adopts set conditions that must be 
met for union conduct to fall outside the scope of the Sherman Act.  It provides certainty and 
predictability for trade unions.  This contracts with the Supreme Court’s earlier approach to 
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the statutory exemption, which provided a significant element of confusion.  The lack of 
consensus between Congress and the Supreme Court as to the proper treatment of trade 
union activities by antitrust allowed the exemption’s boundaries to be probed to the 
detriment of trade unions and workers.  This shows the benefit (and importance) of a clear, 
certain and predictable exemption.  I shall return to this in section 5 below, when exploring 
what we can learn from the US approaches. 
The statutory exemption, however, does not protect collective agreements.  This is 
through the requirement that the conduct in question is protected by the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act.  The NLGA prevents an injunction from being granted in a specific number of 
circumstances, all arising from a labour dispute.  Despite the wider interpretation of a labour 
dispute,93 it prevents the inclusion of collective bargaining within the statutory exemption.  
How collective agreements are protected from antitrust is the focus of section 4. 
 
4. The Non-Statutory Immunity 
Allen Bradley heralds the creation of the non-statutory exemption.  There, the Supreme Court 
assumed that the collective agreement between the union and employers was 
unobjectionable to antitrust.94  However, it remained unclear whether collective agreements 
were exempt from antitrust liability or fell within the scope of the Sherman Act.95  The 
Supreme Court’s decision restricted the statutory immunity to union and worker conduct 
only.  To resolve this problem, and effectuate congressional policy of encouraging collective 
bargaining, the Supreme Court developed a “non-statutory” exemption to cover both 
employers and trade unions when engaged in collective bargaining.96  “The union benefit from 
the … [collective agreement] … is direct and concrete and the effect on the product market, 
though clearly present, results from the elimination of competition based on wages among 
the employers in the bargaining unit, which is not the kind of restraint Congress intended the 
Sherman Act to proscribe.”97 
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The non-statutory exemption gained prominence in the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Pennington and Jewel Tea.  However, neither decision provides a clear enunciation of the 
exemption.  In Pennington, Justice White appeared to conclude that a collective agreement 
concerning a mandatory subject of bargaining it is exempt from antitrust laws, unless “it is 
clearly shown that [the union] has agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage 
scale on other bargaining units.”98  Where the union participated in a conspiracy to eliminate 
competitors from industry, the labour exemption does not apply99: “the policy of the antitrust 
laws is clearly set against employer-union agreements seeking to prescribe labor standards 
outside the bargaining unit.”100  Such an agreement was challenged in Pennington itself.  In 
Pennington, the union and employers sought to impose collectively agreed terms on all other 
companies in the industry regardless of a firm’s ability to pay.  The union and employers also 
took steps to exclude the marketing, production and sale of non-union coal, refused to lease 
land to non-union operators, and refused to buy or sell coal mined by those operators.  In the 
Court’s opinion, the conspiracy to impose the agreed conditions on other employers removed 
the exemption.  Demanding equal wages from all employers was a legitimate demand, the 
Court held, and not grounds for denying the exemption.  However, where there was an 
explicit agreement between the union and one or more employers to impose the same wages 
on all employers regardless of the firm’s ability to pay, the union’s self-interest, and for the 
purpose of destroying competition, the exemption would be withheld.101  One can see the 
decision as following Hutcheson’s self-interest test and being closely based on that in Allen 
Bradley.102  However, is it not in the self-interest of the union to prescribe standards outside 
of its bargaining unit in order to protect wage rates within the bargaining unit?   
In Jewel Tea, the agreement in question was exempt from the Sherman Act.  The 
agreement, restricting the marketing hours for the sale of fresh meat to protect the working 
hours of butchers, was challenged as a conspiracy to restrict competition in retail meat 
markets.  The Supreme Court found that there was no union-employer conspiracy; it was “not 
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as a result of a bargain between the unions and some employers directed against other 
employers … [but was] … pursuant to what the unions deemed to be in their best interest.”103 
(emphasis added) However, the Court was split – with those dissenting not commenting on 
the exemption.  Mr Justice White, with the Chief Justice and Brennan J, argued that an 
agreement was exempt from the Sherman Act where it was “so intimately related to wages, 
hours and working conditions … [and obtained] through bona-fide, arms-length bargaining in 
pursuit of their own labor policies, and not at the behest of or in combination with non labor 
groups.”104  Mr Justice Goldberg, with Harlan and Stewart JJ, argued that the Court should 
draw on the approach taken in Hutcheson, and exempt collective agreements (and 
bargaining) “concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining under the Labor Act”.105  Such 
approach “would effectuate the congressional policies of encouraging free collective 
bargaining, subject only to specific restrictions contained in the labor laws, and of limiting 
judicial intervention in labor matters via the antitrust route…”106 
Putting Justice White’s decisions in Pennington and Jewel Tea together, the following 
approach takes shape.  A collective agreement will enjoy immunity where the union pursues 
the agreement in its own self-interest; is intimately related to matters of immediate and 
direct union concern; and does not impair the freedom of contract of the parties to the 
collective agreement in their relations with third parties.107    This third aspect has been 
criticised as finding no support in “traditional antitrust doctrine … [subverting] the very 
essence of contractual obligation.”108  It implies that a contractual restriction on a party’s 
freedom to bargain represents a per se infringement of the Sherman Act.109 
In Connell,110 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve any uncertainty and 
provide an authoritative statement of the non-statutory exemption.  Connell alleged that a 
collective agreement requiring it not to subcontract work to firms who did not have a current 
union agreement violated the Sherman Act.  In holding that the agreement in question did 
not benefit from the exemption, Justice Powell, delivering the Court’s opinion, adopted a 
                                                          
103 Jewel Tea (n.77) 688 
104 ibid., 689-90 
105 ibid., 710 
106 ibid. 
107 See Jewel Tea ibid 689-90; Pennington (n.97) 663-6; Handler and Zifchak (n 76) 486. 
108 ibid 508–11. 
109 ibid. 
110 Connell Construction Company Inc. v Plumbers and Steamfitters, Local Union No. 100 421 U.S. 616 (1975) 
199 
 
slightly different approach to that in Jewel Tea and Pennington.  Having reaffirmed the need 
to exempt collective agreements from the Sherman Act, Justice Powell held that although the 
goal of the union, organising as many contractors as possible, was legal, the methods used 
were “not immune from antitrust sanction simply because the goal is legal.”111  In order to fall 
within the antitrust immunity, any restrictions in the business market should “follow naturally 
from the elimination of competition over wages and working conditions.”112  
The decisions in Jewel Tea, Pennington and Connell have been the subject of much 
criticism.  Hoffman, for example, states that although the cases do not change the approach 
taken in Apex,113 the Supreme Court did not “clarify the significance of the nonstatutory 
exemption: it is simply an application of the Apex rule to a particular set of facts.”114  Along 
similar lines, Goldman advocates a return to the test set out in Allen Bradley115: the non-
statutory exemption applies unless the union has “joined or instigated a conspiracy to create 
a monopoly among conspiring business interests.”116  This would recognise that the labour 
exemption was designed to protect union activity furthering its own self-interests.117  
However, in situations such as Allen Bradley, is the union not furthering its own self-interest 
by combining with an employer?  Through price fixing, unions could ensure that wages are 
simultaneously increased.  Using standards such as “follows naturally”118 could lead to such 
activities being exempt.119  Such a standard also creates uncertainty; it has the potential to 
“intensif[y] the uncertainty in this area.”120  Were this standard to be applied post-Connell, 
Congress should step in and “state whether conduct which violates national labor laws can 
also be attacked as violative of antitrust laws.  Pending such Congressional clarification, we 
will continue to witness the judiciary applying its own views on how to strike the balance 
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between labor law and antitrust.”121  However, is such a fixed rule possible?  Adopting a self-
interest standard, without either tethering it to labour or antitrust laws, would be too broad.  
It could immunise conduct that is solely anti-competitive. 
Criticism has also focussed on the suggestion that the exemption derives from a 
balancing between labour and antitrust policy,122 including the three factors set out in Jewel 
Tea and Pennington.  Roberts criticises the Courts for introducing such a reconciliation 
without defining the scope or limits of such an approach.123  The Courts’ focus in each case 
was limited to the specific circumstances of the case rather than the broader implications.124  
However, Jewel Tea, Pennington and Connell do provide guidance.  Jewel Tea suggests that 
where there are strong labour policy interests and weak competition ramifications the 
exemption will apply; Pennington and Connell the opposite.125  The cases establish that where 
the restraint “follows naturally”126 from, and directly relates to a mandatory subject of 
bargaining, the strong labour policy interest in upholding the collective agreement would 
override any antitrust ramifications.127  Any dispute should be resolved through contract or 
labour law.  Only direct product market restraints lose the exemption’s protection.128   
Handler and Zifchak concur; pointing out that the basic understanding of these cases 
is that no collective agreement is automatically exempt from antitrust, even where limited to 
mandatory subjects.129  There is no congruence between the boundaries of compulsory 
collective bargaining and the labour exemption.  In their view, Justice White stopped short of 
following Hutcheson, creating an automatic immunity for all agreements concerning 
mandatory subjects.130  Such an approach, they argue, creates a clash between two conflicting 
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Law: The Antitrust Labor Exemption’ (1978) 9 Seton Hall Law Review 744, 754; Handler and Zifchak (n 76) 484; 
Susan Schwochau, ‘The Labor Exemptions to Antitrust Law: An Overview’ (2000) 21 Journal of Labor Research. 
See also Jewel Tea (n.77) 689-691, where Justice White refers to “[w]eighing the respective interests involved” 
and factors “weighing heavily in favour” of the exemption. 
123 Roberts (n 23) 59–61. 
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economic goals, placing the review of collective agreements in the hands of the courts and 
not a specialised body such as the NLRB.131   
Jewel Tea, Pennington and Connell, however, all concerned product market restraints.  
Jewel Tea restricted an employer’s hours of operation; Connell, from subcontracting with 
certain subcontractors.  No restraint was consigned solely to the labour market.  Where an 
agreement simply specifies how much the employer will “pay for labor, as well as working 
conditions and hours”, such agreement requires no antitrust immunity.132  It should be 
classified as a simple vertical agreement between sellers and purchasers describing the terms 
of the purchase.133   
 
4.1 A wider application 
Despite the criticism of Jewel Tea, Pennington and Connell, the Court’s balancing approach 
was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Brown.134  In Brown, “squad” players challenged the 
imposition of new rules establishing a development squad in each NFL team.  Following a 
breakdown in bargaining, the NFL imposed the rules unilaterally, with sanctions imposed 
where a team failed to comply.  The players challenged the requirement that development 
squad players be paid $1000 per week as a restraint of trade under the Sherman Act.  The NFL 
defended the rules on the basis that they were protected by the non-statutory exemption.  
Although not contained in a collective agreement, the Court found that the non-
statutory exemption applied.  Justice Breyer, delivering the opinion of the Court, held that the 
non-statutory exemption applied to conduct that “grew out of, and was directly related to, 
the lawful operation of the bargaining process.”135  Thus, the exemption was broad enough to 
shield the entire collective bargaining process “established by federal law.”136  In the Court’s 
view, for there to be an effective exemption, including for employer conduct, the exemption 
must apply to the whole bargaining process, not just the bargain itself.137  On the facts of the 
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case, the conduct complained of took place during and immediately after collective 
bargaining; was part of and directly related to the lawful operation of collective bargaining; 
was a mandatory subject of bargaining; and, concerned only the specific parties involved in 
bargaining.138  Furthermore, in Justice Breyer’s view, absent the protection of the exemption, 
the NFL would have been faced with dual liability.  If they imposed their last joint offer, they 
would invite antitrust liability as the NFL’s conduct demonstrated “a common understanding 
or agreement”.139  If each individual employer imposed different terms, they would “invite an 
unfair labor practice charge.”140  Therefore, to facilitate collective bargaining, antitrust liability 
should be removed: to allow it would “introduce instability and uncertainty into the collective 
bargaining process.”141 
 In balancing the competing interests, the Court relied on the factors identified in Jewel 
Tea, Pennington and Connell.  As already stated, the conduct  
 
(i) took place during and immediately after a collective bargaining relationship;  
(ii) was directly related to the lawful operation of the bargaining process;  
(iii) involved a topic that the parties were required to bargain over; and  
(iv) concerned only the parties to the bargaining relationship.142   
 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the majority decision imported their own policy 
considerations into the balance, instead of the policy considerations contained within the 
labour statutes.  Justice Stevens saw the majority opinion as upsetting the balance of power 
in collective bargaining: the exemption being a pro-labour tool.143  In his view, the non-
statutory exemption had its roots in strong labour policy favouring the elimination of 
competition over wages and working conditions, preventing “collective action initiated by 
employers to depress wages below the level that would be produced in a free market.”144  As 
Justice Stevens pointed out, the majority ignored the facts of the case and the way in which 
collective bargaining operates within the NFL.  The Court, by protecting the imposition of 
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terms not previously agreed by the union, “would not only infringe on the union’s freedom 
of contract … but would also contradict the very purpose of the antitrust exemption by not 
promoting execution of a collective bargaining agreement with terms mutually acceptable to 
employer and trade union alike.”145  Thus, Justice Stevens would have refused to exempt an 
agreement where it was contrary to the interests of employees.146  
The majority decision in Brown has been heavily criticised.  A consistent criticism is the 
proposition that the exemption can only be avoided through either decertifying the union 
and/or repudiating its role as bargaining agent.147  As long as the bargaining relationship 
continues, the exemption applies to union and employer conduct.  Decertification is the only 
way in which a union can show a clear end to the bargaining relationship.  Such conduct is not 
uncommon and has been used in disputes involving the NFLPA and NBPA in recent years.148    
Although these cases concerned the professional sports environment, the Courts’ decisions 
extend beyond this highly unusual context.149 
Extending the exemption beyond a bargaining impasse, it has been argued, is 
inconsistent with the policy objectives sought by the exemption: the protection of 
congressional policy favouring collective bargaining.  Bryant argues that this gives too much 
power to employers, using the non-statutory exemption to exempt unilateral employer 
conduct.150  As the purpose of the exemption is to enable collective bargaining, once 
bargaining reaches impasse there is no further need for the exemption.151  Post-impasse there 
is no bargaining relationship.  Furthermore, Yu argues that Brown is overbroad and will have 
an adverse effect on collective bargaining.152  It gives insufficient regard to labour law and the 
                                                          
145 Brown v Pro Football Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125 (D.C. 1991), 139 
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jurisprudence of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which states that courts cannot 
compel a party to accept contractual terms, which it has never agreed to.  As such, Yu argues 
that the exemption should expire when it “becomes clearly unreasonable for either party to 
believe that a particular provision will be incorporated into a subsequent agreement.”153  Such 
a standard, Yu argues, would encourage collective bargaining, as the union would be willing 
to accept anticompetitive provisions.154 
However, the ruling in Brown is not as wide as it appears.155  Lower courts have 
restricted the exemption’s application to multi-employer agreements and conduct.  For 
example, the lower courts have held that multi-employer conduct will only be allowed where 
it falls within the exemption’s rationale156 or, in the case of multi-employer agreements, 
where it is intimately related to the collective agreement.157  In Safeway, for example, the 
Court held that the exemption did not apply to a profit-sharing scheme used to protect 
members of the multi-employer bargaining unit against targeted industrial action.  Other 
options were available to make the collective bargaining process work, “without the need to 
engage in such basic violations of the antitrust system.”158  As such, conduct not “historically 
authorised for use as part of the collective bargaining process” is not exempt from antitrust’s 
scope.159   
 
4.2 Summary 
To summarise, the non-statutory exemption applies to union and employer conduct that 
“[grows] out of, and [is] directly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining process.”160  
Although the Supreme Court implies that the exemption applies where the conduct  
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(i) took place during and immediately after a collective bargaining relationship;  
(ii) was directly related to the lawful operation of the bargaining process;  
(iii) involved a topic that the parties were required to bargain over; and  
(iv) concerned only the parties to the bargaining relationship,  
 
the court will still balance the competing objectives.  Conduct meeting these factors may still 
not benefit from the non-statutory exemption. 
This individual balancing approach appears more flexible and nuanced than the 
approach in Albany.  This is unsurprising given that the non-statutory exemption applies to a 
wider range of activities than Albany: the weights of the competing objectives will differ 
significantly depending on the conduct challenged.  However, the application of the non-
statutory exemption has created a level of confusion and uncertainty not seen within the EU.  
This is particularly due to differently constituted Supreme Courts altering the ‘structure’ of 
the balancing exercise.  This confusion and uncertainty has allowed employers to explore the 
boundaries of the exemption to the detriment of collective bargaining and workers.   
The remainder of this chapter will explore what the EU can learn from the statutory 
and non-statutory exemption.  Section 5 will examine whether the exemption created in 
Albany should be altered in line with the discussion set out above.  The section shall also 
consider whether the approach in Albany is better than the approaches adopted by the US 
Supreme Court. 
 
5. What can be learnt from the US approaches? 
Sections 3 and 4 have set out the current exemptions in the US for both collective agreements 
and unilateral union conduct.  The statutory exemption applies to conduct which is lawful 
under the Norris-La Guardia Act and ss.6 and 20 Clayton Act, does not substantially affect 
commercial competition, and is pursued by the union in its own self-interest: the non- 
statutory to conduct which “[grows] out of and [is] directly related to, the lawful operation of 
the bargaining process.”161  This section will examine whether it is possible to develop Albany’s 
exemption in line with the approaches and literature in the US. 
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There is no comparable approach under EU competition law to the US statutory 
exemption, nor has the CJEU been faced with applying EU competition law to industrial action.  
Any restraints on interstate trade caused by industrial action have been challenged under EU 
free movement rules, particularly freedom of establishment and free movement of goods and 
services.162  Industrial action aimed at preventing the transportation of goods or preventing 
businesses operating between the Member States concerned, breaches the free movement 
provisions more obviously than it does the Treaty competition provisions.  For EU competition 
law to apply, industrial action would need to be conceptualised as either collusive or joint 
conduct on behalf of two or more undertakings, or the abuse of a dominant position.  The 
free movement provisions are closer to the prohibition in Section 1 of the Sherman Act: 
contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce. 
 There are two issues with adopting a ‘European’ version of section 6 of the Clayton 
Act, that labour is not a commodity or article of commerce.  First, the definition of trade is 
wide, extending beyond traditional goods and services to encompass all cross-border 
economic activities.163  The purpose of such a wide definition is to ensure consistency with the 
free movement objective of the EU: to promote free movement of goods, services, persons 
and capital.164  Thus, the Court has held that the concept of trade extends to the provision of 
labour market services.  Labour is considered a commodity and/or article of 
commerce/trade.165  Although legislation overruling these decisions is possible, this could 
undermine the ability of employees to exercise their free movement rights unless such a rule 
were confined to the competition rules.166  For example, a new Treaty provision or Court ruling 
could simply state that the competition rules do not apply to the labour market. Such an 
approach would potentially achieve the same result as Albany: collective agreements are 
exempt from EU competition law but are still subject to the free movement and public 
procurement rules.  This could drive potential competition claims into the free movement 
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realm, creating the danger that free movement rules are used to undermine any express 
exemption from competition rules.  As seen in Viking Line, the CJEU takes a less labour-
friendly approach under the free movement provisions than it has under Albany.    
Second, a broad statutory exemption, as seen within s.6 Clayton Act, would also 
exempt employer conduct in the labour market.  As seen in the US, recent debate has 
focussed on the extent to which joint employer conduct should be exempt from antitrust 
liability.167  Employer collusion within the labour market could exacerbate unequal bargaining 
power.  Employers could engage in collusive conduct setting wages at low levels, conclude 
non-poaching agreements,168 and engage in significant anti-competitive behaviour.  Such 
conduct would skew the balance of power towards employers   Rather than furthering EU 
labour policy, labour policy encouraging collective bargaining could be undermined.  Again, 
any statutory exemption would potentially be no different to that adopted by the CJEU in 
Albany. 
 The exemptions adopted in the US and EU do adopt similar bases.  The exemptions 
result from balancing the competing objectives.  As Chapter 4 demonstrated, Albany’s 
exemption results from balancing the social policy objectives pursued by collective 
agreements and the policy objectives behind EU competition law.  In a similar vein, both 
approaches in the US stem from a balance between the Congressional policies encouraging 
both antitrust and trade unions.  As the discussion in sections 3 and 4 above demonstrates, 
both the statutory and non-statutory exemptions stem from Congress’ decision to promote 
labour policy at the expense of antitrust.  For example, section 3 showed that the statutory 
exemption arose from Congressional intent to exempt certain trade union activities from 
antitrust.  Congress considered that the benefits of trade union activities outweighed the 
antitrust harm caused.  As such, it is arguably only the outcome of the balancing exercise and 
how the balancing exercises are carried out that differ. 
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However, the US Supreme Court arguably takes a much more nuanced and flexible 
approach to exempting trade union activities (balancing the competing objectives/interests) 
than the CJEU in Albany: specifically, the non-statutory exemption.  The US Supreme Court 
base their exemptions on federal labour policy and law, with the exemption generally 
applying where the conduct in question is lawful under either the Norris-LaGuardia Act or the 
National Labor Relations Act.  Although a balancing approach determines whether the non-
statutory exemption applies, lawfulness under labour law raises a strong, rebuttable 
presumption that the exemption applies.169  This leads to a potentially more flexible approach, 
which is not present within the EU.  However, this is at the expense of the clarity and 
predictability that the Albany exemption provides.  Within the EU, there is no significant 
confusion as to what the exemption protects.   Albany’s exemption applies where a collective 
agreement is between management and labour, or their representatives, and aims at 
improving working term and conditions.  There is no subsequent balancing, as required under 
Brown in the US, between the labour and antitrust considerations present in the case.  Thus, 
where there are significant anticompetitive effects in either labour or product markets, for 
example, a most-favoured ‘employer’ clause or promise to extract the same concessions from 
each employer in the industry, such an agreement would be exempt under Albany yet subject 
to US antitrust law.  
As shown in Chapter 4, section 4, it is incorrect to state that the Albany exemption is 
blunt, or static, when compared with the US exemptions.  The CJEU’s decision is more 
nuanced than it appears.  Although it is not possible to point to a definitive body of EU labour 
law as one could with a fully federated state such as the US, it is possible to point to a form 
of labour policy.  There are legislative provisions on labour law,170 and the Treaties provide 
for, and protect, collective bargaining.  Title X of the TFEU provides for collective bargaining 
and collective agreements,171 and Article 28 CFREU states that “[w]orkers and employers, or 
their respective organisations, have, in accordance with Union law and national laws and 
practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements…”172  It is through this, 
                                                          
169 See the decision in Brown (n.3). 
170 See, for example, Council Directive 98/69/EC on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to 
collective redundancies [1998] O.J. L225/16; Council Directive 2001/23/EC on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [2001] O.J. L82/16 
171 See Articles 152-154 TFEU 
172 Article 28 CFREU also includes the right to take industrial action. 
209 
 
when combined with the policy linking clauses in the Treaties, that balancing labour and 
competition policy to determine whether first, there should be an exemption for collective 
agreements (and by extension other trade union activities) and second, whether such an 
exemption should apply in that specific circumstance, becomes possible.   As shown in 
Chapter 4, the CJEU in Albany balanced the competing objectives, concluding that the balance 
fell in favour of encouraging collective bargaining and the accompanying social policy 
objectives where Albany’s stipulated conditions are met.173  It is not that there is no balancing 
exercise, but that rather than requiring individual courts to balance the interests present, the 
CJEU decided the outcome of the balance in advance, thereby providing certainty and clarity.  
Such pre-determination can be seen to a limited extent within the US approaches.  
Guidance provided for the application of both the statutory and non-statutory exemptions 
gives some certainty and predictability.  For example, the US Supreme Court is clear that the 
statutory exemption applies where three criteria are met.174  Similarly, the Supreme Court has 
concluded that where the considerations mentioned in Brown, and Jewel Tea and Pennington, 
are present, there is a strong presumption in favour of the non-statutory exemption applying.  
Compliance with federal labour law generally leads to a finding that the exemption applies, 
implying that federal labour policy outweighs antitrust policy interests.  However, the non-
statutory exemption still requires that the competing policy objectives be balanced. 
Furthermore, the US Supreme Court and the CJEU in Albany balance the same 
social/labour policy considerations.  Collective bargaining is necessary in a democratic society 
for the protection and improvement of worker interests, the redistribution of power to 
provide an equality of bargaining strength, and the promotion of workplace democracy.  In 
his opinion in Kunsten, AG Wahl states that collective bargaining  
 
not only helps workers and employers in reaching a balanced and mutually acceptable outcome, but also 
produces positive effects for society as a whole ….  [They] prevent costly labour conflicts, reduce 
transaction costs through a collective and rule-based negotiation process and promote predictability and 
transparency … I also believe that the promotion of social peace and the establishment of a system of 
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210 
 
social protection which is equitable for all citizens are aims of the greatest significance in any modern 
society. 175 
 
Such policy objectives are also present within individual Member States, although how they 
are protected, and the prominence given to them, differs.  Thus, in contrast with the US 
approaches, it may not be possible to balance the different policy considerations in each case.  
In Germany, for example, collective bargaining and collective agreements are given 
precedence due to their constitutional status under the Grundgesetz (Basic Law).  In contrast, 
the United Kingdom adopts a lower level of protection of collective bargaining and 
agreements.176  Both Member States accept the importance of collective bargaining and 
promote the policy behind such activities yet differ in the level of protection given.  Thus, 
whether the exemption applies will differ according to the Member State in question.  By 
adopting a more static approach, the Court in Albany sidestep such issues, accommodating 
differing levels of protection in individual Member States. 
This problem is not present within the US.  As set out above, the policy reasons behind 
the exemption are given the same level of protection within each US State.  Given that 
balancing is of federal labour policy with federal antitrust policy, individual balancing can take 
place absent competence or subsidiarity issues.  Where the US Courts have premised their 
exemptions on balancing competing objectives, with a strong presumption in favour of the 
exemption applying where there is no breach of federal labour law, the EU simply requires 
that the agreement is between labour and management, or their representatives, and aims 
at improving working terms and conditions.   
Individual balancing is also more appropriate as the US exemptions cover a much 
wider area of labour law.  Although, as has been argued above, the Supreme Court provides 
some guidance, this is not as precise or clear a rule as that seen in Albany.  For example, the 
non-statutory exemption applies not only to collective agreements, but also to any union and 
employer conduct growing out of, and directly related to, the bargaining process.  This means 
that individually balancing the competing objectives is more appropriate as the weights to be 
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applied to the competing objectives will differ significantly depending on the conduct 
challenged.  For example, as seen in section 4.1 above, the US courts have restricted the 
application of the exemption to multi-employer agreements where other options are 
available to make the collective bargaining process work.177  In contrast, the Albany exemption 
only applies to collective agreements between management and labour aimed at improving 
conditions of work and employment.  As such, it is easier for the CJEU to pronounce the 
balance in advance.   
This does not mean that the CJEU insufficiently considered the competing objectives.  
As highlighted in the previous paragraphs, and discussed in Chapter 4, the CJEU considered 
and balanced the competing objectives present.  This is similar to the approaches adopted by 
the US Supreme Court.  It is not that there is no balance in Albany, but that rather than 
requiring individual courts to balance the interests present, the CJEU decided the outcome of 
the balance in advance.  The CJEU provided a level certainty and clarity for the social partners.  
As the discussion in Chapter 4 showed, the CJEU balanced the conflicting objectives as a 
genus, and did not require later courts to individually balance those objectives.   What was 
missing from the CJEU’s analysis, however, was how it assigned the values it did to the 
competing objectives.   
 This arguably means that the approach in Albany potentially better protects employee 
interests.  As already stated, collective agreements aimed at improving working terms and 
conditions are exempt from EU competition law.  Trade unions, employers and workers have 
certainty and predictability.  Whilst the US exemptions have wide applicability, that there is 
an overall, individual balancing creates a level of uncertainty for the social partners.  This is, 
however, the cost of ensuring that the competing principles are applied sensitively and 
appropriately across a wide range of situations.  The CJEU, in contrast, has had limited 
exposure to such issues; it has not had to answer questions around industrial action, 
“traditional” collective agreements such as in Jewel Tea, nor whether the exemption applies 
to conduct during bargaining or post-expiry of a collective agreement (Brown).  In adopting 
such a static approach, it is possible that Albany has avoided the confusion and uncertainty in 
the US as set out in sections 3 and 4 above.  Could the US courts learn from the approach in 
Albany? 
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6. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to explore the approaches adopted in the US in order to 
explore whether the EU can draw anything from the discussion and approaches taken.  The 
chapter has shown, in sections 3 and 4, how the statutory and non-statutory exemptions have 
developed.  Section 3 showed that the statutory exemption applies where the conduct in 
question falls within the NLGA; restrains competition based on differences in labour; and, is 
pursued by the union in their sole interest.  Section 4 showed that the non-statutory 
exemption applies where the conduct grows out of and is directly related to, the lawful 
operation of the bargaining process.  This, section 4 showed, requires an individual balancing 
approach which creates significant uncertainty, with differently constituted Supreme Courts 
altering the ‘structure’ of the balancing process.  This allows employers to probe the 
exemption’s boundaries to the detriment of collective bargaining and workers. 
 The discussion of the exemptions showed that such approaches have been heavily 
criticised within the academic literature.  The main concerns are that that the approaches 
taken by the Courts are inconsistent with Congressional intent and subject to uncertainty.  For 
example, examination of Congressional debates on the Sherman, Clayton, and Norris-
LaGuardia Acts shows that Congress did not intend trade unions to be subject to the Sherman 
Act.  This is most visible in section 6 of the Clayton Act: labour of a human being is not a 
commodity or article of commerce.  This has led to calls to return to the approach in Apex: 
only where a trade union’s purpose is to restrain market competition will antitrust law apply.  
However, the Courts have not adopted such an approach, continuing to apply the standards 
briefly set out in the previous paragraph.   
The chapter has demonstrated that Albany provides a more certain and predictable 
exemption than those seen in the US.  Albany’s predetermined balance provides certainty 
and predictability for the social partners (and workers).  The discussion in section 5 has shown 
that the CJEU’s decision in Albany avoids the confusion that the individual approaches to 
balancing have created in the US.  As demonstrated above, it is not entirely clear when the 
US exemptions do and do not apply.  Although the Supreme Court has given some guidance 
for courts in balancing the competing interests, the Court is unable to predetermine the 
balance in advance due to the larger area of labour law to which it applies.  This, to an extent, 
places industrial relations at the whim of the Court.  This concern can be seen in the discussion 
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in sections 3 and 4 discussing the development of the statutory and non-statutory 
exemptions.  That Albany restricts the exemption to very specific circumstances avoids these 
issues and potentially strikes a better balance between the competing objectives. 
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Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
 
Trade unions are combinations of workers, which “could be construed as a labour cartel, 
fettering the operation of free market forces between union members over the terms on 
which they offer their services in the market for their services.”1  Through collective 
agreements (and collective bargaining), trade unions restrict competition, undermining the 
low-cost, efficiency model that is vital to the competitive process. As such, Article 101 TFEU 
should “step in” and prevent such anti-competitive behaviour from occurring.  Collective 
agreements which reduce consumer welfare should be void, unless accompanied by 
compensating productivity or quality benefits.  The application of Article 101 TFEU, however, 
creates a problem.  Trade unions, in restricting competition, seek to achieve social policy 
objectives and exercise human rights.  They seek to protect their members’ interests through 
increasing wages and providing greater employment protection.  As such, applying Article 101 
TFEU to collective agreements may seriously undermine the social policy objectives and 
fundamental human rights interests present.  In Albany, the CJEU held that collective 
agreements fall outside the scope of EU competition law where they are (i) between 
management and labour, or their representatives, and (ii) aim at improving working terms 
and conditions.  To subject competition law to collective agreements would seriously 
undermine the social policy objectives pursued by such agreements.  
The thesis has explored whether we need to exempt collective agreements from EU 
competition law to protect the social policy objectives present.  It has explored whether the 
Albany exemption is the most appropriate approach for resolving the conflict between the 
competing objectives present.  It has sought to show  
 
(i) whether the approach in Albany is correct;  
(ii) whether we need an exemption; and  
(iii) whether the social policy objectives would be seriously undermined were 
collective agreements to be subject to EU competition law?   
 
                                                          
1 Shae McCrystal and Phil Syrpis, ‘Competition Law and Worker Voice: Competition Law Impediments to 
Collective Bargaining in Australia and the European Union’, Voices at Work (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2014) 421. 
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In addressing these questions, the thesis has argued the following.   
Chapter 2 argued that a trade union is an undertaking under EU competition law when 
engaged in collective bargaining. It showed that, trade unions offer a service (collective 
bargaining) on a given market (the labour market).  Collective bargaining can be carried out 
with a view to making a profit, with the trade union bearing financial risk associated with 
collective bargaining.  Collective bargaining, Chapter 2 argued, is not a public function, nor 
does it constitute a solidarity function as understood by CJEU case law.  This means that 
Article 101 TFEU may apply to a collective agreement.  Where the application of Article 101 
TFEU seriously undermines the social policy objectives, the Albany exemption may be 
necessary.  Chapter 2 also concluded that a trade union does not, contrary to existing 
understanding, act as its members’ agent when engaged in collective bargaining.  A trade 
union bears sufficient financial risk to negate the agent-principal relationship.  The discussion 
also showed that a trade union is not an association of undertakings when engaged in 
collective bargaining.  When bargaining over terms and conditions of employment, the 
chapter demonstrated that a worker, although not subsumed within their employer’s 
undertaking, is not an undertaking when bargaining as it is highly unlikely that a worker bears 
sufficient financial risk. 
Chapter 3 examined the decision of the CJEU in Albany.  It showed that the CJEU 
resolved the conflict between the social policy objectives and competition policy’s objectives 
by exempting collective agreements from EU competition law.  In Albany, the CJEU balanced 
the competing objectives, concluding that the social policy objectives always outweigh 
competition policy’s objectives where its stipulated conditions are present.  The discussion in 
Chapter 3 showed that there are several issues with the CJEU’s approach.  Key amongst these 
are: (i) that the CJEU did not examine whether collective agreements would fall within EU 
competition law; and, (ii) that the CJEU’s approach to balancing is opaque.  These two points 
challenge the basis for the exemption in Albany and go to the heart of whether (and how) we 
should resolve the conflict present.  First, where a collective agreement does not infringe 
Article 101 TFEU there is no conflict between the relevant objectives, nor are the social policy 
objectives seriously undermined.  Second, identifying the CJEU’s balancing approach allows 
us to establish whether the exemption is correct.  If the CJEU incorrectly balanced the 
competing objectives, its conclusion—the exemption—needs reassessing.  These two points 
formed the basis of the discussion in Chapters 4-7. 
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Chapters 4 and 5 focussed on the wider EU constitutional aspects of the Albany 
exemption.  The chapters demonstrated that conflicts between objectives, interests and 
rights are resolved in two ways.  First, the chapters showed that the CJEU resolves conflicts 
by balancing the competing objectives through the proportionality principle.  The discussion 
showed that the CJEU in Albany adopted a constitutional approach to resolving the conflict 
between the competing objectives present.  It demonstrated that the CJEU adopted a 
proportionality approach stricto sensu, symmetrically balancing the competing objectives.  
The CJEU balanced the harm to the social policy objectives against the importance of 
achieving competition policy’s objectives, and vice versa.  This is visible in the CJEU’s 
predetermination of the balance in favour of the social policy objectives where its two 
conditions are met.  This implies that the CJEU considered that exempting all collective 
agreements would be disproportionate to the harm caused to competition policy’s objectives.  
It can be concluded from this that the approach adopted by the CJEU in Albany is correct. 
Second, chapters 4 and 5 showed that conflicts can be resolved through interpreting 
and applying EU law in a manner which takes account of the wider objectives pursued by a 
measure or action.  This, the chapters argued, is required by the Treaty integration clause, the 
CJEU’s teleological approach, and the EU’s approach to fundamental rights.  In the context of 
the questions posed by this thesis, where EU competition law can be interpreted in such a 
way as to give the social policy objectives adequate weight, the Albany exemption may not 
be necessary.  In such a situation, the social policy objectives would not be seriously 
undermined; they would have been appropriately considered.  Thus, the exemption in Albany, 
although correctly reached, may be unnecessary. 
  Chapters 6 and 7 showed that Article 101 TFEU can be interpreted in a manner that 
gives adequate protection to the social policy objectives pursued by collective agreements.  
In relation to Article 101(1) TFEU, Chapter 6 showed that a constitutional balancing is possible 
through the application of the approach in Wouters.  In Wouters, the CJEU held that 
agreements that restrict competition fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU where the 
restriction on competition is proportionate to the legitimate objective pursued by the 
agreement in question.  Similarly, Chapter 7 demonstrated that the same approach is possible 
under Article 101(3) TFEU through the CJEU’s decision in Metro.  In Metro, the CJEU held that 
an agreement benefits from exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU where a restriction on 
competition is necessary to achieve a legitimate aim and does not result in the elimination of 
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competition in a substantial part of the common market.  The chapters argued that in applying 
these tests, a restriction on competition caused by a collective agreement aimed at improving 
conditions of work and employment would often be a proportionate restriction on 
competition.  This negates the need to balance the competing objectives outside of Article 
101 TFEU. 
Chapter 8 argued that the exemption in Albany achieves a more satisfactory balance 
between the competing objectives and interests than the approaches present within the US. 
Within the US, collective agreements are protected from the application of the Sherman Act 
by an implied exemption, which applies where the conduct in question grows out of and is 
directly related to the bargaining process.  In applying the exemption, the US courts balance 
the competing factors present in the conduct in question: do the labour policy considerations 
outweigh the antitrust interests?  Under the US approach, where conduct is lawful under 
federal labour law, it appears to be presumed that the exemption will apply.  In exempting 
collective agreements aimed at improving working terms and conditions, the CJEU sidesteps 
the issues that have arisen under US antitrust rules.  By not adopting an individual balancing 
approach in each case, the CJEU provides a bright-line preventing individual value judgments 
being made in difficult cases. 
 
The Conclusion… 
The thesis has shown that the CJEU’s decision in Albany was ‘correct’ in how it balanced the 
competing social and competition policy objectives.  However, the thesis has also 
demonstrated that the conflict could be resolved via individual balancing.  Chapters 4 and 5 
showed that the Treaty integration clauses, the CJEU’s teleological approach, and EU’s 
approach to fundamental rights require that wider objectives are considered when applying 
and interpreting EU law.  Thus, it was argued, the CJEU should have considered whether 
Article 101 TFEU could have been interpreted in a manner, which gave adequate weight to 
the social policy objectives pursued by, and fundamental rights present in, collective 
agreements without resorting to an agreement.  Where this is possible, the social policy 
objectives are not undermined.  This is so even where the application of Article 101 TFEU 
voids a collective agreement.  Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrated that such an interpretation of 
Article 101 TFEU is possible.  Therefore, there may have been no need for the CJEU in Albany 
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to balance the competing objectives outside of Article 101 TFEU and predetermine the 
balance in advance.  The exemption in Albany may be unnecessary.   
There are, however, significant drawbacks to adopting such an approach.  These 
considerations necessitate the conclusion that the Albany exemption is retained.  First, 
individually balancing the competing objectives removes the bright-line certainty provided by 
the Albany exemption.  Such certainty allows trade unions, workers and employers to rely on 
the terms of a collective agreement, setting the bounds within which they can bargain free 
from the enforcement of EU competition law.  As concluded in Chapter 7, the approaches 
identified in Chapters 6 and 7 create uncertainty and unpredictability for the social partners.  
Were collective agreements subject to EU competition law, the certainty with which collective 
agreements could be relied upon to set terms and conditions of employment would be 
substantially reduced.  This uncertainty is exacerbated by including wider policy objectives 
within Article 101 TFEU.  Including such objectives within Article 101 TFEU’s analysis further 
complicates an already difficult analysis.  Although the application of the approach in 
Wouters, for example, would provide some structure to the balance, it still allows courts 
significant leeway in how they apply it.   The discussion in Chapter 8 of the US approaches 
showed that individual challenges to collective agreements have created confusion as to how 
the balance operates, with differently constituted US Supreme Courts altering the ‘structure’ 
of both exemptions.  This has allowed employers to probe the boundaries of the exemptions 
to the detriment of both collective bargaining and workers. 
Second, individual balancing potentially has a ‘chilling effect’ on collective bargaining, 
like that seen by the CJEU’s decision in Viking Line.  As Chapters 3 and 5 explained, the CJEU 
in Viking Line significantly restricted the ability of trade unions to justifiably restrict the 
fundamental freedoms in the exercise of the right to strike.  Were such an approach adopted 
within Article 101 TFEU, the scope allowed for collective agreements would be significantly 
restricted.  As such, trade unions (and employers) may become reluctant to conclude 
collective agreements aimed at improving conditions of work and employment.  This would 
make collective representation less attractive and render the social institution of collective 
bargaining illusory.  This has a detrimental impact on the right to join and form trade unions, 
and the right to collective bargaining protected under both the CFREU and ECHR.  Whilst, as 
was argued in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, an application of Article 101 TFEU which gives adequate 
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weight to the relevant fundamental rights protected under EU law may be proportionate, any 
potential ‘chilling effect’ may devoid the right and objectives of their essence.   
Similarly, imposing fines on trade unions (and employers’ federations) alters the 
conclusion in Chapter 7; that where adequate weight is given to fundamental rights 
considerations (and the social policy objectives) any restriction would be proportionate.  In 
the context of the ECHR, the ECtHR in Demir held that the voiding of a collective agreement 
and the subsequent requirement to repay all gains from the agreement was a breach of the 
right to collective bargaining under Article 11 ECHR.  As Chapter 5 showed, the potential 
equivalence of protection given to trade union rights means that a similar conclusion would 
be reached under Article 28 CFREU. Where trade unions, and or individual members, are 
required to pay damages for their anti-competitive conduct, the restriction on the right to 
collective bargaining under Article 28 CFREU may be disproportionate. 
The Albany exemption avoids these issues.  It avoids the uncertainty and 
unpredictability of interpreting and applying EU competition law in a manner, which gives 
adequate weight to the competing objectives.  These concerns can also be seen were we to 
adopt the approaches set out in Wouters and Metro.  Although, the approaches in Wouters 
and Metro achieve the same formal outcome – collective agreements falling outside of Article 
101 TFEU following a balancing of the competing objectives and rights – the substantive 
outcome of the balancing exercise will differ on the same facts.  Additionally, adopting a case-
by-case balancing approach does not provide the same level of certainty and predictability 
provided by Albany.  Chapter 4’s discussion of the balancing exercise in Albany established 
this very point.  Albany’s exemption provides a level of certainty and predictability, which 
enables collective bargaining to occur, and provides an adequate level of protection for 
collective bargaining.  The approach in Albany also avoids individual value judgments being 
introduced to the balancing exercise, protecting both collective bargaining (and agreements) 
and EU competition law.  
  Fundamentally, removing or altering the Albany exemption would have significant 
detrimental effects, which will undermine any “true” balance achieved by adopting a more 
individualistic approach.  Although the discussion in this thesis has shown that the social 
policy objectives would not be undermined by the application of EU competition law, the 
uncertainty that the application of Article 101 TFEU would create necessitates the need for 
the general exemption Albany created.  
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